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## KIKUYU, CLERICAL VERACITY AND MIRACLES

Kikuyu, clerical veracity and miracles: it might seem that no three topics could bear less intrinsic relation to one another. In point of fact they are connected by very natural bonds, and it was inevitable that the controversy aroused by the publication of the Bishop of Zanzibar's open letter at the end of last year<sup>1</sup> should run rapidly through stages which raised successively the three issues of intercommunion, the sincerity of clerical engagements, and the supernatural origin of Christianity. The bomb-shell which Dr. Weston cast into the Anglican camp was thus like one of those fire-work bombs of Chinese concoction, which explode first into a serpent, out of which is at once extruded a noisome reptile, while from that in turn proceeds a fiery dragon. Each successive stage of the controversy cuts more deeply and uncovers more clearly the canker which lies at the root of much of our modern Church-life. The question raised in its first stage concerns only the limits of proper Christian communion; the issue in the second stage is just common honesty; while what is at stake in the third stage is the very existence of Christianity. The three issues are necessarily implicated in one another because they are only varying phases and interacting manifestations of

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<sup>1</sup>*Ecclesia Anglicana*. For what does she stand? An Open Letter to the Right Reverend Father in God, Edgar, Lord Bishop of St. Albans. By Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar. 1914. Some curious details as to the publication of this letter may be read in the Christmas (1913) number of *The Christian Warfare* (Talbot & Co.), the organ of the Catholic Literature Association.

the fundamental conflict, underlying them all, between faithfulness to the Christian deposit and that indifferentism which is the outcome of essential unbelief.

# I

The Bishop of Zanzibar was handicapped in dealing with the question of the limits of proper Christian communion by his position as a member of the Church of England, one of the numerous and not altogether unconflicting boasts of which lies in its extreme comprehensiveness. As a bishop receiving his orders from (he may himself perhaps prefer to say "through")<sup>2</sup> that Church and ruling over a section of it by its commission,<sup>3</sup> and as a Christian who has been bred in it and still shares its life, participating of necessity in all that that life means, he is himself living in the most intimate communion with many of far less clearness of Christian faith and profession than any of those with whom the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa communed on that now historic occasion in the Scotch Presbyterian Church at Kikuyu. In the amazing reversal of values which characterises the thought of extreme High Churchmen, he might indeed have taken refuge in the contention that episcopal organization is more fundamental to the Church's life than purity of Christian faith, so that where

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *The Case against Kikuyu*. A Study in Vital Principles. By Frank Weston, D.D., Bishop of Zanzibar, 1914, p. 40: "A Bishop sent from England to Africa goes out not as a Bishop of the English Church, but simply as a Catholic Bishop who owes his consecration to the Universal Episcopate represented to him by prelates of the Church of England": and what follows, in which he repudiates the duty of carrying into Africa the peculiarities, among the Catholic bodies, of the Church of England,—e.g. its comprehensiveness.

<sup>3</sup> His Open Letter itself and his appeal to the Archbishop of Canterbury surely carry with them the admission of that much as to the African sees. Cf. what Bishop Tucker said on this matter: "At present the missionaries of the C. M. S. working in East Africa, and their adherents, are members of the Church of England; they form the Church of England in East Africa" (quoted in *Steps towards Reunion*. A statement for the Consultative Committee. By the Right Rev. W. G. Peel, D.D., Bishop of Mombasa, and the Right Rev. J. J. Willis, D.D., Bishop of Uganda. 1914, p. 29.)

episcopacy is everything else may be tolerated. Mr. R. A. Knox seems to give us to understand that by many of his supporters at least—and there is no reason to suppose Dr. Weston to be in substantial disaccord with them<sup>4</sup>—any heresy whatever might be endured better than lack of episcopal orders: truths are only “enshrined by the Church,” it seems, while “episcopacy is integral and belongs to the essence of the Church itself.”<sup>5</sup> It may be supposed, however, that it is more embarrassing to contend at Zanzibar than in the Common Rooms at Oxford—at least without some counterbalancing action—that it is more important to induce Mussulmans and Fetish-worshippers to permit themselves to be episcopally organized than it is to bring them to the acceptance of the Gospel. At all events the Bishop of Zanzibar has felt compelled in protesting against what he deems the laxity of the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa in the matter of episcopacy, to protest also against the laxity of the Church of England in tolerating within its communion men who deny fundamental elements of the Christian faith. By so doing, he has not only guarded himself to some extent against the uncomfortable *tu quoque*, but has immensely strengthened his case. He appears not merely as the zealot of untenable episcopal pretensions,<sup>6</sup> but as the champion of the Christian religion.

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“The Church does not *accept* the Episcopate,” he remarks (*The Case against Kikuyu*, p. 56), “she cannot exist without it.”

<sup>4</sup> *The British Review*, February, 1914, p. 186.

<sup>5</sup> His own contention is expressed in the words: “So that ultimately we are compelled to admit Episcopacy to be the result of divine will and guidance; and, apart from modernist views, the purpose and wish of Christ Himself” (*The Case against Kikuyu*, p. 18). But even this is made out only (1) by confusing parochial (Presbyterian) and diocesan (Episcopalian) episcopacy, and then (2) invoking the amazing principle (p. 13): “For it is now positively agreed among Christian theologians that it is not possible to distinguish in effect between an immediate act of God, and an act performed by Him through the agency of the Christian Church”—that is to say what the Church does, God does; and hence whatever is established by the Church must be declared to have been established by God. On that principle it may be said that Episcopacy is “the purpose and wish of Christ”, for has it not been established by Christ’s Church? This mode of con-

We may regret—we do regret—that it has been left to High Churchmen in the Church of England, to come forward effectively in defense of these fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith. We may ask—we do ask—where are those Evangelicals who still boast that they constitute the core, or the larger portion, of the Church of England; and who, one would think, would have the greatest stake of all in the fundamentals of the faith and the warmest zeal of all for the preservation of them pure and whole for those who are to come after them—for what have they more than these? But it is a cause for rejoicing that in the prevailing apathy there are some who, even if it be merely because of the qualities of their very defects, raise a voice in defence of the well-nigh deserted cause of fundamental truth and demand greater faithfulness in preserving pure the deposit of the faith.<sup>7</sup> There surely is no one really awake to the demands of the present situation, not only in the Church of England but in all the churches, who

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ciliating the Divine Right of Episcopacy with its tardy origin in the Church is becoming quite common. An extreme instance of it,—on quite other grounds than those occupied by Dr. Weston—may be found in the argument of the Rev. J. H. Skrine, D.D., who knows that “authority derives from Church to office and not the other way”—that is to say that Bishops are the creations and representatives of the church—and who on that ground seems disposed to grant the validity of non-episcopal ministries, and yet who is able to make his own such language as this: “Briefly, we declare that the Order of Bishops is an integral part of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ” (*Eucharist and Bishop*, 1914, p. 21).

<sup>7</sup> We agree thoroughly with the opinion of Dean B. I. Bell (*The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1914, p. 95): “Better the bitter intolerance of those who believe too much and too strongly than the easy complaisance of those who believe too little, and hold that too lightly.” And there is truth in his remark that not only is (this so-called easy) “tolerance a destructive force” which is in danger of eradicating the very “capacity for constructive thought”, but that those who are condemned as “intolerant” are often so—as he expresses it—only because they are “seers not politicians”. Jesus Christ, he points out, certainly did not follow the methods of our modern campaigners for what they call “Church Unity”, among whom there is manifested a tremendous amount of good feeling and a clear assumption “that there is no such thing as objective religious truth”.



will not recognize the necessity of such a protestation as is embodied in the following words,<sup>8</sup> or who will withhold (apart from its sacerdotal coloring) his hearty sympathy from it.

"I submit to your Lordship that it is safer for us to do and say what God has commanded, rather than, being, moved thereto by an unbalanced desire for union, to falsify our witness and tamper with the message with which we have been entrusted.

Nor has He revealed to us that by the way of modifying revealed Truth to the taste of the modern world we shall lead the souls of men to Him. Rather has He bidden us uplift our voice in solid, corporate witness to the Faith delivered to the Church, leaving it to His wisdom and love to turn the modern mind to His sacramental presence in His Church.

For Modernism does not make men Christians in the accepted sense of the word, much less does it make them sons of the Holy Church of Christ. It is a new religion, and every soul attracted thereto means a new betrayal of the witness with which we are entrusted. It is easy enough to cast away the dogmas that hinder the modern mind from professing Christ, but if so be God requires of us, for the furtherance of His plans, a faithful witness to Revelation rather than an increasing roll of not very humble disciples, to what purpose is our self-appointed task?"

When Dr. Weston speaks here of "an unbalanced desire for union", he has of course in mind, among other manifestations of it, especially the proposed scheme of federation set forth in the resolutions of the Kikuyu Conference; and he may be supposed, accordingly, to be thinking, among other betrayals of the cause of truth which he thinks have been perpetrated in the cause of union, particularly of the betrayal of the cause of episcopacy of which he considers Drs. Willis and Peel to have been guilty in assenting to that scheme of federation. We regret to be compelled to understand that these Bishops have no intention whatever of "betraying" the cause of episcopacy; whatever value they attach to the union of the churches, they attach more value to episcopacy.<sup>9</sup> They stand flatly on the "Quadrilateral" of the Lambeth Conference of 1888 as the

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<sup>8</sup> *Ecclesia Anglicana*, p. 27.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Steps Towards Reunion*, pp. 7 and 28 ff.

irreducible basis of union,<sup>10</sup> and are held by it to a certain conservatism which makes the Kikuyu scheme conspicuous among such schemes for its moderation and its faithfulness to those Christian truths at least which are embodied in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. It even goes beyond this measure of faithfulness to fundamental Christian truth, to lay as the foundation-stone of its proposed federation an emphatic assertion of two of the key-doctrines of Christianity, the deity and atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ.<sup>11</sup> It is not merely Kikuyu, however, that Dr. Weston has in

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<sup>10</sup> They therefore themselves say truly (*Steps Towards Reunion*, p. 52): "The Kikuyu proposals represent an honest attempt to interpret what we believe to be the spirit and intention of the Lambeth Conference in regard to closer coöperation in the mission field." This is the strength and weakness of the Kikuyu scheme. Its strength, because thus a certain degree of conservatism is secured to it. Its weakness, because the fourth provision of the "Quadrilateral" makes episcopacy indispensable to reunion, and the second provision lays down an utterly inadequate doctrinal basis for a united church. The Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, though statements of certain essential elements of the Christian faith, are emphatically not "a sufficient statement of the Christian faith". The Kikuyu Conference did not find them such; and there are other elements of the Christian faith besides those it felt it necessary to add in more emphatic statement, which no Protestant should be willing to omit. If we are prepared to abandon all that has been gained by the Reformation for spiritual religion, why should we stick at the Pope?

<sup>11</sup> "The basis of Federation shall consist in (a) the loyal acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as our supreme rule of Faith and Practice; of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as a general expression of fundamental Christian belief; and in particular belief in the absolute authority of the Holy Scripture as the Word of God: in the Deity of Jesus Christ, and in the atoning death of our Lord as the ground of our forgiveness" (*The Kikuyu Conference. A Study in Christian Unity*, by J. J. Willis, Bishop of Uganda, 1914, p. 19). Bishops Peel and Willis explain (*Steps Towards Reunion*, p. 25) that "these clauses are not inserted as additions to the historic Creeds, but as emphasizing positions which were felt by some of the members of the Conference to be peculiarly in danger." This is a defence against the imputation that they did not treat the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds as (in accordance with the Lambeth declaration) "a sufficient statement of the Christian faith". For this Dr. Headlam, for instance, calls them sharply to task: he will have nothing but these two Creeds and he will have no "interpretations" of them (*The Church Quarterly Review*, January 1914, pp. 417 f.).



mind; and no thoughtful observer can doubt that the "unbalanced desire for union" which he cites to the bar of our judgment, constitutes one of the gravest, because one of the most insidious, dangers which confront the Churches of our day whether at home or on the mission-field. The crimes which have been and are being committed in the name of union rival in number and in greatness those which are said to be committed in the name of freedom. Nor has this "unbalanced desire for union" always even the excuse of drawing its impulse from a serious purpose, so as to be chargeable only with a faulty perspective; it sometimes seems to be the outcome of little more than thoughtlessness and lack of spiritual earnestness. A recent writer,—who is much of the same general way of thinking with Dr. Weston—even correlates it with nothing deeper than the so-called "practical" genius of Americans. We read:<sup>12</sup>

"The American nation is ever out for results. Its triumphs are in applied science. A new experiment is its joy. We are impatient of delay, of debate, of dependence upon any one. The problem of irreligion arises; let the religious bodies get together, and get busy. The plain man wants something he can understand. Why have rival businesses, when one can accommodate the trade? Sunday is neglected; let everyone go to church once on one Sunday, it matters not where. Fix the day, and we will all wear a button and go to church. Missions are right. They help civilization. But there is waste of money and men in the same fields. Business methods demand coöperation in the Mission Fields. Organize, advertise, unify, push things through. If objection should be taken that this is a very worldly proposition for attaining spiritual results, there are certainly many who would see no great harm in that, who conceive that the twentieth century demands a new version of Christianity, who claim that problems of faith have had their day, who would change now even our Lord's own test of discipleship. It is no longer 'Whom do ye say that I am?' but 'What do ye say that I am?' The Kingdom of Heaven must find its realization on earth. Social betterment is the Gospel. There is little wonder that reunion at any price for practical purposes is the temptation of the hour. And the method is—Coöperate that you may find unity. In practice this means that convictions of faith are kept for private edification. We are forced to act, when we get

<sup>12</sup> H. P. Bull, *The Constructive Quarterly*, September 1914, pp. 464f. Compare A. C. Headlam below, note 19.

together in spiritual affairs, on what are common beliefs, and the wider the circle of coöperation the narrower are the borders of common faith—until the Christian Creed is too broad to be taken in."

Extremes meet. As the zealot for episcopacy may be in danger of subordinating to the conservation of mere tactical succession, or of a mere provision of order, that saving truth for the perpetuation of which in the world alone episcopacy exists, so the zealot for union is in danger of sinking the claims of the truth for the safeguarding and propagating of which alone union is valuable, in the mere abstract fact of union itself. Union for union's sake is as starved and hunger-bitten a programme as episcopacy for episcopacy's sake: each alike sacrifices for what it believes the efficiency of the machine the very cause for which alone the machine is supposed to be useful. It may sound well to bewail the reproduction in the foreign field of the "unhappy divisions" by which the Church at home is rent. But the only thing clear about this complaint is the multitude of unhappy assumptions on which it is based. Every division (like every war) is of course "unhappy" when considered with reference to those who are in the wrong in it. But equally every division (like every war) is "happy" when looked at with reference to those who maintain the right by it,—who by it, let us say for example, preserve for themselves and for the world in which they are placed as the seed of the Kingdom, that purity of faith and life, from which alone the Kingdom of God can be propagated. Where the seed is not pure, what shall the harvest be? Obviously the only justifiable way in which our "unhappy divisions" can be healed is by the abandonment of their error on the part of those whose error necessitates them. To attempt to heal them by abandoning the truth to which their existence is the outstanding witness, or to mitigate them by ceasing to insist upon this truth, or to cover them up by the suppression of at least all corporate testimony to it in some sort of an amalgam of truth and error, involves the fearful guilt of unfaithfulness to the Gospel with

which we have been put in charge, as the one saving force in the world.

The "unhappy divisions" by which Reformed Protestants for example are separated from their brethren of other communions are just the external marks and therefore the public witnesses of the purity of the Gospel in which they trust and for the preservation and propagation of which in the world they exist as organized communities. Their brethren in other communions—the existence of which bears witness to other convictions—they have no difficulty in heartily recognizing as Christian brethren, though in error,—oftentimes no doubt serious and in itself considered deadly error; and they have no difficulty in heartily co-operating with them in the whole range of Christian work, so long as thereby their own particular testimony to the purer Gospel which in God's providence they have been enabled to preserve, is neither abandoned, nor truncated, nor diluted, nor obscured. These "divisions" mean to them just the Gospel; the Gospel that has been maintained by them in this its purity only through struggle and strife, tears, and yes, blood, during two thousand years of Christian history. They cannot undo this history; nor can they in these latter days cast lightly off from them the heritage of divine truth of which through this history they have come to be the guardians in the world. This heritage they must preserve at all costs; and at all costs they must transmit it pure and whole to those, whether at home or abroad, to whom it is given to them to convey the Gospel. They owe the heathen the Gospel; the Gospel in its entirety and in its purity; not a diluted Gospel, nor a truncated Gospel, nor a distorted Gospel, as if a diluted, or a truncated, or a distorted Gospel were good enough for heathen. And they owe them this Gospel as it has been clarified, and compacted, and guarded, and given its most vital and perfect statement, after two thousand years of study and thought and experience and controversy, that the new churches growing up under their care in fresh lands may be saved from the er-

rors of the past and protected from the necessity of fighting on their own ground all the old battles over again—as they inevitably will be compelled to do, if we withhold from them the results of the controversies of the past. Being possessed of the pure Gospel, we dare not either for ourselves or for them consent to its adulteration. After all, what is required of stewards is first of all that they be found faithful.

O but, it will be said, the waste and the scandal of our “divided front” in the face of the heathen world! No doubt there is both waste and scandal in our divided front. All Christians should be one; because all Christians should hold fast in its completeness the Gospel in its purity. But the guilt of this waste and scandal must rest where it belongs,—on the shoulders of those whose attenuation or corruption of the Gospel necessitates the divisions by which alone the pure Gospel can be maintained in the world. They cannot justify the abandonment of the pure Gospel that we may present to the heathen world in undivided front a depraved and contaminated, and therefore weak and ineffective Gospel. Meanwhile we may console ourselves with the reflection that it is easy to exaggerate both the waste and the scandal of a “divided front” in the face of the heathen world. We are not referring here again to the fundamental truth—which nevertheless we are bound to bear above all things in mind—that there is a gathering which is really a scattering abroad. Our minds too are moving for the moment on the plane of good policy, and we are bringing into question the bald utility of what is called our “undivided front”. If there is something imposing in an “undivided front”, which may seem to promise results, there is something to be expected also from generous emulation and variety of appeal.<sup>13</sup> It is greatly to be doubted,

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<sup>13</sup> Uganda is often adduced as a proof of the value of having but a single church in a field (so e.g. Eugene Stock, *The Church in the Mission Field*, p. 7). It may perhaps be worth while to note therefore Dr. Willis' testimony that in Uganda the converts of purest life are not found in the sections in which there exists no other but the Church of England and this one church has become therefore powerful and

at all events, whether such an "undivided front" as could be given to Christianity by sinking essential differences and covering over suppressed divergences of the utmost importance, in an indistinguishable mass of apparent sameness, could be more effective in winning the heathen to the common Christianity than the frank exploitation by each type of belief and organization of its own particular message. Certainly the heathen may be trusted,—none can be more fully trusted,—to feel the gulf which separates a Christian of any type from the heathen around him, and to class solidly together in their thought all Christians of all types as a people apart. The differences that divide Christians, in the heathen apprehension as truly and as spontaneously as in that of the Christians themselves, divide Christians. The essential unity is not lost in the superimposed variety, and the "front" amid all divisions remains for all spiritual ends undivided.

Those who have read with attention any considerable portion of the immense correspondence in the British newspapers, which was called out by the Kikuyu incident, will not have failed to note a number of testimonies from actual observers on the ground to both facts here adverted to—the positive value of what we may call "competition" in mission work also, and the full recognition by the heathen of the solidarity of the whole Christian body despite its more superficial divisions. We are glad to observe that the promoters of the Kikuyu Federation exhibit no tendency to minimize the reality of this solidarity or its ready recognition by the heathen. Dr. Willis himself, in defending before his Anglican brethren (that such a defence should be thought necessary betrays the real point of weakness and scandal in our "unhappy divisions"), his recognition as fellow Christians of the converts of other churches, throws the whole weight of his defence on the fact that the Mission Authorities are after all helpless in the matter—apart from

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"the fashion"; but in those in which the Protestant Christians are a minority in a Roman Catholic community. (*The Church in Uganda. A Charge to Missionaries of the Uganda Mission, 1913; 1914, p. 18.*)



any decision of the Authorities, the mission converts will recognize their Christian brethren on sight. He testifies:<sup>14</sup>

"No one who has lived in direct touch with African heathenism and knows the profound gap that lies between even the primitive and often most imperfect native Christian and his heathen brother can doubt for a moment on which side of the gap the convert from another Mission is standing. And even were he himself to hesitate, his own converts, to whom the 'Communion of Saints' is still a vivid reality, would be quick to recognize through all outward differences a Christian and a brother."

Similarly the well-informed writer of that one of the "Kikuyu Tracts" which deals with the question of comity in the mission field, bears testimony at once to the ready understanding by the heathen of the essential unity of Christians of all names and the strong sense of solidarity existing among the converts themselves. He writes:<sup>15</sup>

"Non-Christians, and especially Muslims and Hindus, are quite familiar with varieties within their own borders which in no way interfere with fundamental unity, nor are ever regarded as essentially contrary to one another. . . . All outsiders probably, Chinese and Japanese as well as Muslims and Hindus, are quite able to appreciate true Unity underlying superficial variety."

And as to the insiders:<sup>16</sup>

"One of the most refreshing glimpses of real Catholicity is the way in which converts will warmly welcome as brethren all who own Christ as Lord, be they Romanists or Plymouth Brethren. They look aghast and astonished sometimes at petty ecclesiastical rules which seek to pen them off from one another."

Things being so on the mission field, we need not be in haste to deny the faith that we may abate "the weakness and scandal of our divided front." Apparently the strong impulse to ill-considered schemes of union of essentially discordant churches on mission ground flows from some other spring than concern for the purely spiritual life of the converts.

<sup>14</sup> *The Kikuyu Conference*, p. 11.

<sup>15</sup> *Comity on the Mission Field*. By the Rev. H. G. Grey, M.A., Principal of Wycliff Hall, Oxford, Formerly Principal of St. John's College, Lahore, India, 1914, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> P. 7.



We may endure with patience accordingly even those divisions of the forces operating in the mission field which have as little reason behind them as that produced by the pretensions of Anglican prelacy. Dr. Willis and Principal Grey alike being witness, these pretensions on the part of Anglican missionaries do not prevent brotherly intercourse among the converts. They do not even introduce any new factor to be reckoned with on the field. Protestant missions are in any event faced everywhere by Romanist missions making the same exclusive claims. If Protestant missions can adjust themselves to the conditions created by the presence of the Romanists, they are already adjusted to any problem raised by Romanizers: Anglicans and Romanists will only be classed in the public mind together, as over against Protestants. Should the Anglican authorities, on the appeal of the Bishop of Zanzibar, therefore,—as they possibly may under the dominating (we had almost said, domineering) influence of the High Church section of the clergy—choose “the policy of isolation” deprecated by Professor A. C. Headlam<sup>17</sup> and close the way to such an adjustment as that which the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa propose to make; this is to be regretted chiefly for the sake of the Church of England itself and the missions she has so splendidly sustained, which, we are given to understand, would find it difficult in such conditions permanently to retain their own converts.<sup>18</sup> No increased difficulties would be brought to other missions which have it in their hearts only to make disciples of all the nations.

It is a pity, however, to permit the mind when engaged

<sup>17</sup> *The Church Quarterly Review*, January 1914, p. 406.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Eugene Stock, *The Church in the Mission Field*, 1914, p. 8. At one point Bishops Peel and Willis postpone the loss thus (*Steps Towards Reunion*, p. 52): “There may not be an immediate danger of losing our present converts; but there will be a very great danger of losing their children.” They quote (p. 36) with strong approval the Rev. W. Chadwick’s opinion: “If we hold ourselves aloof from other Churches we shall be left in a hopeless minority,—we not only lose power for the whole cause of Christ in the face of Mohammedanism, but we shall be ignored when in the future a native Church of East Africa is formed.”

on such things, to dwell even temporarily upon questions of mere policy. It ought to be a matter of course that no considerations of policy can determine action where principles are so deeply involved. It may be intelligible that the members of native churches themselves,—and especially the leaders among native Christians—should be attracted by the alluring vision of strong national churches; it is very natural that the advantages, political, social and other, which would accrue to such relatively great bodies, should blind them for the moment to the nature of the spiritual compromises by which alone they may ordinarily be attained. It is even intelligible that many missionaries themselves, weary of the difficulties which clog the work in small, isolated communities, or worn by the frictions which unavoidably attend the divisions of interest among several separate, however cordially sympathetic, communions, may be swept along by the current setting so strongly towards consolidation. No doubt there are gains, obvious and large, which may be secured by the smelting of all the churches in an area into one. But there is a price to pay; and what is wholly unintelligible is that the Missionary Agencies at home and the churches they serve, which might be supposed to look out upon the field from a more elevated standpoint, should show themselves so frequently ready to pay the price—which not rarely includes desertion or compromising of the very Gospel for the propagation of which in the world they exist.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Cf. A. C. Headlam (*Church Quarterly Review*, January 1914, p. 408) commenting on the reports printed in *The Continuation Committee Conferences in Asia, 1912-1913*, writes: "There is a danger which sometimes comes to the surface as we read these reports that a conception of religious unity might prevail which would take the form of what we might call a 'successful commercial combine'. Christianity, it is argued, is weakened by the isolation and separation of the different religious bodies: there is universal competition: let us therefore unite. Here lies a serious danger. There is as great danger in such union as there is in an insincere political combination of religious bodies. All such proposals forget that the basis of religion is truth, that any combination which is to be sincere and permanent must have a basis that is recognized as true, and that religious truth can only be gained by earnest prayer and study."

Nothing could afford a more startling revelation of the wide-spread indifference to the most central and most precious Christian verities than the disposition manifested in many quarters to look upon the slender doctrinal basis laid down in the Lambeth "Quadrilateral"—the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds—as a sufficient sum of Christian doctrine on which to found a church's confession and a church's life. This is to blot out at a stroke sixteen hundred fruitful years of the church's thinking and the church's living, and to begin afresh with the veritable *incunabula*. The entire body of saving truth, won once for all for God's saints of every clime and blood in the throes of the great controversies of a millenium and a half,—we need instance only those with the naturalism of Pelagianism and its successors, and with the sacerdotalism of Rome and its imitators (they center around the doctrines of Free-Grace and Justification by Faith)—have no place in the meagre teachings of these cradle-Creeds. And yet even these Creeds are often treated as providing too extended a doctrinal basis to be insisted upon; and unions of churches are proposed upon an even narrower foundation of doctrine than that they lay down. Certainly nothing could be more disheartening than the constant manifestation, in the negotiations for bringing the several churches in the mission field into some sort of amalgamation, that men set more store by petty points of ecclesiastical order or practice than by the most fundamental or most central truths of the Christian revelation. The Gospel will be cheerfully given up that they may "become One"—one what?—but not a peculiarity of organization or a customary method of administering a sacrament. Men will readily fraternize on equal terms with those who deny the deity of Christ, or His substitutive atonement, or justification by faith, but not with those who differ with them as to the qualifications for the ministrant of the eucharist or the proper mode of applying the water in baptism. A very good example is offered by the "South India United

Church," as it is described at least by Mr. B. M. Streeter.<sup>20</sup> The churches "founded by five British and American Missions of different denominations," we are told, have entered into this union, and "some other bodies are contemplating entering" it. "Three Churches, however, felt precluded from participation, by what they regard as points of principle." What are these "points of principle?"

"The Anglicans stand outside, because they—or at least one important section of them, whose opinions the rest cannot disregard—believe that an episcopally ordained ministry is necessary for the regular administration of the Lord's Supper. The Lutherans stand out, because they hold that a correct belief about the nature of the Elements administered, i.e., the doctrine known as Consubstantiation is equally essential. The so-called 'close' Baptists stand out, on the ground that Baptism, other than that of adults, and that by complete immersion, is invalid."

Has anyone felt precluded from participation in the union because of the exceeding defectiveness of its Confession of Faith—a Confession of Faith which knows the Trinity only as a "mystery" not expressly affirmed to be true,<sup>21</sup> the Incarnation only as it might know a supreme *avatar*,<sup>22</sup> sin only as a repeated act of man, not as a fault of nature,<sup>23</sup> redemption only as some vague "way of salvation" established by Christ with no affirmation either of a substitutive atonement or of justification by faith? So far as appears, not one.

Phenomena like this are not accidental. They are intrinsic to an "unbalanced desire for union", and are inevitable wherever this "unbalanced desire for union" has its way. In the very nature of the case bodies can unite only on the basis of the minimum of truth held among them. That body which confesses the least of truth held by any of the contracting bodies, necessarily sets the maxi-

<sup>20</sup> *Restatement and Reunion. A Study in First Principles.* 1914, pp. 157 ff.

<sup>21</sup> "We believe in one God. . . . We acknowledge the mystery of the Holy Trinity."

<sup>22</sup> "His only-begotten Son, who alone is the perfect incarnation of God."

<sup>23</sup> "We acknowledge that all have sinned."

mum of truth which can be confessed by them all. Otherwise that body would be excluded from the union. The inevitable result is that the Union-Churches being, or in danger of being, erected in the mission fields are being systematically organized on the basis of the least doctrinal profession made by any church doing work in the several missions; sometimes they even appear to seek an even lower doctrinal basis than is actually professed by any one of the contracting parties,—apparently to meet the demands of “undogmatic” individuals in the missions, to prepare the way for the “liberal” era supposed to be dawning, or to refrain from binding the “poor, ignorant natives” to too much truth. Any one who does not see that thus a great wrong is being done to the native churches; that what is really being done is to found a series of new sects in mission lands organized on the very lowest plane of profession and therefore of life—for life always follows doctrine and can no more rise above it than a stream above its source—known in Christendom, must be blind indeed. When we contemplate what we do not say may be, but, in the natural development of effects, must be, the ultimate result of this, we are tempted to address our zealous advocates in the mission fields of union at all costs, in some such words as those which Charles Kingsley places on the lips of his Raphael, as he bowed himself out from the presence of Cyril of Alexandria,—of course *mutatis mutandis*, and of course including the offensive phraseology in the final clause in the *mutanda*:—“I advise you honestly to take care lest, while you are only trying to establish God’s kingdom you forget what it is like, by shutting your eyes to those of its laws which are established already. I have no doubt that with your Highness’ great powers, you will succeed in establishing something. My only dread is, that when it is established you should discover that it is . . . not God’s Kingdom.” It is at least beyond controversy that no church can be great in the only sense of greatness which matters with churches,—great before God,—which lays its



foundations in contempt for God's truth given for the healing of the nations.<sup>24</sup>

## II

We have supposed that the Bishop of Zanzibar, as a member and prelate of the exceedingly "comprehensive" Church of England, must have felt some embarrassment in arraigning the Bishops of Uganda and Mombasa for their readiness to fraternize with Christians of non-prelatical communions. We must suppose him to have felt an even greater embarrassment as a "Catholic" member of the Protestant Church of England, in denying to any of his fellow-members of that church an equal right with himself to its spacious toleration. That the "Modernists" as they are more and more coming to be called—they used to be called "Liberals"—the legitimacy of whose position in the church of England he challenges, hold their position in it only by doing incredible violence to the formularies by which, as members of that church, they are bound, is obvious enough. But the attempt to deny them the privilege of doing these formularies this violence comes with little grace from the adherents of that Romanizing party which has established its own right to a place in the church—it seems to have ended by becoming the ruling place—by doing equal violence to them in another interest. You may play fast with formularies; or you may play loose with them; in the interests of ordinary honesty we think it better that you should play fast with them. But it seems particularly indecorous to undertake to play both fast and loose with them—fast with them as regards others, loose with them as regards yourself.

We are meanwhile entirely in sympathy with Dr. Weston

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<sup>24</sup> It is quite clear on the face of it, and among reasonable men it is commonly recognized, that all useful coöperation presupposes real agreement in faith. We must be one before we can usefully act as one. Nothing is more hopeless than to attempt to make a false unity serve the purposes of a true one,—to agree to differ and yet to function as not differing. We might as well try to make a hive by imprisoning together in a box bees belonging to different swarms.



in his contention not only that the presence of the so-called Modernists in the Church of England gravely weakens that church as a teacher of Christianity, and that not least in the mission field;<sup>25</sup> but that their presence in it is in itself intolerable. His remedy for the evil is the direct one of calling upon the church to move in its judicial authority and cleanse itself from heresy. "The *Ecclesia Anglicana*," he declares,<sup>26</sup> "needs at once to choose between the liberty of heresy and the duty of handing on the faith as she received it. She cannot have the one while she fulfils the other. And the sooner she chooses the better for her, the heathen and the Moslem." We are in as complete sympathy with him with respect to the remedy which should be applied as with respect to the nature of the evil requiring it. The chief of Dr. Weston's supporters in the home Episcopate, Dr. Gore, however, while fully agreeing with him as to the seriousness of the evil, appears nevertheless not to be able to go the whole way with him with respect to the remedy which should be applied. If we understand Dr. Gore, he would deprecate any attempt on the part of the church to extrude the Modernists by judicial proceedings. He would be satisfied with a declaration by "the bishops, as the official guardians of the Church" repudiating all complicity with their claim to a legitimate place in the church, and the relegation of their actual separation from the church to their own consciences. "Let us continue," he says,<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Dr. Weston feels very strongly on this matter and permits himself the use of somewhat biting language in speaking of it, likening so "comprehensive" a body as the Church of England to "a Society for shirking vital issues" (*Ecclesia Anglicana*, p. 10), and expressing serious doubt whether it is not thereby rendered entirely "unfit to send missionaries to heathen or Mohammedan lands" (p. 7). "I can speak only for what I see and know," he remarks (p. 14); "and speaking for this Mohammedan land, I do not hesitate to say that a Church that has two views in its highest ranks about the trustworthiness of the Bible, the authority of the Church, and the infallibility of the Christ, has surrendered its chance of winning the Moslem."

<sup>26</sup> *Ecclesia Anglicana*, p. 15.

<sup>27</sup> *The Basis of Anglican Fellowship in Faith and Organization*. Fourth Impression. 1914, p. 26.

"to leave the individual members of our ministry to their own consciences." Of course not neglecting to prod their consciences with very distinct and strong intimations that in the opinion of many of their fellow-Churchmen, they have, like the Jesuit casuists whom Pascal scourged in the *Provincial Letters*, been "led on, in a special atmosphere, to adopt a position and maintain a claim which, looked at in the light of common morality, proves utterly unjustifiable."<sup>28</sup> For, even if we put it on this low ground, how can it be denied that "the officer of a society who finds himself unhappily brought to a conclusion the opposite of some fundamental principle of his society, is bound to resign his office?" Is not this—so far from "a violation of liberty"—just "common conscientiousness"?<sup>29</sup>

This reasoning is undoubtedly sound. But it is futile to expect it to have more effect in this case than in other similar cases, as for example in the case of Dr. Gore himself and other adherents of the "Catholic" party. The Episcopal declaration which Dr. Gore asked for has, in response to numerous signed petitions, been given,<sup>30</sup> and all things

<sup>28</sup> P. 25.

<sup>29</sup> P. 16. The Bishop of Ely (Dr. Chase), in the preface which he has prepared for the reprint of his essay on *The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism*, 1914, joins Dr. Gore in urging the Liberal clergyman who "has been led by his studies to deny portions of the historic creed of the church", to consider "whether he is not sacrificing his intellectual honesty, whether he is acting fairly towards its members, if he seeks to maintain his position as an accredited teacher in the Church." He seems more ready than Dr. Gore, however, to have the Bishop act authoritatively in the matter "in the last resort".

<sup>30</sup> In response to several petitions (one of which contained almost 50,000 signatures) and on the motion of the Bishop of London, the Upper House of Canterbury Convocation, April 29, 30, 1914, debated and adopted certain anti-modernist resolutions (*The Guardian*, April 30, 1914, p. 569). These began by reaffirming two earlier deliverances. The former of these was a resolution passed by the same House, May 10, 1905, as follows: "That this House is resolved to maintain the Catholic Faith in the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation as contained in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, and in the *Quicumque Vult*, and regards the faith there presented, both in statements of doctrines and statements of fact, as the necessary basis on which the teaching of the Church reposes." The latter of them was a resolu-

remain as they were before. Why should men who are able to reconcile it with their consciences to accept office under the condition of assent to formularies which they do not believe, and to prosecute the functions of their office under the condition of reservations with respect to declarations which they publicly recite at every service, be driven from office by the *brutum fulmen* of an episcopal pronouncement?<sup>31</sup> Not all men look upon Bishops and their deliverances with the reverence which their High-Church principles presumably impose upon Dr. Gore and his friends. And why should men subject their consciences to the instruction of moral teachers who have not seen fit to illustrate their counsels by their own example? Shall they not remember not merely *Tract Number Ninety* but *Lux Mundi*? Or if their memory is too short for that, shall they not attend to Dr. Gore's remarks in this very pamphlet on the Old Testament and recall his solemn affirmative to the question put to him when he was ordained deacon: "Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?"—a question which he tells us the Bishops have determined to qualify "if they can",<sup>32</sup>—from which we learn that it remains as yet unqualified. Dr. Gore, it is true, challenges "any one to show at what point I fail in orthodoxy as judged by our standard, the standard which I have already endeavored to state, the standard, that is, of the ancient and undivided Church, as

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tion agreed to by the Lambeth Conference of 1898, as follows: "The Conference, in view of tendencies widely shown in the writings of the present day, hereby places on record its conviction that the historical facts stated in the Creeds are an essential part of the faith of the Church." These resolutions having been reaffirmed Convocation proceeded to guard itself from the imputation that it condemns legitimate scholarship, and reasserts the Episcopal organization of the Church of England. In its leader of May 7, *The Guardian* expresses approval of this action.

<sup>31</sup> It is not surprising, then, to observe Mr. J. M. Thompson writing of Dr. Gore's proposal (*Contemporary Review*, June 1914, p. 827) that such a declaration as he desires "would be futile, unless followed up by legal proceedings against recalcitrant Liberals."

<sup>32</sup> *The Basis*, etc., p. 18.

interpreted by the message of the Bible."<sup>33</sup> But is there not manifested here a certain lack of a sense of humor? It would be hard if Dr. Gore could not escape the charge of heresy, were he permitted thus to adapt the standard he will be judged by to his own opinions. But by any standard hitherto in force in the Church of England—or, for the matter of that, in any of the great churches of Christendom—he could scarcely be so fortunate. Meanwhile his personal appeal to men to act conscientiously with regard to their ecclesiastical engagements suffers fatally from the inevitable *tu quoque*.

The only effect of the demand that Liberal clergymen shall voluntarily withdraw from the church in the interests of their sincerity has been accordingly to call out angry refusals which, perhaps not wholly unnaturally, manifest resentment at the imputations of dishonesty made and a disposition to maintain their position in the church at all hazards. Mr. J. M. Thompson, for example, cries:<sup>34</sup>

"The Church can always withdraw the commission which it has given; why should it expect the individual voluntarily to surrender it? Why should the clergyman who is not allowed to put his own interpretation upon the formularies when he is admitted to the Ministry, be invited to do so as a ground for leaving it? For that is what is involved in the claim that he should resign. The Church will not, or cannot, make good such an interpretation of its formularies as would justify deprivation by law—it dares not proceed against the Liberal clergyman as a heretic. It therefore asks him solemnly to consider whether his interpretation of the Creed is not heretical, and, if he thinks that it is, to resign. If this is a cowardly method, it also is a cruel one, for it lays a double burden upon the individual conscience. The man in the dock may fairly say, 'If you can prove that I have committed a murder, you have every right to hang me; but you have no right whatever, when your case breaks down, to ask me to commit suicide.'"

<sup>33</sup> P. 21.

<sup>34</sup> *The Contemporary Review*, June 1914, p. 829. Mr. Thompson has now passed beyond Liberalism and Modernism and has become a "Post-Modernist", and he tells us that "the Post-Modernist, like the Modernist, holds with the traditional beliefs so long as he can, and stays in the society so long as it will let him" (*The Hibbert Journal*, July 1914, p. 742).

It is obviously useless to appeal to a man in this state of mind on purely ethical grounds. He entrenches himself behind bare law and refuses to admit that conscience need be sensitive to any demand which the sheriff cannot enforce. "He is happy in his work, and believes that there is room for him as well as for others within a modern and progressive Church."<sup>35</sup> As to the formularies,—nobody really believes them anyhow, that is, through and through; and when each disbelieves them somewhere no one has the right to assail the sincerity of another because his disbelief happens to fall at a different place from his own.

"How many of us nowadays accept the descent into Hell, the resurrection of the body, or the coming of Christ to judge the quick and the dead, in the sense in which these beliefs were held by the men who composed the Creeds, or by many subsequent generations of Christians? Do the clergy? Does the Bishop of Ely? If he does not, how does his position differ from that of the clergy whose 'sincerity of confession' he is not afraid to doubt? By what right can the bishops enforce the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed and criticise the Athanasian? By what rule other than that of private preference can they condone the non-literal interpretation of one clause, and condemn that of another? By what infallible instinct, or by what appeal to authority, can they decide that one man's re-interpretation of the Creed is an allowable latitude of doctrine, and another man's is heresy; that there is no place for A in the ministry but that B may be a bishop? These questions are not asked impatiently or with any intention to attribute dishonesty where certainly none is to be found. But they are pertinent to the present situation. And unless there is some better answer to them than has as yet been forthcoming, the Liberal clergyman may well feel that he has as much right to remain in the ministry as others whose orthodoxy is above suspicion."<sup>36</sup>

It must be allowed that as *ad hominem* reasoning this is very effective. The retort, "You are another!", though perhaps not uncommon among a certain class of disputants, seems, however, scarcely a satisfactory proof that we are not ourselves one; it appears on the contrary to begin by admitting that we are one. The conclusion of the reasoning

<sup>35</sup> P. 830; cf. p. 833: "So long as they are happy in their work, and do not want to give it up, why should they sacrifice their whole ministry to an intellectual difficulty?"

<sup>36</sup> P. 831.



would seem to be, therefore,—if we are to take it at its face value,—not that there is no insincerity in the relation of the Liberal clergy to the formularies of the Church of England, but that there is no sincerity in the relation of any of the clergy of the Church of England to its formularies: that sincerity in clerical assent to formularies has absolutely died out in the Church of England. Worse: that there is no such thing as sincerity to be considered in the matter of assent to formularies; any man is justified in assenting to any formulary whatever and then teaching anything whatever that he happens to wish to teach—"within a modern and progressive Church." Apparently Mr. Thompson's argument proves too much: he would have done more justice to himself had he confined himself to the question raised,—namely the ethics of his own position,—and not gone off on the, perhaps not unnatural, tangent, of, My position is ethically as good as your position. It might well be that, and yet ethically bad.

The classical discussion of the ethics of clerical assent to formularies probably remains that carried on now nearly a score of years ago between the late Professor Henry Sidgwick and Mr. (now Dr.) Hastings Rashdall, the latter of whom has also given us a later summary of his views on the subject.<sup>37</sup> Dr. Gore does well pointedly to call attention

<sup>37</sup> Professor Sidgwick printed a lecture on "The Ethics of Religious Conformity" in *The International Journal of Ethics* for April, 1896. To this Dr. Rashdall replied in the number of the same *Journal* for January 1897, under the title of "Professor Sidgwick on the Ethics of Religious Conformity." Professor Sidgwick's response to this was printed as the sixth number in his volume on *Practical Ethics*, 1898, under the title of "Clerical Veracity" (his former lecture is reprinted as the fifth number in the same volume). Dr. Rashdall has also printed a discussion of "Clerical Liberalism" as the fifth number in the twenty-fourth volume of the *Crown Theological Library*, entitled "*Anglican Liberalism* by Twelve Churchmen." 1908. Cf. here also the article "Criminous Clerks" in *The Hibbert Journal* for July 1914, pp. 746 ff. by Archibald Weir: Mr. Weir thinks that Professor Sidgwick was too tender to "criminous clerks" because he took too narrow a view and thought of thier treason less as it concerned the race than as it concerned an institution. "Hence the modern mind (the expression is Sidgwick's) has no sympathy with either a lax lukewarm Church or



to Professor Sidgwick's strong argument,<sup>38</sup> as offering helpful guidance to an inquirer in this field. His opinions are particularly commended to us moreover by the circumstance that they at least are supported by his action; he resigned a Fellowship that he might not express acceptance of views which he did not really hold. He writes, however, from the Hedonistic Utilitarian point of view; though it is particularly worthy of remark that even from that low standpoint he is compelled in the name of general ethical science to condemn the practice of those who, as Dr. Rashdall expresses it, "are anxious to maintain the comprehensiveness of the Church of England by a liberal interpretation of its formulae."<sup>39</sup> What his judgment would have been had he been able to approach the matter from the standpoint of a higher ethical principle we can easily imagine; it is indeed openly suggested to us by Dr. Rashdall himself (himself a Utilitarian of less Hedonistic type) when he complains that the opinions which Professor Sidgwick announces are "almost what might have been expected from a Kantian rigorist." The question of the legitimacy of such an unnatural acceptance of formularies as is practiced by the Liberal clergy of the Church of England resolves itself thus primarily into the question of the validity of the principles of Utilitarian Ethics: to any higher ethical standpoint this practice confessedly is morally wrong.

with men who distract it by occupying positions in it while repudiating fundamental tenets. It regards them as it would regard any other defaulting officers in any other lethargic corporation. If it cared to give the delinquents a distinctive name, it would not trouble to invent a new term. It would adopt the old historical phrase which serves as our title. . . . We declare that veracity and integrity are principles whose strict interpretation and maintenance must take precedence of any convenience that laxity may be fancied to bring to a Church or a communion; and we find our moral position all the stronger. In a word, we have arrived at a stage when no conceivable advantage to religious teaching and organization can be allowed to legitimise any sort of debasement of the moral currency" (pp. 747-9). If this be really the sentiment of "the modern mind" then the modern and ancient minds have become one and Utilitarian and "Rigorist" Ethics have kissed one another.

<sup>38</sup> *The Basis*, etc., p. II.

<sup>39</sup> *The International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897, p. 138.

To those occupying higher ethical ground than the Utilitarian, therefore, the value of Professor Sidgwick's argument is purely *ad hominem*. It shows, and we think shows solidly, that even on the low principles of Hedonistic Utilitarianism the loose practice of the Liberal clergy cannot be ethically justified. After allowing a laxity which to us seems excessive even on the ground of his own ethical principles, he is yet compelled to sum up in such words as these:<sup>40</sup>

"My contention is simply that the widest license of variation that can be reasonably claimed must stop short of the permission to utter a hard, flat, unmistakable falsehood; and this is what a clergyman does who says solemnly—in the recital of the Apostles' Creed—'I believe in Jesus Christ . . . who was conceived of the Virgin Mary', when he really believes that Jesus was, like other human beings, the son of two human parents. He utters of course a similar falsehood in affirming the belief that Jesus 'on the third day rose from the dead' when he does not believe that Jesus had a continued life as an individual after death, and a life in some sense corporeal. . . ."

He is willing to allow to Dr. Rashdall that there are important considerations which may justly be urged against "a pedantic insistence on what he calls 'technical veracity' in dealing with formulae presented for assent or repetition," but—he continues:<sup>41</sup>

"My contention is that instead of stating and applying these considerations with the care and delicacy of distinction required for helpfulness, so as to show how the essence of veracity may be realized under peculiar and somewhat perplexing conditions, he rather uses them to suggest the despairing and demoralizing conclusion that no clergyman can possibly speak the truth in the sense in which a plain layman understands truth-speaking; so that any clergyman may lie without scruple in the cause of religious progress with a view to aiding popular education in a new theology and still feel that he is as veracious as his profession allows him to be. Or perhaps I should rather say that Mr. Rashdall's conception of substantial veracity is what grammarians call *proleptic*; the duty of truth-speaking is, he thinks, adequately performed by a Postnatalist<sup>42</sup> if he may reasonably hope that

<sup>40</sup> *Practical Ethics*, p. 146.

<sup>41</sup> P. 155.

<sup>42</sup> This is the term Professor Sidgwick employs to express one who holds that Jesus was the Son of Joseph and Mary.

the falsehood he now utters will before long cease to deceive through the spread of a common understanding that he does not mean what he says."

He had already been led to warn his readers against the dangers of this proleptic morality. He remarks:<sup>43</sup>

"It is very difficult for men in any political or social discussion to keep the ideal quite distinct from the actual and not sometimes to prescribe present conduct on grounds which would only be valid if a distant and dubious change of circumstances were really certain and imminent. It is peculiarly difficult to do this in discussing the conditions of religious union; for in theological matters an ardent believer, especially if his beliefs are self-chosen and not inherited, is peculiarly prone to think that the whole world is on the point of coming round to his opinions. And hence the religious persons who, by the divergence of their opinions from the orthodox standard of their church, have been practically led to consider the subject of this lecture, have often been firmly convinced that the limits of their church must necessarily be enlarged at least sufficiently to include themselves; and have rather considered the method of bringing about this enlargement, than what ought to be done until it is effected."

The truth of this representation and the remarkable reasoning to which the attitude described leads, are abundantly illustrated in the course of Dr. Rashdall's argument. As a whole this turns as on a hinge on two prodigious paradoxes. The first is that since "words must be understood to mean what they are generally taken to mean", so soon as all can be brought to agree to sign a formulary in a non-natural sense, that becomes its true sense—though obviously this process of change can be inaugurated only by some signing the formulary in a sense contrary to that which the words are generally taken to mean, and these must accordingly endure the reproach of insincerity for the coming good.<sup>44</sup> The second is that, since unscrupulous signing of a formulary is an evil, we must put aside any scruples we may feel in signing it, not believing it, that thus a new sense may gradually be given it and so unscrupulous signing of it may be prevented. We are not car-

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<sup>43</sup> P. 121.

<sup>44</sup> Pp. 143-4.

icaturing but reporting Dr. Rashdall's reasoning. He cites at one point in illustration the Thirteenth of the Thirty-nine Articles, on works done by the unregenerate. This Article asserts that such works have the nature of sin. Nobody believes that, says Dr. Rashdall, or even thinks that he believes it. On that very account anybody can subscribe it. His subscribing it really deceives nobody; for nobody supposes he believes it. "It is," he says, only "a balance of utilities" that the subscriber has to consider. It may be bad for clergymen to have to sign such a statement when they do not believe it; it would be worse to have only such clergymen as could believe such a statement. If it be said that if everybody not believing it refused to sign it, that would secure its early correction, and no one would any longer be asked to sign it; it is to be answered that long before such a happy consummation could be reached the clergy would have come to consist only of men of such low intelligence and low scrupulosity as would sign it without believing it.<sup>45</sup> We must be unscrupulous, therefore, in the interests of scrupulousness. This may be good Utilitarianism but it is as absurd as it is abominable ethics. It would be a work of supererogation to refute ethical judgments based on such reasoning.

Upon one matter which was debated between Professor Sidgwick and Dr. Rashdall and which has been thrown into great prominence in recent discussion, we must adjudge Dr. Rashdall to be in the right. Professor Sidgwick laid considerable stress upon the particular obligation of the clergy to be sincere in the matter of the Creeds which they recited in public worship; and in recent discussion such stress has been laid upon this particular obligation that the like obligation really to believe other formularies assented to has been somewhat obscured in comparison. Perhaps the place given to the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds in the Lambeth "Quadrilateral" of 1888, is at once a manifestation and in part a cause of the tendency which has become

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<sup>45</sup> Pp. 140 ff.

very marked of late,<sup>46</sup> to lay the whole stress of the clergy's doctrinal obligation upon them. Dr. Gore in particular has for a series of years been throwing all the emphasis on the Creeds and particularly on the circumstance that not only are they recited in public worship but that in their recitation the personal "I believe", not the general "we believe," is employed. There may be some confusion here between the nature of the obligation incurred and the effect of the increased publicity given to this obligation in its constant repetition in the face of the people. The difference in this respect can have little ethical value, however, except perhaps on Utilitarian principles. We take it that Dr. Rashdall is altogether right, therefore, when he remarks—treating it as a matter of "technical veracity"—that "the clergy do not profess their beliefs in the Creeds in any other sense or to any other degree than they assent to the whole of the Prayer-book and Articles."<sup>47</sup> But this cannot

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<sup>46</sup> Dr. Rashdall says truly ("Clerical Liberalism", p. 95): "The most popular attempt to substitute another external text for the one which has been abandoned by tacit and universal consent puts the Creeds in the place of the Bible and the Articles."

<sup>47</sup> *The International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897, p. 148, cf. p. 159. Everything that could readily be said on the other part is said by Dr. Headlam in *The Church Quarterly Review*, April 1914, p. 151: "An attempt has been made by Dr. Rashdall to suggest that in relation to the teaching of the Church of England the Creeds stand on exactly the same level as the Thirty-nine Articles, and he has supported that view by saying that we only accept the Creeds because of the Articles. It seems to us that the position is one which is untenable. He quite forgets that whereas the Thirty-nine Articles are now only imposed on the clergy, and from them only a general assent is required, the use of the Creeds is quite different. Every single baptized member of the Church of England has been baptized on the basis of confession of faith, either by himself or by others in his behalf, in the Apostles' Creed. Every single communicant of the Church of England solemnly recites the Nicene Creed before he partakes of communion. Every clergyman when he is ordained, directly after his ordination, solemnly repeats the Nicene Creed as representing that Christian truth which he has expressed his readiness to hold and believe." This is an eloquent as well as conclusive statement of how profoundly the Church of England is committed to the Creeds, and how great an evil it is for a party among her accredited teachers to repudiate obligation to them. But it has no tendency to vacate the obligation under which the



be pleaded as an excuse for relaxing the obligation to believe the Creeds, but rather reveals the stringency of the obligation assumed when the clergyman, for example, says, "I, AB, do solemnly make the following Declaration: I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion. . . . I believe the doctrine of the Church of England, as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God. . . ." If this can "no longer be described as a 'signing of the Articles'" that is only because the word "subscribe" in use before 1865 has been replaced by the word "assent to"—which does not seem to be a weaker word. The obligation under which the new form of assent brings the clergymen who makes this "solemn declaration" is just as distinct, though it may not be quite as detailed, as was the obligation under which he was brought by the old form of subscription, before the words "and to all things therein contained" were dropped—their place being taken by, "the doctrine of the Church of England as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God". He who makes this "solemn declaration" undoubtedly asserts that the doctrine of the Church of England is set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles—that is, that what is set forth in them is the doctrine of the Church of England; that this doctrine of the Church of

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clergy rest to the Thirty-nine Articles, to which and not directly to "the Creeds" they must give their assent as a condition of ordination, licensure to a curacy or institution to a benefice: and through which alone by their express validation of the Creeds are the clergy in this formal manner committed to the Creeds. Compare what is said not only by Dr. Sanday (*Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, etc., pp. 7 ff.) but by Dr. Gwatkin (*The Bishop of Oxford's Open Letter: An Open Letter in Reply*, p. 4) in response to the view supported by Dr. Headlam. Dr. Gwatkin (addressing Dr. Gore) says: "I cannot view the Creeds quite as you do. The daily repetition of them does not make them a whit more binding than the Articles to which we assent only on certain solemn occasions. Would our promises in Matrimony be made more binding if they were formally repeated in every service? The Creeds are ancient and venerable summaries of certain chief parts of our belief; but we have no reason for believing them beyond that stated in the Articles, that they may "be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." They have no independent authority." This is the real doctrine of the Church of England.



England set forth, and as set forth, in these Articles is agreeable to the Word of God—by which is meant just the Scriptures here recognized as the Word of God: and that he assents to this doctrine thus set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles because he believes it to be agreeable to the Word of God—by which his acceptance of the Scriptures as the supreme rule of faith is notified. He who does not mean this by his “solemn declaration” cannot be acquitted of making that declaration in a non-natural sense which no appeal to an *animus imponentis* (whether specific or general) can empty of its unethical character. No greater obligation than this can arise from the repeated declaration in public worship of belief in the affirmations of the Creed; though the breach of this more constantly and more publicly repeated affirmation may produce more public scandal.

The deeper ground of the movement to substitute “the Creeds” for the legal formularies of the Church of England is twofold. It is the result on the one hand of the decay of confidence in the Scriptures and the consequent impulse to seek for some other authoritative basis for doctrinal belief. That this new basis is found in “the Creeds” is due, on the other hand, to the constantly growing power of the High Church party in which “tradition”, and especially the tradition of “the undivided Church”, takes the place of Scripture as the ground of authoritative teaching. It is in the spirit of that party that Dr. A. C. Headlam, when undertaking to state “the principles of the Church of England” declares at once: “The first is that the fundamental basis of belief is that Creed which alone can claim to be oecumenical, the Nicene Creed, and in association with it the Baptismal Creed—that of the Apostles.”<sup>48</sup> The primary effect of the practical substitution of “the Creeds” for the proper formularies of the Church of England is greatly to reduce the range of her doctrinal testimony. It reduces it in effect almost to the narrow circle of the Trinity, the deity of Christ and the great supernatural

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<sup>48</sup> *The Church Quarterly Review*, April 1914, pp. 151-2.

facts of His manifestation on earth.<sup>49</sup> What it is of importance for us at the moment to observe, is that it is license to disbelieve and deny even this meagre body of Christian truths that is now widely claimed among the accredited teachers of the Church of England, as a right due to them on the score of "a liberal interpretation of its formulae." To bring the matter into a perfectly clear light by an illustration—an illustration which has long been thrown into such prominence and which remains so prominent in the present debate that it may well be thought to stand at its center—it is vigorously contended that it is permissible in the Church of England, and is consistent with that sincerity in accepting its formularies which should characterize so solemn an act, to disbelieve and deny the miraculous birth of Jesus from a virgin mother and the miraculous rising of His body from the grave, and, with these great constitutive miracles, also all other strictly miraculous acts which are ascribed to Him in the Biblical narrative, including His bodily Ascension,—that is to say, to put it briefly, the whole miraculous character of His manifestation.

The grounds are as numerous as they are sinuous on which the sincerity of accepting Creeds by a solemn act of

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. Dr. Headlam's strong words (as cited, p. 153, with which January 1914, p. 41, may be compared): "And as we believe that the historic Creed sums up for us the Christian teaching which is necessary for salvation"—the proper formularies of the Church of England say this not of the Nicene Creed but of the Scriptures—"so we must be careful not to add to that tradition by putting forward as necessary any other documents or beliefs. . . . Most of the evils of Christianity have arisen through an excessive desire to add to the Christian Creed. . . . It was added to above all at the Reformation, when every separate Church felt it incumbent upon itself to define many things which it had much better left undefined." Here is a veritable glorification of the principle of minimum confession: one would almost suppose that truth was noxious and we would do well to get along with as little of it as possible. The express repudiation of all the gains of the Reformation in the acquisition of truth (including the formularies of the Church of England to which Dr. Headlam has himself assented) and the confinement of "saving doctrine" to what is set forth in the Nicene Creed are to be noted.

affirmation,<sup>50</sup> and constantly repeating them in the public services of the Church with at least the appearance of assenting to their statements are defended, although their declarations—in whole or in part—are not in the least believed. One of the most popular of those made prominent in the present controversy insists upon what is spoken of as the symbolical character of the language in which the declarations of the Creed, dealing as they do with matters too high for literal human speech, are necessarily couched. No one, it is said, can take this language literally; and as everyone is compelled to attach a symbolical sense to it, each—so it seems to be argued—is equally entitled with all others to use the language and to take it (symbolically) in whatever sense he chooses to attach to it. Thus, for example, Dr. Sanday seems to argue<sup>51</sup> that, as it is agreed that “sitteth on the right hand of God” is “pure symbolism,” so it must be agreed that references to an “Ascension” are “just as much pure symbolism.” “The right hand of God” is not a particular place; and the Ascension was not a change of locality. And therefore—so it seems to be argued—since we cannot by any possibility take all the statements of the Creed literally, we are entitled to take none of them literally, and can say with a good conscience in the face of men: “Conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary”—or as the Nicene Creed has it: “Came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary and was made man,”—and: “The third day He rose from the dead”; and mean nothing more than that He was born in the ordinary fashion, like other men, of human parentage, and, like other men, still lived in His spiritual being after His body had been given to corruption in the grave.<sup>52</sup> No doubt there are consider-

<sup>50</sup> Thirty-nine Articles, Art. viii: “The three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasian Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles’ Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for that they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.”

<sup>51</sup> *Bishop Gore’s Challenge to Criticism*, etc., pp. 13 ff.

<sup>52</sup> Dr. Rashdall (“Clerical Liberalism”, pp. 98-99) says: “There is no intelligible principle of interpretation according to which the belief in

ations arising from the extraordinary confidence with which this mode of argumentation is pressed in wide circles which demand that some notice should be taken of it; and Dr. Gore may be justified therefore in taking the trouble to expose its inconsequence.<sup>53</sup> We cannot profess, however, that his discussion of *The Place of Symbolism in Religion* seems to us greatly to advance the understanding of the subject in general.<sup>54</sup> All is said that needs to be said when it is said as he does say effectively: "It is quite one thing to recognize that all this is symbolical language and is not to be taken literally. It is quite another thing to evacuate the pictures of their moral and practical meanings and substitute a really fundamentally different idea. . . . We must recognize that the Biblical language is symbolic, but we must recognize, if we would be Christian believers, that what the symbolism teaches is true. . . . Language may be symbolic and also true."<sup>55</sup>

To what extent the evil leaven is at work in the Church

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the everlasting punishment of heretics, in the descent into Hell, in the future coming of Christ, in the Resurrection of the body, can be mitigated or spiritualized, which will not equally permit us to take the word 'Virgin' to mean a young woman, or to understand by 'He rose again from the dead' a vision of the risen and immortal Christ. . . . It is open, of course, to anyone to contend that the toleration of the one set of opinions is, in his private opinion, desirable in the best interests of the Church, while that of the other set is undesirable. What is not open to any man of common intellectual consistency or common moral honesty is to accuse the one kind of non-literal interpretation of dishonesty, while he claims for himself, or concedes to his friends, the other instances of non-literal interpretation." We are not inclined to dispute the validity of Dr. Rashdall's *tu quoque*. But even that may be pressed beyond reason; and it has no value at all against the charge of insincerity lying against both.

<sup>53</sup> *The Basis*, etc., pp. 19 ff; *The Constructive Quarterly*, March 1914, pp. 50 ff.

<sup>54</sup> His contention is that "Symbolism is in place when we are dealing with what we cannot express in terms of human experience; it is quite out of place when the affirmation concerns what passed within the limits of present human experience." In point of fact all language is symbolical; and yet it manages to convey true statements of both facts and truths.

<sup>55</sup> *The Constructive Quarterly*, March 1914, p. 56.

of England is brought home to us startlingly by the appearance of the Lady Margaret Professors of Divinity of both Universities in the lists in championship of the lax interpretation of obligation to formularies.<sup>56</sup> As he gives "no explicit expression" of his own position Professor

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<sup>56</sup> *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*. A reply to the Bishop of Oxford's Open Letter on the Basis of Anglican Fellowship. By W. Sanday, D.D., F.B.A., Lady Margaret Professor and Canon of Christ Church. 1914. *The Miracle of Christianity*. A plea for "the Critical School" in regard to the use of the Creeds. A letter to the Right Reverend Charles Gore, D.D., Lord Bishop of Oxford, from J. F. Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. 1914. We regret to be compelled to associate Dr. Gwatkin with his fellow professors so far as the advocacy of toleration of these lax views in the Church is concerned. He writes with a constant flavor of sarcasm to Dr. Gore: "You are disquieted, and not without reason, for the air is full of reckless theorizing, and some of the literary criticism is very shallow and profane. Yet I see little cause for alarm, and none at all for 'solemn repudiations' intended to make it as dishonorable for critics as for Evangelicals to remain in the ministry of the Church of England. But, say you, Mr. X rejects the Virgin Birth, denies the Resurrection, and admits no miracles. Well, this is more easily said than proved without a minute and undesirable inquisition into private beliefs. It is not a plain question of fact, as when some disloyal person forces the most solemn part of our Communion Service with extracts from the Latin Mass; it is a question, as you say, of interpretation, and I may add, is a question calling for much caution, and sometimes for more sympathy and charity than most of us possess. Take a couple of instances. Some explain the Birth from a Virgin by saying that intense Messianic longing enabled her to do what other women cannot do; while Keim's account of the Resurrection is that Jesus lives, and sent 'telegrams' to his disciples. These theories are none of mine; they seem to me seriously defective. Yet I cannot see that one who holds them necessarily means to deny the essential truths of the Incarnation and the risen Son of Man. And if he does not cut himself off from Christ, what right has the Church to cut him off? Nay, my Lord, we need to remember that the goodness of God is leading others as well as ourselves; and by the mystery of His dealing with your own soul I entreat you to reverence His dealing with another. If my neighbor walks in darkness, I will rather pray God to cast His bright beams of light upon him than help to stigmatize him in the Church and drive him out from what you hold to be the only means of grace which God has promised."—*The Bishop of Oxford's Open Letter: An Open Letter in Reply*. By H. M. Gwatkin, M.A., Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Cambridge, Hon. D.D. and formerly Gifford Lecturer, Edinburgh. 1914, pp. 3-4.



Bethune-Baker is charitably supposed by Dr. Gore<sup>57</sup>—the charity seems to us a little overstrained—to be “only making a claim on behalf of others.” No such charitable hope, even with straining, can be indulged in the case of Dr. Sanday who with great explicitness associates himself with the lax position which he defends.

Professor Bethune-Baker would be loath to see “driven from their places by any exercise of ecclesiastical authority” even men

“who though they do not hold the doctrine of the Incarnation, conceive of our Lord as a Man so fully inspired by the Spirit of God that they can apply to Him sincerely many of the terms of traditional Christian devotion and even of Christian theology, and, regarding His teaching as a real revelation of God’s nature and His purpose for men, occupy a position of discipleship to Him which can hardly be described as other than Christian”—

if they are earnest in their work and acceptable to their parishoners.<sup>58</sup> That is to say he would allow a place in the Church of England to express Humanitarians in their doctrine of the Person of Christ. Naturally then he would not exclude from it any who believed in the Incarnation, however they might think it was accomplished. He goes further. He draws a broad distinction between “a doctrine which is capable of verification in present experience and a judgment of the past as to a phenomenal ‘fact.’”<sup>59</sup> The Incarnation and the Resurrection themselves he puts in the former category as ‘doctrines’ “strongly attested by the experience of the Church.” “The traditional beliefs in the Miraculous Birth and the restoration to life of the Body of our Lord” he places in the latter, as “simply intellectual convictions held by some on the strength of what they deem sufficient historical evidence, and by others because they seem to supply an adequate explanation, not only of early Christian belief about our Lord and of the origin and history of the Church, but also of common Christian experience ever since.”<sup>60</sup> And he pleads that only the doctrines

<sup>57</sup> *The Basis*, etc., p. 9.

<sup>58</sup> *The Miracle of Christianity*, p. 5.

<sup>59</sup> P. 11.

<sup>60</sup> P. 9.

supported directly by Christian experience shall be insisted upon. "No stigma," he thinks, "should be set on a clergyman who believes in the Incarnation, yet is not able to affirm the mode of this Birth."<sup>61</sup> He even contends that such a clergyman "is entitled to recite the words of the Apostles' Creed as his profession of faith without being exposed to any charge of breach of 'the moral principle of sincerity of profession'";<sup>62</sup> and, indeed, is "morally obliged in public worship to use the Creed,"—since these words which declare a fact as to the manner of the Incarnation which he does not believe are nevertheless the only means that the Creed offers him of confessing the Incarnation which he does believe. Similarly with respect to the Resurrection. Anyone who finds the testimony inadequate for such beliefs as these,—“the Empty Tomb, the return of the spirit of life to the Body which it had left, the ‘physical’ resurrection”; “but the testimony for the reality of the Appearances convincing”,—“that our Lord after His death on the Cross was really alive again and able to convey the sense of His presence and powers and will to His disciples, through whatever *media*”: believes “the essential religious conception which the doctrine of the Resurrection expresses” and “can surely with a clear conscience use the words, ‘And the third day He rose from the dead.’”<sup>63</sup> “I do not know,” adds Professor Bethune-Baker “what other form of words he could find which would so simply and clearly state his belief.” He ventures, therefore, to plead with the Bishop of Oxford and his fellow Bishops not

“to throw the weight of their authority on the side of those who would bind belief in the Incarnation inseparably to belief in ‘the Miraculous Birth’, and belief in our Lord’s Resurrection and Ascension to belief in the reanimation of His earthly Body, and so would forbid men whose essential religious convictions are the same as their own to join with them in reciting the ancient Creed of the Church, because, in regard to the Incarnation that Creed is expressed in terms of biographical statement as to how it was effected rather than as to religious conviction as to what It is.”<sup>64</sup>

<sup>61</sup> P. 11.<sup>62</sup> P. 11.<sup>63</sup> P. 13.<sup>64</sup> P. 17.

The master-key which is to unlock all scruples is to bear in mind

"the distinction between the religious convictions embodied in the doctrines and the forms in which they have been expressed in the past, or, in other words, between the reality of the spiritual experience enshrined in our Gospels and the 'historical' credibility of all the 'miraculous' narratives they contain."<sup>65</sup>

He himself has never "felt that belief in these 'miracles' was a necessary part of the doctrine which he desired and was pledged to preach."<sup>66</sup> Christ is Himself the Miracle of Christianity: "the particular narratives of miracles in the Gospels" are but "convincing evidence of the unique impression which He produced in the time of His life in the world as man", and not "a scientific account of the way in which that impression was produced."<sup>67</sup> What Professor Bethune-Baker is pleading for, we see now clearly, is a non-miraculous Christianity, a Christianity finding its substance and warrant in present religious experience instead of in transactions of the past; and the right of the adherents of this non-miraculous, experiential Christianity to profess publicly a miraculous, transactional Christianity without derogation to their sincerity.

Dr. Sanday's pamphlet differs markedly from Professor Bethune-Baker's in the charming simplicity of the style in which it is written, in the directness with which Dr. Sanday identifies himself in it with the party of laxity which he defends, and we are afraid we ought to add in the extremity of the position assumed. If we do not find it quite possible, with Dr. Gore, wholly to dissociate Professor Bethune-Baker from the cause which he pleads, we gain a distinct impression from his argument that he himself is a believer in the Incarnation, and looks upon Jesus as the very Son of God in the sense of the Creeds. We grieve to say that we do not gain so clear an impression to this effect in the case of Dr. Sanday, and find ourselves, as we read his discussion, associating him in our thought with the class of thinkers who used to be spoken of as Speculative

<sup>65</sup> P. 14.

<sup>66</sup> P. 16.

<sup>67</sup> P. 16.

Theists,—men who are quite clear that God is a Person and acts as a Person in the government of the world; and who are in that sense believers in the Supernatural; but who profess it to be impossible for them to think of Him as acting in His world otherwise than in accordance with the laws He has impressed upon it in its making. These thinkers, it is needless to say are all Humanitarians in their doctrine of Christ as well as anti-supernaturalists in their view of the course and activities of His life.<sup>68</sup> Dr. Sanday does indeed say in the most impressive manner:<sup>69</sup>

"The central truth which it is most important to guarantee is the true Godhead of Father, Son and Holy Ghost; that our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly Lord, very God and at the same time very Man. I imagine that if we were to cross-question ourselves as to what we mean when we recite the Creeds, it would be something like that in its simplest terms. That is what we are all, educated and uneducated, trying to say, and what we each believe the other to be trying to say. We should all agree that anything really less than this would be hypocritical. The man who in his heart of hearts really believed less ought not to stay where he is."

And again:<sup>70</sup>

"The coming of the Only-begotten into the world could not but be attended by every circumstance of holiness. Whatever the Virgin Birth can spiritually mean for us is guaranteed by the fact that the Holy Babe was Divine. Is it not enough to affirm this with all our heart and soul, and be silent as to anything beyond?"

No one could for an instant distrust the sincerity of these moving words. But the puzzled reader who finds it difficult to conciliate them with the tone of the discussion at large and its anti-supernaturalistic conclusions, and with its ex-

<sup>68</sup> That these things normally go together Dr. Sanday himself has taught us. "If the Son of God," says he (*The Expository Times*, xiv, 1903, p. 65a), "did assume human flesh for men's redemption, that alone is an event so unique and stupendous that we cannot wonder if its accessories were also in a manner unique."

<sup>69</sup> *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, pp. 96.

<sup>70</sup> P. 20. Contrast the earlier language quoted in note 68: there, it is not merely "holiness" which is guaranteed by "the coming of the Only-begotten".

plicit refusal to allow that the course of nature has ever been infringed even in the coming of the Only-begotten into the world,<sup>71</sup> and who remembers Dr. Sanday's later Christological writings, in which he works out a view of the constitution of our Lord's Person—he no doubt only suggests it, and does not explicitly adopt it—which can hardly be thought anything other than Humanitarian<sup>72</sup>; may be pardoned if he wonders whether the words are intended to convey all that they seem to mean,—at least all that they must seem to mean to one whose habitual thought of our Lord's Person runs not only in the language but in the conceptions of the Nicene Creed and the Chalcedonian Decree. Meanwhile it is already clear from these few words what Dr. Sanday's attitude to the declarations of the Creeds is. When we recite the Creeds we mean just that the man Christ Jesus is "truly God and truly man." Affirming the Divinity of Jesus, we may be silent as to all else. The difficulty is, of course, that when we recite the Creeds we say much more of the man Christ Jesus than that He is "very God": affirming His Divinity we are not silent about everything else. We affirm also, for example, His birth of a Virgin, His resurrection from the dead, His ascension to the right hand of God. Is it sincere to affirm these things of Him not believing them to be true—even though we believe that somehow, in some sense, He is very God?

Beyond what has already been suggested, Dr. Sanday has very little to say which is to the point, in justification of the lax treatment of formularies. His *argumentum ad hominem* to the Bishop of Oxford, we venture to think complete. But that carries us a very little way towards the justification of the laxity which each in his own degree practices with reference to the formularies. Certainly what Dr. Sanday speaks of<sup>73</sup> as "the one argument that seems

<sup>71</sup> P. 19: "I cannot so easily bring myself to think that His birth was (as I should regard it) unnatural."

<sup>72</sup> Cf. THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, January 1911, pp. 166-174; October 1911, pp. 686-689; *The Hibbert Journal*, April 1914, pp. 591 f.

<sup>73</sup> P. 8.



to him to be really decisive"—"the argument from *the difference of times*"—cannot be accorded the validity which he ascribes to it. Even should we grant—which we by no means do—that "Creeds composed fifteen, sixteen, seventeen centuries ago cannot possibly express with literal exactitude the mind of to-day", it would not seem to follow that the "mind to-day" (which *ex hypothesi* no longer believes their statements) may with all sincerity give assent to their statements. It might be validly concluded that these outgrown Creeds should be discarded, or at least corrected into harmony with the "mind of to-day". It might be equally validly concluded, that "the mind of to-day"—which after all is not infallible—should be corrected into harmony with the Creeds. Facts, after all, remain facts after any lapse of time and after any changes which the meaning of the words in which they are stated may have undergone, or which "the mind" of men may have experienced during the years. It would be a sad commentary on the evolution of the modern mind, if the main thing it had acquired during the increasing ages were the power to assent in all sincerity to statements of facts of tremendous importance if true,—no matter in what form of words, old or new, these facts are stated—which it is thoroughly convinced are not true.

### III

The real significance of Dr. Sanday's pamphlet does not lie, however, in its defence of the practice of assenting to formularies which you do not believe, but in the frankness with which it advocates a completely unmiraculous Christianity. We must be wary in our use of terms here. All the terms which naturally present themselves to express the supernatural character as well of Christianity itself as of those great events by which it was inaugurated in the world, commonly called miracles, are employed by this and that writer or coterie of writers, with different kinds of qualifications of their natural and formerly well-settled meanings. It is hardly possible to use them without a certain

amount of ambiguity, or without causing some offence in one quarter or another. Dr. Sanday makes an almost pathetic appeal that his affirmations shall be adduced only with scrupulous care to reproduce their exact shades of suggestion:<sup>74</sup>

"I know that to the end of the chapter it will be said that miracles are denied, that the Virgin Birth is denied, that the Resurrection is denied, that our Lord's infallibility is denied. It would not be candid of me if I were to pretend that there is not a foundation of truth—and in one instance a considerable foundation of literal (but I would submit only literal) truth—in each of these charges. But in every single case there is some important limitation or qualification which ought to be borne in mind whenever the charge is repeated. To omit this is always to import an element of injustice. Statements respecting others, and especially statements respecting the beliefs of others, should always be reproduced in the same meaning and with the same balance of context with which they were originally made."

We have the strongest desire to do no injustice to Dr. Sanday in reproducing the statements of his opinions which he has given us: we wish to convey in our reproduction of these statements precisely what he intends to convey by them—no more and no less. But in attempting to do this as exactly as possible in current language taken at its current value, we do not know how to say anything else than that miracles are denied, nature miracles are denied, the Virgin Birth is denied, the Resurrection is denied, and our Lord's infallibility if not directly denied is certainly not affirmed and, at the best, is left in doubt.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> P. 17.

<sup>75</sup> Dr. Sanday's statement here suffers from a tendency we have noticed also elsewhere to employ a connecting word in an argument in more than one sense. "The exactly true proposition," he says (p. 18), "would, I think, be something of this kind: that whatever our Lord either thought or said or did was strictly in accordance with the will of the Father." The reader naturally takes "in accordance with the will of the Father" to mean all that "infallibility" could express. But the next sentence undeceives him: "It is part of the will of the Father that every age should have its own appropriate range of knowledge. Our Lord assumed the particular range appropriate to the age in which He lived." We have thus merely an assertion that our Lord, like everybody else, was subject to the decreative will of God. The Liberals

Dr. Sandy is emphatic in his assertion of his belief in the reality of "the Supernatural Birth" and of "the Supernatural Resurrection" of our Lord, and in the actual occurrence during our Lord's life—and also in the early days of the Church, subsequent to His death—of numerous "Miracles." But he "cannot so easily bring" himself "to think that His Birth was (as he should regard it) unnatural."<sup>76</sup> And he knows that in declaring his belief in "the Supernatural Birth" of Jesus, he is not confessing "all that the Church in the past has believed."<sup>77</sup> What he apparently thinks about the birth of Jesus from the physical side is that it was supernatural in something of the same general sense in which the births of Isaac and Samuel and John the Baptist were supernatural—according at least to the Scriptural representations regarding them. For the rest, when his mind dwells on "the Supernatural Birth" it is satisfied with recognizing the holiness of Him who thus came into the world. Neither can he assure himself of "the actual resuscitation of the dead body of the Lord from the tomb."<sup>78</sup> That the Lord "was dead, and behold He is alive for evermore"—this, he thinks, is proved; and this is all that he has it in mind to affirm. Here too he knows that he is not allowing for all that the Church of the past has believed; but he cannot "as at present advised", commit himself to the resurrection "as literal fact."<sup>79</sup> Neither again can he quite believe that the "nature miracles" happened just as they are recorded:<sup>80</sup>

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have a very pronounced objection to "infallibility" anywhere. Dr. Sanday gives expression to this objection. He would be more willing to use the term of our Lord than of anything else: but even here it is awkward, seeing that infallibility belongs rather to absolute than to relative knowledge and our Lord's knowledge was relative. Mr. B. H. Streeter (*Restatement and Reunion*, pp. 455 ff.) thinks it an unhappy term even with reference to God. "Infallibility is the tyrant's claim," he asserts; "that we do not want; but we do want authority, the parent's right." A "sign-post", "a lantern" to help us by our own efforts to attain the truth, he is willing to confess the need of; but not the truth itself—like Lessing's apologue about seeking and finding.

<sup>76</sup> P. 19.

<sup>77</sup> P. 28.

<sup>78</sup> P. 20.

<sup>79</sup> P. 28.

<sup>80</sup> P. 19.

"I think that of the two hypotheses—that they were performed by our Lord exactly as they are described, and that they came to be attributed to Him in this form by the imagination of the early Church—the latter is the more probable. I believe that in most of these cases *something* happened which gave rise to the story, but that the most difficult element in it was probably due to the extension of the original fact, rather than itself original."

He can see his way, it is true, to admit the occurrence of events which may fitly be described as *supra naturam*—"exceptional, extraordinary, testifying to the presence of higher spiritual forces", but involving "no real breach in the order of nature."<sup>81</sup> But he cannot admit the occurrence of "events or alleged events" which must be called *contra naturam*,—which "do imply such a breach", involving "some definite reversal of the natural physical order."<sup>82</sup> We do not see how a position thus explained differs from the old-fashioned, common, garden variety of naturalism. We are then in Dr. Sanday's case merely faced with a return to the simple old issue, which we thought had been fought out a generation ago, of Miracles and the Supernatural.

Of late years Dr. Sanday is nothing if not autobiographical. It is natural for him therefore to incorporate in his manifesto in behalf of an unmiraculous Christianity a sketch of the processes by which he has reached the naturalistic position he now occupies.<sup>83</sup> He has been gradually brought to it, he tells us, by careful historical investigation into the evidence for miracles. Dr. Gore had said<sup>84</sup> that he rejected the criticism of the radical school, as the champion of which Dr. Sanday comes forward, not because it is criticism, but because it is not sound criticism. "It is based, it seems to me," he added, "on a mistaken view of natural law, and on something much less than a Christian belief in God." Looking back on the course of his own thought, Dr. Sanday repels this characterization, at least as applying to

<sup>81</sup> P. 23.

<sup>82</sup> P. 23.

<sup>83</sup> Pp. 21 ff.

<sup>84</sup> *The Basis*, etc., p. 9.

himself.<sup>85</sup> "It could not be said of me," he insists, "that my attitude was based 'on a mistaken view of natural law, and on something less than a Christian belief in God'. At least I was not disposed to put any limit to the Divine power or to ascribe any necessity to natural law as such". It is proverbial that our knowledge of ourselves leaves something to be desired; and Dr. Sanday's readers will find it difficult to understand such a declaration. However he may consciously withhold from natural law the attribute of "necessity", and ascribe to God "the power to make what exceptions He pleases", he yet unconsciously speaks currently of miracle as if it were a thing not only that we have not observed God doing<sup>86</sup> but that we must assume that God will not do, because it would violate laws which condition His action.

We may illustrate what we mean by a phrase taken from *The Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907), to the discussion in which Dr. Sanday refers<sup>87</sup> us as "really containing all the guiding ideas he has ever had on the subject" of the supernatural activities of God. Speaking of the Christian's experience of the answer to prayer—in which, like Theodor Haering,<sup>88</sup> he finds the key to the idea of the miraculous,—he remarks that "it does not prove that God will violate His own laws, but I think it does prove that, within the conditions imposed by these laws, He does interest Himself in human affairs." It is to the phraseology employed here that we call attention. Precisely what is meant by such phrases as these: "God will not violate His own laws"; "God will act within the

<sup>85</sup> P. 22. Mr. Streeter similarly (*Restatement*, etc., p. xi) repudiates the statement for himself and his friends, one ventures to think equally mistakenly.

<sup>86</sup> Pp. 22-3. The negative form of statement is significant. In point of fact we are invited to exclude miracles from happenings not on the ground of a "uniform experience" but on the ground of a lack of experience: our world-view is to be based not on experience but on the absence of experience, and thus we are to found our belief on an attempt to prove a negative.

<sup>87</sup> P. 22.

<sup>88</sup> *The Christian Faith* (1906), 1913, p. 560.



conditions imposed by His laws"? What "laws" are these which "impose conditions" on God, that He "will not violate"? By a "law of nature" we ordinarily mean merely an observed uniformity of occurrence. Is it meant that God will never, or can never, act outside a single line of observed occurrence? That He will, or can, never act otherwise than as we observe Him acting ordinarily? That He has established for Himself "laws" of action which He will, or can, on no account "violate"? That His customary mode of activity imposes "conditions" on all His actions? It is difficult for the ordinary man to see what "law" God would "violate" by acting on proper occasion after a fashion different from that of His ordinary mode of action. We can hardly say that He *must* act uniformly without reducing Him from a person to a natural force: it is only a natural force which must by its very nature act uniformly. Nor can the circumstance that He has so made natural forces that they act uniformly constitute His own action in a different mode a violation of them. It would be a violation of them only if He compelled *them* to act in a mode different from the uniform mode of action which He imposed on them in their making as the law of their action. And nobody supposes that this is the way in which God works what is called a miracle. We do not see how we can avoid saying that a very crude idea both of "natural law" and of God's mode of action in working miracles underlies the forms of statement which Dr. Sanday currently employs in speaking of the subject.

It would be a pity to neglect Dr. Sanday's invitation<sup>89</sup> to survey in connection with the present expression of his views on miracles, what he has formerly written about them.<sup>90</sup> Very much is to be learned from such a survey.

<sup>89</sup> P. 22.

<sup>90</sup> The publications which chiefly come into consideration are the following: (1) "Free-thinking" in the *Oxford House Papers*, First Series, 1886; (2) Article, "Jesus Christ" in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. ii, 1899 (reprinted in *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, 1905): cf. also *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, 1905; (3) Paper at the Northampton Church Congress, October 1902 (reprinted in *The Exposi-*

For example it becomes at once clear as we glance through the series of writings to which he refers us, that his naturalistic opinions, here expressed with so keen a consciousness, have not been of quite so slow a growth and have not come to their present completeness quite so recently as might be supposed from the mere letter of the sketch of their development here given.<sup>91</sup> Dr. Sanday had already indeed more than a quarter of a century ago given them expression quite as clearly and in much the same terms as now; and it may be doubted whether the obligations under which he is inclined generously to recognize that he may stand to Professor Lake and Mr. J. M. Thompson for the formation of his opinions, may not more naturally have been the other way about. Now and then an incidental suggestion comes to us, at least, which leads us to fear that Dr. Sanday may have (like the late Dr. A. B. Davidson for example) been through all these years building worse than he knew.<sup>92</sup> At all events there is certainly very little of what he has subsequently said about miracles which is not already present, in germ at least, in a passage like the following:<sup>93</sup>

"Into the philosophy of these marvellous phenomena I do not enter. What is their relation to God's ordinary government of the universe I do not feel competent to say. I do not myself believe that they are in the strict sense 'breaches' of natural law. I believe that if we could see as God sees we should become

*tory Times*, November 1902); (4) *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, 1907; (5) Sermon on "The meaning of Miracles" in *Miracles: Papers and Sermons contributed to the Guardian*. Edited by H. S. Holland, 1911. (6) Paper at the Middlesbrough Church Congress, October 1912.

<sup>91</sup> P. 17.

<sup>92</sup> For example we meet in Mr. H. C. Hoskier's *Codex B and its Allies*, 1914, Part I, p. 422, the following: "Many who should have raised their voices against the mischief wrought, have sat by in apathy or have wilfully fostered these heresies. Or, if not wilfully, they have assumed a faltering attitude which caused their own students to misinterpret their master's lessons. Thus we have the spectacle of Thompson and Lake saying to Sanday: 'We learned that from you', and Sanday retorting: 'I never meant to teach you that'." Only in the case of the nature of Miracles, unfortunately, there was no misinterpretation.

<sup>93</sup> No. 9 of *Oxford House Papers*, First Series, on "Free-thinking", 1886.

aware of links and connections, at present hidden from us, binding together the mighty organism of facts and processes into a mysterious, but still harmonious whole. I am also not prepared to say that if the miracles of the New Testament had been described by competent observers in the nineteenth century instead of their actual eye-witnesses in the first, there would not have been a perceptible difference in the narratives. All these concessions I should be willing to make; and I could understand others pressing them further than I should care to press them myself. But on one simple proposition I should take my stand, as a rock of certainty amidst much that is uncertain: *Miracles did actually happen.*"

Here it is already denied that "miracles" are "in the strict sense 'breaches' of natural law"; the All is already spoken of as a closed system, if only we could see it all in all; it is already suggested that observers of the nineteenth century would have described miracles differently; and the strong affirmation that "miracles did actually happen" is already made—in conjunction with the explanation that what happened was not after all "miracles". These are the characteristic features of Dr. Sanday's latest declarations.

A comparison of Dr. Sanday's earlier and later dealing with miracles reveals meanwhile many features which one would think might cause him some embarrassment. Take the Virgin Birth and its attestation, for example. It has been quite common to minimize the attestation to the Virgin Birth. Dr. Sanday has never given way to that temptation. He never could have been capable, for example, of writing such a sentence as this—it is Dr. Rashdall's:<sup>94</sup> "The only traces of the doctrine in the New Testament are confined to the prefaces to the first and third Gospels, neither of which seems to belong to the two early documents which modern criticism is agreed in regarding as the basis of our existing synoptics"; or of suggesting, as Dr. Rashdall does, that the assured attribution of the third Gospel to Luke lessens its claim on our belief. Such remarks betray a total misapprehension of the meaning and implications of what is called the Two Document Hypothesis of the origin of the Synoptic Gospels. The discovery that these two sources

<sup>94</sup> *International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897, p. 156.

existed and that they account for a very large part of the contents of the Synoptics, has no tendency to suggest that other portions of the contents of these Gospels, derived from other sources, are inferior either in age or in historical trustworthiness to the material derived from one or the other of these two. The relative originality and historical trustworthiness of this additional material are to be ascertained on their own proper evidence; and Dr. Sanday, for his part, has put himself very fully on record as estimating both the originality and the historical trustworthiness of the Infancy Chapters of Luke very highly indeed.<sup>95</sup> He points out many and very convincing indications in the narrative itself of its historical value; and he even permits himself (like Sir William Ramsay,<sup>96</sup> but as he is careful to intimate independently of him) to trace the material here recorded ultimately to Mary herself—an attribution for which he has reasons to give which he considers weighty. "Such an inference", he very justly remarks,<sup>97</sup> "would invest the contents of these chapters with high authority." We are not informed that Dr. Sanday has withdrawn this high estimate of the historical authority of this material.<sup>97a</sup> One would

<sup>95</sup> E.g., *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible*, II, 1899, pp. 643 ff. Cf. also the Sermon on the Virgin Birth printed in *The Expository Times*, xiv, 1903, pp. 296 ff.

<sup>96</sup> *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* A Study on the Credibility of St. Luke. 1898.

<sup>97</sup> P. 644 and note.

<sup>97a</sup> He has perhaps somewhat modified it in the sermon on "The Meaning of Miracles", printed in *Miracles*, edited by Dr. Holland, 1911, where however he still presents a rapid but telling summary of evidence for the historical trustworthiness of the Infancy chapters of both Matthew and Luke. The very cautious conclusion runs (pp. 14f.): "I would not myself deny that the imagination has been at work somewhat freely in these opening sections of both the First and Third Gospels; it would be precarious to lay great stress on more than the points that the two authorities have in common—the birth at Bethlehem, the birth before conjugal union, the name Jesus, the home at Nazareth." Here we have probably the low-water mark of his growing skepticism prior to the Paper at Middlesbrough—after which he tells us that his progress has been rapid. He still apparently affirms "the birth before conjugal union" as credibly attested. But he had not yet apparently attached himself to "the school whose watchword is 'the supernatural without miracle'" (p. 16).

think, however, that the maintenance of it would cause him some embarrassment in the face of his present statement: "I believe most emphatically in His Supernatural Birth; but I cannot so easily bring myself to think that His Birth was (as I should regard it) unnatural." What is it that Dr. Sanday supposes that Mary could and did bear witness to with respect to the extraordinary birth of her son? Precisely the one thing which Mary was competent to testify to with conviction and full knowledge—with indubitable weight—is what Dr. Sanday here calls the "unnatural birth"; and that is precisely the thing she does testify to, if this narrative has any validity at all as the vehicle of her witness; and we cannot be surprised that a precise assertion of it from her lips is embodied in the narrative: "I know not a man" (Lk. i. 34). The only thing that Dr. Sanday is prepared to accept now on Mary's testimony is just the thing that Mary had no competency to attest as a witness: that the Holy Spirit was so far concerned in this birth as to sanctify the product, so that It should be holy. What Mary was competent to attest—he refuses to believe: what she was not competent to attest—is all that he will believe. Phenomena like this increase our difficulty in crediting that Dr. Sanday's opinions as to miracles are the pure result of his critical examination of the evidence.

Let us take another example even more startling. Dr. Sanday seems still to profess readiness to accept any miracle adequately attested. In adequate attestation, he gives us to understand, first-handedness holds with him a primary place. "For instance, whenever we have the direct evidence of St. Paul, that evidence is immediate and cannot be questioned."<sup>98</sup> He suggests that the only miracles receiving such first-hand attestation are of the class called by him *supra naturam* in contrast with those which he calls *contra naturam*,—that is to say they are such as are wrought through the medium of natural forces, not independently of

<sup>98</sup> *Bishop Gore's Challenge*, etc., p. 24.



them. It is not immediately apparent on what grounds he bases this opinion. Paul, for example, in his references to miracles speaks quite generally<sup>99</sup> and Paul is not the only first-hand witness. Dr. Sanday does not doubt, for instance, that Luke was both Paul's companion and the author of the Book of Acts: and in that case it is hard to deny to Luke recognition as a first-hand witness to miracles, Paul's and others'. On Paul's and Luke's testimony we may be sure, and Dr. Sanday is sure, that miracles happened in the early days of the Church.<sup>100</sup> The miracles to which Luke testifies, however, are not all of the sort that Dr. Sanday calls *supra naturam*. But Luke testifies not only to the miracles of the early Christians but to miracles wrought by Jesus, and though he does not pretend to have himself witnessed any of these, as Paul's companion he enjoyed excellent opportunities of informing himself on first-hand authority of what really happened (as say with respect to the resurrection of Jesus), and we can hardly doubt, on his testimony alone, that Jesus Himself as well as His followers worked miracles,—and Dr. Sanday does not doubt it. If Luke is not technically a first-hand witness that fault, to all who believe, with Dr. Sanday,<sup>101</sup> that the Fourth Gospel is the work of an eye-witness, is fully cured by the testimony of John. We can moreover get behind Luke. As Dr. Sanday himself points out,<sup>102</sup> each of the chief documents which underlie Luke, the Narrative Source, the Discourse Source, and the so-called Special Source, testifies to abounding miracles wrought by Jesus. And, as Dr. Sanday again himself points out,<sup>103</sup> the distinction which he draws between *supra naturam* and *contra naturam* miracles "certainly was not present to the mind of the Biblical historians, and miracles of the one class are not inferior in attestation to those of

<sup>99</sup> Cf. the passages; Roms. xv. 18, 19; 2 Cor. xii. 12; 1 Cor. xii. 6, 8, 10, xiv. 7, 5, 19; Gal. iii. 8, cited in *The Expository Times*, xiv. p. 62. Cf. the *Church Congress at Middlesbrough*, p. 183.

<sup>100</sup> *The Expository Times*, as cited, pp. 64 ff.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

the other". These historians, indeed, in the most trustworthy accounts of His teaching which they have transmitted to us, represent Jesus as Himself bearing witness to His own miracle-working. There are no better attested sayings of our Lord's than those in which He pronounces woes upon Bethsaida and Chorazin (Mat. xi. 21, Lk. x. 13), replies to John the Baptist's inquiry as to who He was (Mat. xi. 5, Lk. vii. 22) and speaks of a faith which can remove mountains (Mat. xvii. 20, Lk. xvii. 6). Each of these saying includes a direct claim on our Lord's part to be a miracle-worker, and the only two of them which intimate the nature of His miracles, intimate that they included "nature miracles", Dr. Sanday's *contra-naturam* miracles. If it is unreasonable to doubt that these are genuine sayings of our Lord,—and surely Dr. Sanday will not doubt that<sup>104</sup>—we seem to have our Lord's own witness to the fact that He wrought "nature miracles".

Dr. Sanday is indeed so deeply committed to this conclusion that we can only wonder at the extreme embarrassment into which he has brought himself by his denial that our Lord nevertheless wrought any miracles *contra naturam*. The narrative of our Lord's Temptation and its implications Dr. Sanday has by repeated and searching critical examinations of it made peculiarly his own. This narrative, he strongly holds, presents evidence that our Lord claimed to work miracles and really did work miracles which Dr. Sanday ventures to characterize as "quite stringent", indeed "as stringent as a proposition of Euclid."<sup>105</sup> For this account of the Temptation, he argues,<sup>106</sup> is of such a kind

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<sup>104</sup> See what Dr. Sanday says in the paper at the Church Congress at Middlesbrough on Mat. xi. 21; Lk. x. 13, and in *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, p. 224, on Mat. xvii. 20; Lk. xvii. 6. Cf. also what Dr. Headlam says in his paper at the Church Congress at Middlesbrough (p. 187) on Mat. xi. 21; Lk. x. 17, and Mat. xi. 5; Lk. vii. 32.

<sup>105</sup> *The Expository Times*, xiv, p. 63 f.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*: the argument here is repeated from Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, ii. p. 624 b, where it is more expanded: cf. also pp. 612 f.

and contains features of such a character as to make it intrinsically certain that it could not have been invented, but "must have come from our Lord Himself and no other". "But the story of the Temptation," he proceeds, "all turns on the assumption of the power of working miracles. All three temptations have for their object to induce Him to work miracles for purposes other than those for which He was prepared to work them. The story would be null and void if He worked no miracles at all." That is to say our Lord Himself bears witness in the account of the Temptation which He, and no other, *must* have given and therefore actually did give, that He was conscious of the power to work miracles, and did work them on all proper occasions. Here is stringent evidence indeed, independent of all inquiry into "sources": the narrative in itself bears convincing testimony to its authenticity as a personal witness of our Lord's own; and this witness is to His miracle-working. The point now to be pressed is that this stringent witness of our Lord's own to His miracle-working concerns particularly "nature miracles", miracles *contra naturam*. The making of the stones into bread is as distinctly a nature miracle, for example, as the multiplication of the loaves and fishes which Dr. Sanday refuses to believe happened, on this precise ground. How can Dr. Sanday insist, then, that "nature miracles" did not happen and could not happen? Has he convicted our Lord of false-witness to the nature and extent of His powers—transmuted Him into an empty boaster in the accounts He gives of Himself? Or does he wish to abandon his elaborate proof of the necessary origin of the account of the Temptation in our Lord's own report? One thing stands out with great clearness. Dr. Sanday's rejection of "nature miracles" does not rest on critical grounds. His most elaborate, thorough and characteristic essays in criticism accredit them. If he refuses to believe that such miracles occurred he can ground his refusal in nothing but an *a priori* pronouncement that such miracles are impossible.

This having been said, everything has been said. Dr. Sanday has given his life to the study of criticism. At the end of the day he casts criticism and all its findings out of the window and falls back on a bald anti-supernaturalistic preconception. All his suggestions are dictated not by the facts as ascertained by critical inquiry, but by a philosophical principle assumed at the outset. The underlying motive seems to be, as Mr. Knox would say,<sup>107</sup> to make Christianity easy "for Jones to swallow". It is not of the ascertainment of the pure truth that Dr. Sanday seems to be thinking at the bottom of his mind, but of the placating of "the modern mind" and the adjustment of Christianity to its ingrained point of view. He seems to value his suggestions looking to the substitution of an unmiraculous Christianity for the supernatural Christianity hitherto believed in by men, because by them Christianity would be made more acceptable to "the modern mind". He tells us with charming *naïveté*.<sup>108</sup>

"What they would mean is that the greatest of all stumbling-blocks to the modern mind is removed, and that the beautiful regularity that we see around us now has been, and will be, the law of the Divine action from the beginning to the end of time. There has been just this one little submerged rock in our navigation of the universe. If we look at it from a cosmical standpoint, how infinitesimal does it seem! And yet that one little rock has been the cause of many a shipwreck of faith. If it is really taken out of the way, the whole expanse of the ocean of thought will be open and free.

But what if that "one little submerged rock" is just Christianity? Does it not fall strangely upon our ears, to hear a Christian theologian speak thus belittlingly of the whole supernatural element in Christianity? When Dr. Sanday read that amazing paper on Miracles at the Church Congress at Middlesbrough (in 1912) in which he preadumbrated all that he has since said, there were those on the platform with him who, had he only been willing to hearken to them, could have corrected his deflected points of view. Dr.

<sup>107</sup> *Some Loose Stones*, 1913, pp. 9 ff.

<sup>108</sup> *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, etc., p. 30.

Headlam, for instance, warned him already of the untenableness of his division of miracles into two classes—he called them then “the supernatural” and “the abnormal”—in point of both nature and attestation. Dr. Strong rebuked beforehand his belittling of the issue and pointed out clearly that the real issue raised is just that between Christianity and “some form of mechanical naturalism”. He said:<sup>109</sup>

“The question of miracles is not a question of detail, or one that can be neglected in the interest of practical or spiritual religion. It is one form of the question whether God made and governs the world, and to decide this negatively is to adopt some form of mechanical naturalism.”

And Canon Carnegie pronounced already the final judgment upon the whole matter:<sup>110</sup>

“A non-miraculous Christianity might have a future before it; on that I express no opinion; but it would have no past behind it to which it could look for guidance and encouragement. I cannot regard it as a legitimate development of the old Christianity. It is a new religion constituted on a completely different basis, and involving principles and motives of a completely different character.”

There are in point of fact unnaturally bound together in the Church of England to-day three different and necessarily antagonistic systems of religion. The Bishop of Oxford takes some account of them in his survey of the state of the Church,<sup>111</sup> but does not seem adequately to feel their essential opposition to one another. According to him the Church of England is brought into peril to-day by three tendencies which are driving to intolerable excesses points of view in themselves mutually tolerable: Catholic, Evangelical and Modernist need only avoid pushing things to such extremes and all will be well. It is a great mistake, however, to imagine that it is only in extreme applications of the warring principles that the strange combination of such contradictory elements in a single body becomes an intolerable evil. Sacerdotalism, Evangelicalism, Naturalism

<sup>109</sup> P. 181.

<sup>110</sup> P. 194.

<sup>111</sup> *The Basis*, etc., p. 30.



are not complementary elements in one whole of truth but stand related as precise contradictions in their fundamental principles. No doubt there is a larger body of truth held in common between Sacerdotalism and Evangelicalism than between either and Naturalism, and these may therefore seem in their common opposition to Naturalism to draw together. Supernaturalism for instance,—which is the very breath of life of any operative religion for sinners—is common ground between them. But this agreement in certain fundamental truths does not void their contradiction at vital points, although it may explain how Dr. Headlam, for example, can argue that it is an exaggeration to speak of them as two different religious systems.<sup>112</sup> In his survey Dr. Headlam strangely omits all consideration of the Naturalism which is rampant in the Church of England—and not in the Church of England alone among the churches—and which undoubtedly is a religion in its very essence distinct from anything that can by any legitimate extension of language be called Christianity.

What is happening in the Church of England at the moment is an attempt on the part of Sacerdotalism to suppress Evangelicalism and to extrude Naturalism. In this Sacerdotalism is only showing that it is coming to ever purer consciousness of its own essential nature. That it should assert itself and endeavor to free itself from the constant irritation of contact within the same organization of contradictory systems of religion is only natural and is to be commended. It is a pity that it should have been left to it to demand the exclusion of Naturalism from a church claiming the Christian name. It is to be hoped that Evangelicalism will after a while awake to its responsibilities and to its strength, and take over the task of freeing the Church of England from such destructive error. It does not seem as if that day had yet come: Sacerdotalism appears rather to be in a position to threaten it along with Naturalism. This undoubtedly brings with it

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<sup>112</sup> *The Church Quarterly Review*, April 1914, p. 156.

a great peril: for no error could be more fatal than for Evangelicalism, under the sting of the common assault made upon them both by Sacerdotalism, to make common cause with Naturalism. What is needed above everything else in the Church of England is that Evangelicals—who after all constitute the only legitimate Church of England—should recover their self-consciousness and assert themselves; no longer seeking as “good churchmen” to conciliate the Sacerdotalists or as “men of open mind” to conciliate the Liberals, but as faithful stewards of the saving gospel to please the Master. There is an application here too of the saying: “Be not unequally yoked together with unbelievers.”

*Princeton.*

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## THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS\*

Recent discussion of the beginnings of Christianity have set in clearer light the intimate relation of the death of Jesus in its redemptive significance and the resurrection of Jesus. This ought never to have been obscured since it is so plainly taught in the New Testament. But the uniqueness of the resurrection and the fundamental importance attached to it by Paul for the validity of the Gospel and of Christian faith and hope, and the manifestly causal relation which it sustained in the quickening and informing of the belief of the primitive Christian community, have given it a certain isolation as an object both of attack and defense in the course of the Christian centuries. The bond of union is primarily conceptual, but ultimately, if both are true, personal, since both are predicated of Jesus. It is this fact—their relation to Jesus—that gives them their significance. Entering thus into primitive Christian faith these two facts—the death and the resurrection of Jesus—have meaning for the early Apostolic conception not only of Jesus but also of His work.

But supposing these two elements to have formed part of the primitive Apostolic conception of Jesus—and the evidence for this can not be questioned—the origin of this conception and its validity are matters of the utmost concern since the issue involves the truthfulness of Christianity in its very inception. There is no reason to doubt and there is good evidence for believing that by this conception of Jesus, including these two facts, Christianity was constituted a religion of redemption; for Jesus was for Christian faith the Saviour in and through His death and resurrection.

Whence then came this faith? Was it grounded in experience and does it lay hold upon reality? If so, its origin and adequate cause can be no other than Jesus Himself. But if not, the origin either of the whole or of part of the

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\*Two lectures delivered at the Princeton Seminary Summer School of Theology in June, 1914.

conception must be sought in some idea which has transformed Jesus into the person possessed of the qualities and charged with the function ascribed to Him in primitive Christian faith.

The decision of this issue is certain if the primary historical evidence—the testimony of the New Testament writings—is trustworthy. This however is frequently questioned. It is necessary therefore to analyse the evidence and consider its implications. When these have been determined, the hypothesis of transformation must be tested. If this fails to account for the origin of Christian faith, the explanation which this faith gives of its own origin ought to be accepted and with it the character of the Christian religion which this involves.

There is of course a reason for the separation of the resurrection from the death of Jesus. The resurrection plainly implicates the supernatural and can have no place in a naturalistic interpretation of the origin of Christianity. The death of Jesus may however be accepted as a fact and fitted into such a construction. But this necessitates a modification of the New Testament representation both of Jesus' person and of the significance of His death, eliminating the divine element, of His person and the redemptive meaning of His death, transferring both to the sphere of idea or belief not grounded in reality but otherwise historically occasioned, and retaining as facts only a human person and his actual death.

It is not strange therefore that even from the naturalistic point of view an interpretation of the origin of Christianity should appear which insists upon the union of the death and the resurrection in a view of Jesus in which together these two elements have significance and of which they form an essential part. Only, on this interpretation, the New Testament conception of Jesus, not in part and not in particular by the inclusion of the resurrection but in its entirety, becomes either the transformation by apotheosis of an historical individual—a man, Jesus the prophet of Nazareth—

or the creation, the origination by personification, the mythological derivation of the Gospel portraiture of an incarnate suffering and rising Saviour God.

The latter alternative—the “radical” view—has the merit of being logically consistent though at the expense of being historically absurd. The New Testament representation of Jesus is held to be entirely mythical. No such person ever existed upon earth; for the person there described is distinctly a divine person and like other representations of divine persons participating in human affairs it too owes its origin to a mythological motive. In the background lies a solar or a vegetation myth historically mediated in a pre-Christian Jesus cult.

This view has been modified by combination with the other type of the naturalistic interpretation of the origin of Christianity, the “liberal” view, and thus creates an intermediate view, well represented by Maurenbrecher.<sup>1</sup> Admitting the existence of Jesus, the prophet of Nazareth, and the generally trustworthy character of the account of His life and teaching in the Synoptic Gospels within the limits of a purely human experience and critically freed from the influences of the later faith, it offers a mythological instead of a personal explanation of His apotheosis in the primitive Christian community.

This is related to the resurrection and to that union of the resurrection and death of Jesus in the experience of a single person and in the faith of the primitive Christian community concerning that person and the function of which he was believed to be possessed. The two generic views of the origin and character of Christianity, the supernaturalistic and the naturalistic, alike offer an explanation of the origin of the belief in the resurrection of Jesus as embodying an idea which does or which does not truly represent reality. The two genetic theories differ in regard to validity. But the issue is broader and deeper than the single element in

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<sup>1</sup> *Von Nazareth nach Golgatha*, 1909 and *Von Jerusalem nach Rom*, 1910.



this belief—the resurrection—since this cannot be isolated from the person of whom it is predicated. In a word, the issue concerns the truth of primitive Christian Christology and thus the truth also of Christianity as a religion of redemption.

It is generally agreed that the primitive Christian community believed in the resurrection of Jesus, or rather, in Jesus who was crucified, who rose from the dead and was exalted to the place of supreme power in the Messianic Kingdom. There is general agreement also that the belief in the resurrection—and, of course, in the precedent death of Jesus—was the characteristic and determinative element in this faith. It is admitted that this faith implicates a Messianic background of prophecy or promise and a Messianic future of expectation and hope. The Jesus of whom the resurrection was believed was believed to be the Messiah. But here also the genetic problem presses and different views give different answers. Did Jesus Himself share and inspire this belief? And whether He did or not, what is the source of the Christian conception of the Messiah? Does this have its origin in the ideas of the Old Testament, or have contributions been made to it from other sources? In particular whence came the transcendent element in the Christian conception and the equally distinctive note of suffering and the triumphant issue in the resurrection? How early did this idea in its essential features form part of the Christian faith?

These are some of the questions that are raised by an historical investigation into the origin of the early Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus. They would not be difficult to answer if the testimony of the New Testament were accepted; but there are many objections urged against this, especially its supernatural standpoint and Christian character. It is necessary therefore to examine the evidence and test its validity.

## PAUL'S FAITH

An important consideration in determining the value of the historical evidence is the element of time. The Gospels as documents are later than the earlier Epistles of Paul, though the tradition which they embody is earlier than their literary composition. The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians will furnish a starting point as its date may be fixed with reasonable certainty. It was written during Paul's stay in Ephesus about the year 55. From its statements it appears that the resurrection had formed part of Paul's original proclamation of the Gospel in Corinth. This was not later than the end of the year 51 or the beginning of the year 52. From Corinth Paul had written to the Church of the Thessalonians recalling "how ye turned unto God from idols, to serve a living and true God, and to wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead, even Jesus, who delivereth us from the wrath to come".<sup>2</sup> In agreement with Paul's statement concerning his Gospel, Luke records in Acts that the resurrection formed an element in Paul's message to the Athenians.<sup>3</sup> It has been maintained by Norden<sup>4</sup> that this address shows the influence of a type of religious discourse which was in use in Christian circles before the resurrection of Jesus had attained the significance it has in the First Epistle to the Corinthians. But this is not affirmed of Paul; and it is extremely doubtful whether the abrupt termination of the speech warrants this conclusion.

There is no letter of Paul's which records or specifically alludes to the character of his Gospel on or at the time of his first missionary journey unless it be the Epistle to the Galatians and—on Lake's hypothesis<sup>5</sup>—the short recension of the Epistle to the Romans. If the South Galatian destination and a date as early as the Thessalonian Epistles or ear-

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<sup>2</sup> 1 Thess. i. 9 f.

<sup>3</sup> Acts xvii. 18, 31 f.

<sup>4</sup> *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, 1911, pp. 362 ff.

lier be adopted, the Epistle to the Galatians would confirm the reference to the resurrection in Luke's account of Paul's speech at Pisidian Antioch.<sup>5a</sup> Even apart however from this theory of the destination and early date of the Epistle, the address and the autobiographical introduction make it impossible to suppose that this element was ever wanting in Paul's Gospel. It may therefore be traced with certainty at least to the time of Paul's activity in Antioch in the forties. Did it originate there or is it still earlier?

Pfleiderer suggests pagan influence both in the practice of the Antiochan Church, and, by conformation, also upon Paul; but he can scarcely mean origination. He says:<sup>6</sup>

In as much as religious practices are never made of nothing, we may well suppose that the Gentile Christians of Antioch still retained the old practices with which they had formerly celebrated the death and resurrection of their Lord Adonis and now transferred them to the new Lord Christ. Thus it happened naturally that Christ seemed the Lord who by His death and resurrection wrought the salvation of His own and became the Redeemer of the world. And now the Apostle Paul came to this new community whither he had been brought from his native city Tarsus by Barnabas. Soon he was at home there and labored with good success, so that the community rapidly increased. Thus it was certainly only natural that Paul also on his part adopted the practices and the conceptions which he found existing in the Gentile Christian community of Antioch. Otherwise, how could he have worked in it effectively? And it was the more natural since all that he found there fitted admirably with the way in which he himself had come to his faith in Christ. From a fanatical persecutor of the community of the Messiah he had been converted to an Apostle of Christ by a vision in which he had seen the heavenly Christ and Son of God, whose death therefore was not that of an offender but a sacrifice to which God had given His Son for our sins that He might redeem us from this present evil world. Of the earthly life of the prophet Jesus, Paul knew very little—as little as the Antiochan Gentile Christians. It was the more natural therefore that he should agree with them in the conviction that it was just the death and resurrection of the Son of God, even Christ, that constituted the redemptive fact and the content of the new redemptive faith.

<sup>5a</sup> Acts xiii. 30.

<sup>6</sup> *Religion und Religionen*, 1906, p. 223; quoted by Clemen, *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*, 1909, p. 152, n. 3; *Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish Sources*, 1912, p. 196, n. 3.

Concerning the agreement of Paul and the Antiochan Church in regard to the redemptive significance of the death and resurrection of Jesus, or in a faith which included the resurrection with the death of Jesus, there need be no doubt. But of the influence of the cult of Adonis upon the practice of the Church and of Paul there is no evidence. Certain similarities are made the basis of a causal inference in support of which no proof is adduced. Certain very significant differences are neglected.<sup>7</sup> We know little of the practices and convictions of the Antiochan Church at this early time save what may reasonably be inferred from its origin and

<sup>7</sup> J. Weiss says (*Jesus von Nazareth, Mythos oder Geschichte?* 1910, pp. 32 f): "The earliest time gives no evidence of the mood peculiar to the Adonis and Attis cults. Where is the passionate weeping for the dead, especially of the women; where the sudden change of mood into wild orgy, which are the characteristic features of those ancient nature cults? . . . Finally have the myths of Adonis and Attis influenced in a single particular the so-called Christ myth? The death of Adonis by a boar, the mutilation of Attis,—where are the parallels? . . . In all these cults and myths the hero is the lover of a goddess—Tammuz-Ishtar, Adonis-Aphrodite, Attis-Cybele, Osiris-Isis—and the pathos of the death, the bitter loss suffered by the beloved—her sorrow, her seeking of the body—is the essential content of the drama in the experience of which the faithful share. Of this there is nothing in the Jesus-myth. Or is there? I know not whether any one has set the figure of Mary Magdalene, seeking the body of Jesus, on this religio-historical background; but it will probably be done. He who does such things may do so; but he should not expect to be taken seriously."

It is not even certain, according to Baudissin, whether the cult of Adonis at Antioch included the resurrection idea. This was not part of the Tammuz cult with which the Adonis cult of Antioch was probably connected. The mention of the resurrection idea by Origen and Jerome has reference most probably to the cult at Byblos where the presence of the idea is witnessed to by Lucian. The idea was present in the Osiris and Attis cults, in the Babylonian conception of Marduk and in the Phoenician conception of the gods Melkart and Esmun. Ammianus Marcellinus is silent about it in his reference to the cult of Adonis in Antioch at the time of the Emperor Julian's visit, and there is no trace of it in the reference to the cult in Athens in 415 B. C. A yearly resurrection seems however to be implied in the yearly death; but it does not appear that this idea formed part of the cult at Antioch. Cf. Baudissin's article "Tammuz" in *Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, Herzog-Hauck, xix, and his *Adonis und Esmun*, 1911.

from Paul's activity there. This makes it impossible to suppose that the common faith of Paul and the Church in the resurrection of Jesus owed its origin to the belief and practices of the Adonis cult. Pfleiderer intimates that Paul was prepared by his experience to coöperate effectively in a Christian community in which this belief existed on his arrival. Its origin therefore in both cases must be sought in antecedent conditions.

Prior to his coming to Antioch Paul spent several years in Tarsus. There also he was surrounded by a pagan culture and was in contact locally with the cult of a pagan God, Sandan. Of this cult Frazer says:<sup>8</sup>

Thus it would appear that at Tarsus as at Boghaz-Keui there was a pair of deities, a divine Father and a divine Son, whom the Greeks identified with Zeus and Hercules respectively. If the Baal of Tarsus was a god of fertility, as his attributes clearly imply, his identification with Zeus would be natural, since it was Zeus who, in the belief of the Greeks, sent the fertilizing rain from heaven. And the identification of Sandan with Hercules would be equally natural, since the lion and the death on the pyre were features common to both. Our conclusion then is that it was the divine Son, the lion-god, who was burned in effigy or in the person of a human representative at Tarsus and perhaps at Boghaz-Keui.

The investigations of Böhlig, in which the influence of Paul's environment in Tarsus is over- rather than underestimated, reaches this conclusion:<sup>9</sup>

It is not surprising that an influence of the pagan popular religion is entirely lacking. . . . The figure of the Tarsian popular god Sandan presents a striking parallel to the central feature of Paul's religious thought. Even if this has in a measure determined the terminology of Paul, still the Apostle drew the content of his message of faith from the Jewish Messianic belief which he transformed in accordance with the Damascus vision. It must be regarded as certain however that this distinctive coincidence of the Jewish and the pagan conception of a Saviour exalted to God prepared Paul's way in the pagan world of Anatolia and perhaps also caused the strict concentration of his thought upon the exalted Jesus.

<sup>8</sup> *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, 1906, p. 60.

<sup>9</sup> *Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos*, 1913, p. 168.



It thus appears that the influences with which Paul was brought in contact in Tarsus at this time can not have contributed to his belief in the resurrection of Jesus and therefore can have had little or no significance for the origin of the more general element of transcendence involved in his conception of the exalted Jesus. We are thus carried back as Böhlig intimates to Paul's conversion, to the experience on the way to Damascus and its historical implications. And here we are possessed not only of Luke's threefold account in Acts<sup>10</sup> but of Paul's own statements in the Epistle to the Galatians<sup>11</sup> and in the First Epistle to the Corinthians.<sup>12</sup> As the result of this experience Paul was convinced of the exaltation of Jesus and of His identity with the Jesus of whose death and Messianic claims he must have known. To him the experience was a revelation of God's Son, that is, of Jesus as God's Son,—certainly involving His Messiahship and the whole element of transcendence by which in Paul's thought Jesus occupies with God and as God the central place in the Christian religion as object of faith and worship, Mediator of the spiritual blessings of the world to come and the supreme Lord of all things both in the sphere of nature and in the sphere of God's redemptive grace. This revelation was the source also of Paul's conviction of the resurrection of Jesus; for Paul definitely correlates his experience with the appearances of Jesus to Peter and to others by which they had already been convinced of His resurrection.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover there is no attenuation of the historical fact by Paul. The resurrection was for him just as concrete an event as the death of Jesus. There is no indication that Paul was consciously clothing in the form of popular conception a belief in Jesus' continued existence in the spiritual world—in the mere immortality of His soul. As He had been crucified and had died in the body, so also the same Jesus rose again from the dead in and through the organ in

<sup>10</sup> Acts ix. 1 ff; xxii. 1 ff; xxvi. 1 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Gal. i. 15 f.

<sup>12</sup> I Cor. xv. 8.

<sup>13</sup> I Cor. xv. 5-8.

which He had suffered. This is not affected by Paul's teaching concerning the transformation of the bodies of believers and their conformation to Christ's glorious body or by his teaching that flesh and blood can not inherit the Kingdom of God;<sup>14</sup> for a transformed and glorious body, corruption changed to incorruption, mortality having put on immortality, the natural body become a spiritual body wholly controlled by and the perfect organ of the spirit, is still a body—the body of Christ the first fruits and then the bodies of those that are His at His coming. Paul can not rightfully be appealed to in support of a spiritual resurrection and his view contrasted with an increasing materialization of the resurrection in the Gospels. There is no trace in his writings of the modern separation of the Easter faith and the Easter message. Paul believed in the resurrection just as confidently as he believed in the death of Jesus and its atoning significance. And he believed it of the Jesus who died—that it was the same Jesus who, having suffered in His human nature, triumphed over death in and through the same nature in which also He passed to His glory. Jesus Himself thus became for Paul in the Damascus experience the responsible author of a faith in which the resurrection formed an element so fundamental that without it his message of deliverance and hope lacked validity and he himself and others who bore witness to its reality became false witnesses of God.<sup>15</sup>

Familiar as we are with Paul's Christology it is difficult to realize what a cataclysmic change, what a revolution, was thus produced in the very center of the religious conviction of a deeply religious Jew, a Hebrew of the Hebrews and strictly monotheistic. To him every thought and practice of polytheism must have been an abomination, as every tendency toward the apotheosis of a human being must have been foreign and revolting to his inmost nature. Yet the Jesus to whom Paul gave with God a place in his monotheistic faith

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<sup>14</sup> I Cor. xv. 35 ff.

<sup>15</sup> I Cor. xv. 15.

was the same Jesus who had lived as a man and suffered a shameful death. The power that produced this conviction must have been overwhelming, dominant, irresistible. Paul never doubted that it was the divine power and in this he grounded its validity. Was he right? He was certainly right in the ground he assigned for its validity; for no other could justify as indeed it is difficult to believe that any other could have caused his faith.

In summarizing the attitude of different views toward this issue Windisch says:<sup>16</sup>

One of the weightiest of New Testament problems is involved in the question: How is it conceivable that as early as Paul the man Jesus has become the divine heavenly being, Jesus Christ. While the more conservative theology denies a wide gap on the ground that a divine self-consciousness existed in Jesus, and while on the other side the mythological radicalism avoids the gap by eliminating the figure of the historical Jesus and interpreting Paulinism as a purely syncretistic structure, the theological criticism [i. e. the "liberal" view] generally maintains that Paul, when he came to believe on Jesus, transferred to the historical Jesus the attributes of the heavenly Messiah whose figure had long been known to him from Jewish tradition.

There can be no doubt about Paul's own conviction concerning the origin of his faith; but is his claim in respect to the ground of his faith valid? This raises the question of mediation, of the causes or influences that may have been operative, consciously or unconsciously, in producing this effect. But ultimately the causal issue involved in Paul's claim must be faced, for on the supernaturalism of its origin the truth of Pauline Christianity depends.

Now this experience of Paul's was within four or five years of the death of Jesus—according to Harnack within eighteen months.<sup>17</sup> Was Paul's faith, in substance as well as in form, an innovation; or are there indications of the existence of a similar faith in pre-Pauline Christianity involving with the note of transcendence also the belief in the

<sup>16</sup> *Neutestamentliche Studien Heinrici dargebracht*, 1914, p. 220.

<sup>17</sup> "Chronologische Berechnung des 'Tags von Damaskus'", *Sitzungsberichte d. kg. preus. Akademie d. Wissenschaften*, 1912 (xxxvii), pp. 673 ff.

resurrection of Jesus? And if there be such indications, how was this pre-Pauline faith grounded; and is it of Christian or pre-Christian origin?

### PRE-PAULINE FAITH

The difficulties of this investigation are due to the fact that we have no documents from this early time, and to the widely prevalent distrust of the later documents. This distrust, in so far as it represents a critical attitude that insists upon a thorough examination of the evidence and an exact exposition of its historical implications, is a useful and necessary instrument of investigation. Such a method however is not primarily concerned with validity but with fact. When it passes into the sphere of values it is necessarily influenced by the differences of principle which distinguish the two generic explanations of Christianity. If the critical testing of the evidence be separated from the ultimate judgment of value upon its implications, the analysis of the documents will yield definite results. When these have been attained and their nature is known, the question of their value or truth-content must be decided in the light of all the considerations that rightfully enter into this issue. With this distinction in mind our investigation will be concerned first of all with the documents and their reasonable implications.

The documents which throw light upon the pre-Pauline Christian faith and the place of the resurrection in it are composed of two groups,—the Synoptic Gospels and Acts; and the Pauline Epistles. The witness of the latter is important not only because of the inference which it justifies: there were some things that were in debate between Paul and members of the Church in Jerusalem, but upon neither his Christology nor the place of the resurrection in it is there the slightest trace of disagreement or the least indication that he was conscious of advocating a view peculiar to himself. It is important also because of Paul's explicit statement of what he had received concerning Jesus,—His death, His burial, His resurrection the third day, and His

appearances.<sup>18</sup> The expression *ὁ καὶ παρέλαβον*, "which also I received",<sup>19</sup> can scarcely exclude human mediation even when read in the light of Paul's strong assertion in the Epistle to the Galatians in which human derivation of his Gospel is denied and its origin through the revelation of Jesus Christ is affirmed.<sup>20</sup> The two are not inconsistent. Paul may have known of the death and alleged resurrection of Jesus prior to his conversion and have learned other details concerning them afterwards, and his Gospel, his interpretation of the meaning of these facts, still have been communicated, as he firmly believed, through the revelation of Jesus. The agreement of his faith with that of the primitive Christian community would not prove its human origin, nor would the divine origin of his faith and Gospel exclude his reception of information about Jesus from sources that commended themselves to him as trustworthy. And as Paul tells in the Epistle to the Galatians of his visit to Jerusalem three years after his conversion and of his intercourse with Peter and James, the Lord's brother,<sup>21</sup> and refers particularly to the appearance of Jesus to these two men,<sup>22</sup> it is not unnatural to suppose that he learned on this occasion some of the details to which the words *ὁ καὶ παρέλαβον* allude. Paul certainly can not have been aware of any difference between his and the primitive Christian faith in the matters thus recounted to the Corinthians and least of all in regard to the resurrection.

Heitmüller<sup>23</sup> has argued that, as the Hellenistic Christianity of Damascus stands between Paul and the primitive Christian community, the inference from the one to the other should be qualified by this fact; and Maurenbrecher<sup>24</sup>

<sup>18</sup> I Cor. xv. 3 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Omitted by Marcion and certain Western Fathers, but well attested. Cf. J. Weiss, *Meyer's Kommentar*. Cf. also I Cor. xi. 23.

<sup>20</sup> Gal. i. 12; cf. i. 1.

<sup>21</sup> Gal. i. 18 f.

<sup>22</sup> I Cor. xv. 5, 7.

<sup>23</sup> *Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1912 (xiii), pp. 326 ff.

<sup>24</sup> *Von Jerusalem nach Rom*, 1910, pp. 36 ff.



has emphasized the importance of the Hellenistic element in the Jerusalem Church for the world-mission of Christianity. Maurenbrecher however attributes to this element not the origin—this, in agreement with the “liberal” view, he assigns to the experience of Peter—but the modification of the primitive faith in the resurrection or rather in the nature of the person of whom this was believed by both elements of the Church, the Galilean and the Jerusalem Hellenistic.<sup>25</sup> Heitmüller’s contention is valuable for its positive rather than its negative elements. Historically Hellenistic Christianity mediated between the primitive community and the Gentile Church in which Paul labored; but it is not likely that Paul’s knowledge of primitive Christian faith was limited to or seriously modified by what he received through this channel. Heitmüller however does not affirm that the belief in the resurrection of Jesus was peculiar to or originated by Hellenistic Christianity. He admits that Paul’s statement<sup>26</sup> shows that the original Apostles preached the same Gospel, including the resurrection. His claim therefore regarding Paul’s derivation of the tradition recorded in the opening verses of the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians—although unlikely in any exclusive sense—does not affect the inference in regard to the existence of a similar faith in the primitive community. This Heitmüller admits, with a qualification only of emphasis; as compared with Hellenistic Christianity and with Paul, the primitive community, as the sources of the Synoptic Gospels show, had a larger interest in the life of Jesus than Paul’s summary of the content of the Gospel would suggest. Both things however are quite possible in the same community; for the summary statement does not deny the fuller historical background, and interest in the elements enumerated by Paul can scarcely have been lacking in the primitive community or have constituted the distinctive feature of Hellenistic Christianity. J. Weiss says :<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 55 f.

<sup>26</sup> I Cor. xv. 11.

<sup>27</sup> *Das Urchristentum*, 1914, p. 2.

We are apt to underestimate the fact that the primitive community fashioned essential elements in the common Christianity which, to a certain extent, were complete before Paul,—the Messiah-faith, the worship of Christ, baptism, the Lord's Supper, the tradition of the words of Jesus and the story of His life, a number of Christian formulae, and the transformation or adoption of a Jewish or an Old Testament manner of thought.

The tradition recorded in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians in particular Weiss traces to the primitive community.<sup>28</sup>

The second group of primary sources for knowledge of the pre-Pauline Christian faith concerning the resurrection of Jesus is composed of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts. The other New Testament writings, with the exception of the Epistle of James, are later than most of the Epistles of Paul and have value in confirmation of the earlier evidence. This is especially true of the Gospel of John and of the first Epistle of Peter.<sup>29</sup> It is generally admitted however that the Synoptic Gospels embody a tradition that is certainly as early as Paul's Epistles and probably is earlier. It is also widely recognized that Acts, whatever its date and authorship, is based in its opening chapters on an early source and contains much that is authentic regarding the beginnings of the Church in Jerusalem. Its Lukan authorship seems well established, as does also its date of composition at the expiration of the two years with which the narrative closes,—a date recently advocated by Koch<sup>30</sup> and by Harnack<sup>31</sup> and adopted by Maurenbrecher.<sup>32</sup> This view of its authorship and date has an important bearing on the problem of the origin of the Synoptic Gospels; but it is not necessary in this connection to base an argument upon its validity. Most of those who date Acts later and two of the Synoptic Gospels after the year 70 admit that the literary sources of the

<sup>28</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. I Pet. i. 3, 21; iii. 21.

<sup>30</sup> *Die Abfassungszeit des lukanischen Geschichtswerkes*, 1911.

<sup>31</sup> *Neue Untersuchungen zur Apostelgeschichte und zur Abfassungszeit der synoptischen Evangelien*, 1911; *The Date of the Acts and of Synoptic Gospels*, 1911.

<sup>32</sup> *Von Nazareth nach Golgatha*, 1909, pp. 22 ff.

Synoptic Gospels are earlier and were current in the Jerusalem Church in the sixties. These sources—according to the widely current “Two-Document” hypothesis—were some form of the Gospel of Mark and “Q”—a source composed chiefly of the discourse material common to the Gospel of Matthew and the Gospel of Luke. But in regard to the Gospel of Luke and especially for that section in which the passion of Jesus is recorded, this hypothesis generally posits a third source, commonly referred to by the symbol “L”. These three sources—Mk, Q, and L—had already assumed literary form in Greek prior to their embodiment in the Synoptic Gospels and in turn depend upon and reproduce an earlier oral tradition of the Jerusalem Church. There is still difference of opinion about the extent of Q. Some affirm, others deny that it included a narrative of the passion. It is not perfectly certain therefore whether on this hypothesis there are two or three sources underlying the Synoptic account of the death and resurrection of Jesus. This however does not affect the main issue; for whether of triple or of twofold derivation the Synoptic Gospels bear witness in twofold form to the belief of the early Church in the death and resurrection of Jesus. The text of the Gospel of Mark, it is true, has been transmitted in an incomplete form; but the loss concerns only the narrative of events subsequent to the resurrection and even for these a form of tradition different from that contained in the Gospel of Luke is preserved in the Gospel of Matthew.

The source used in the opening chapters of Acts bears witness to the same facts and by its account of the speeches of Peter testifies also to the conception of Jesus which obtained in the early Church as the result of the experience upon which this faith is, in this and the sources of the Synoptic Gospels, said to have rested.

But what does this represent? According to Heitmüller the sources of the Synoptic Gospels represent the view of Jesus that was current in the Jerusalem Church in the fifties

or sixties.<sup>33</sup> Back of this these sources do not carry us. Still, this view must have had some justification. It is given not in the form of opinion about Jesus but in the form of a narrative of His life and teaching. Moreover we can not disregard the fact that these sources had their origin in a religious community organized by a definite principle which must have served not only as a principle of differentiation but as the principle of an historical continuity which reached back certainly into the pre-Pauline period. For before his conversion Paul had made havoc of the faith and persecuted the Church of God.<sup>34</sup> This principle can have been no other than the Messiah-faith which Paul knew and attacked; and this faith from the beginning must have included the resurrection, for not only is there no trace in any of the sources that it was ever lacking; there is no indication of its subsequent introduction; and it certainly formed part of the faith to which Paul was converted within four or five years of Jesus' death. The Gospels and Acts record what was continuously believed in the Christian community to have constituted the factual basis of its organizing principle and thus to have been the cause of its faith. The implications of these documents on any reasonable view of their date fully justify the belief that the resurrection of Jesus entered into and formed part of the faith of the primitive Christian community from its inception.

But how soon was this? Certainly prior to Paul's conversion and subsequent to Jesus' death. Acts dates the first expansive movement of the Christian faith in Jerusalem from the feast of Pentecost, fifty days after the Passover at which Jesus suffered. But belief in the resurrection of Jesus had existed before this according both to Paul and to the Gospels. In both the resurrection is definitely associated with the third day after the crucifixion; and while Paul

<sup>33</sup> Article "Jesus Christus" in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, herausgegeben von Schiele und Zscharnack, ii (1912), pp. 356 ff; reprinted in his *Jesus*, 1913, pp. 28 ff; cf. Warfield in this REVIEW, 1914 (xii), pp. 315 ff.

<sup>34</sup> Gal. i. 13, 23; cf. Acts ix. 21.

does not indicate the exact time of the first appearances, these occurred according to the Gospels on that day. The resurrection faith thus antedated the beginnings of the Church in Jerusalem, for it was in this faith that the Church was founded. This is generally admitted. What was the cause of this faith according to the historical evidence? Are the two elements—the death and the resurrection of Jesus—closely related in the Gospels and Acts and combined with the note of transcendence as they are in Paul? What explanation does the evidence in its entirety require in the sphere of values?

#### ORIGIN AND VALIDITY OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

The documents are explicit in describing Jesus Himself as the cause or responsible author of the belief in His resurrection. The empty grave is a fact attested by all the Gospels and formed an element in at least two of the three principal sources underlying the Synoptic Gospels, Mk, and L. But this was not the only or the chief cause of the new faith. Still, alleged analogies do not weaken its silent testimony or invalidate its positive interpretation. Gunkel says:<sup>35</sup>

The history of religion teaches us that Jesus Christ is by no means the only or the first being of a divine nature in whose resurrection from the dead men have believed. The belief in the death and rising again of gods is indeed well known to the East in many places. We know it from Egypt, where it is most of all at home, but also from Babylonia, Syria and Phoenicia. In Crete a tomb of Zeus was shown—of course an empty tomb.

Paul does not mention the empty grave and his silence is thought to have peculiar significance, indicating the later introduction of this feature in the resurrection story and showing also a more spiritual conception of the resurrection itself. The mention of the burial by Paul however makes both of these inferences unlikely. But Paul too like the Gospels grounds the resurrection-faith in an activity of

<sup>35</sup> *Zum religionsgeschichtliche Verständnis des Neuen Testaments*, 1903, p. 77; quoted by Moulton, *Religions and Religion*, 1913, p. 33.



Jesus. And the effect which this activity produced according to all the evidence was belief specifically in the resurrection and not simply in the continued existence of Jesus. Paul moreover does not connect the appearances of Jesus with any particular place or places; and the effort has been made to show that the first appearance occurred in Galilee. This contention is based upon the supposed divergence of two forms of Gospel tradition, the earlier localizing the appearances in Galilee, the later in Jerusalem or in both places. The evidence does not support this hypothesis;<sup>36</sup> and the hypothesis itself is important for and generally maintained in connection with a naturalistic interpretation of the appearances as visions, whether subjective or objective in form.

There is another aspect of the Gospel witness to the resurrection which has both a positive and a negative value. Jesus is represented as predicting His death and resurrection, and that not as a contingency but as a necessity laid upon Him in the discharge of the function He had voluntarily undertaken.<sup>37</sup> The thought of His suffering and of His resurrection formed part of His vocational consciousness. The two things were included not only in His knowledge of the future but in the purpose or end to the realization of which He had definitely committed Himself. On the other hand these predictions have a negative significance indicated in the attitude of the disciples to whom they were uttered. The disciples are represented as failing to understand words whose meaning was altogether alien to their conception of what the future must have in store for the Messiah.<sup>38</sup> The idea of a suffering Messiah, of a dying and rising Saviour God, was quite foreign to their thought and when concretely presented called forth vigorous protest from their leader.

The Gospels like Paul represent the resurrection of Jesus as closely associated with His death not only in fact but in

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. the discussion of the "Place of the Resurrection Appearances of Jesus" in *Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, pp. 307 ff.

<sup>37</sup> Mk. viii. 31 and parallels, etc.

<sup>38</sup> Mk. viii. 32 and parallels.

Jesus' own thought and in the experience of His disciples. A reference to His death is introduced in a general way in the Gospel of Mark at an early period in the Galilean ministry.<sup>39</sup> The Gospel of John, which alone recounts an earlier ministry in Jerusalem and Judea, reports a saying, the reference of which to His death and resurrection was subsequently understood by the disciples.<sup>40</sup> In this Gospel also a saying of John the Baptist is recorded in which, with prophetic insight, the Baptist testified to the sacrificial character of the Messiah's work.<sup>41</sup> In the midst of the Galilean ministry the two elements appear together in the sign of Jonah in the form preserved by the Gospel of Matthew.<sup>42</sup> But from the time of Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi, when Jesus began to instruct His disciples explicitly about His suffering, the two are frequently associated and are so related both in the passion narratives of the Gospels and in the opening chapters of Acts.

The note of transcendence, as in Paul, is not wanting in the Gospels; on the contrary, it constitutes their distinctive feature, permeates their entire structure and is present in their earliest sources. Apart from the Fourth Gospel and the infancy sections of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, which only increase without changing the character of the evidence, the Gospel of Mark and the material common to the Gospels of Matthew and Luke—or the sources of the Synoptic Gospels on the basis of the narrowest definition of their content—witness explicitly to a conception of Jesus' person which transcends the bounds of human nature and partakes of the divine. In the Gospel of Mark this appears not simply in the Messianic function, endowment with the Spirit, miracles in the sphere of nature and authority in the spiritual sphere, but especially in Jesus' confession before the High Priest.<sup>43</sup> When asked, "Art thou the Christ, the

<sup>39</sup> Mk. ii. 20.

<sup>40</sup> Jn. ii. 19.

<sup>41</sup> Jn. i. 29.

<sup>42</sup> Mt. xii. 40.

<sup>43</sup> Mk. xiv. 62.

Son of the Blessed?" Jesus said: "I am, and ye shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power and coming with the clouds of heaven." In the Gospels of Matthew and Luke<sup>44</sup> there is another equally significant confession in which Jesus gives expression to His consciousness of an intimate, mutual and reciprocal knowledge of God, involving sameness not simply of ethical disposition but of being, and with this also a unique and exclusive function as the source of God's self-revelation. It is difficult to escape in these confessions the clear intimations of transcendence. In the presence of the latter Heitmüller<sup>45</sup> acknowledges that the consciousness there described passes beyond the limits of an ordinary human consciousness, as it does also that of the prophet, and reaches up to the supernormal. Its implications thus seem to him weird, verging on the pathological; but from this conclusion he is compelled to draw back by the evident tokens of Jesus' sanity in the Gospel account of His life and teaching. Loofs<sup>46</sup> also has recently argued that the Gospel portraiture of Jesus transcends the limits of mere humanity; and the "radical" criticism<sup>47</sup> is insistent that this element—the transcendent—is not only present and dominant in the Gospels but is utterly destructive of the human.

The two confessions have in common the reference by Jesus to Himself of designations filled with profound meaning. In the one the self-designation "Son of Man", frequently upon His lips in the Gospels, had been enriched in its Old Testament and pre-Christian usage with high ideas both of the nature and of the function of the person who should bear it in the future. These involved not only pre-existence but the exercise of the divine prerogative as judge of the world. In this sense and with particular reference to His future authority Jesus often—as He does here—used it of Himself. The other self-designation, the "Son", is used absolutely and appears by its relation to the designation of

<sup>44</sup> Mt. xi. 27; Lk. x. 22.

<sup>45</sup> *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, iii, p. 375; *Jesus*, p. 71.

<sup>46</sup> *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* 1913.

<sup>47</sup> Kalthoff, J. M. Robertson, W. B. Smith, A. Drews, P. Jensen, etc.

God as "Father"—also used absolutely—not to be a generalization from Messianic titles such as "Son of David", Son of God", or the conception of the theocratic King as the type of the Messiah, but to spring directly out of Jesus' consciousness of the immediacy and intimacy of His relation to God.

The Jesus whose resurrection was believed in by Paul and by the primitive community was thus in common believed to be a person not only charged with a certain function but particularly qualified by nature to accomplish it. The Christian Messiah-faith was of the transcendent type. Its object was Jesus, the risen Messiah, the exalted Lord. The Gospel story of the earthly life and teaching, of the death and resurrection of Jesus was written that Christians might know, in the words of Luke, the surety or factual basis of this faith. In the Gospels the historical interest is indeed more extensive but not more vital than in Paul; and the interest of value and meaning is equally central, for to each alike it is just the transcendent Jesus, the Jesus of whom not only the death but the resurrection could be truly predicated who is at once the object of Christian faith and the source of all its blessedness and hope. Both elements, the historical reality and the transcendent nature of its object, enter into Christian faith; and the elimination or modification of either is destructive of or prejudicial to it. The historical element is epitomized for Paul in its supreme moment when Jesus suffered in His human nature and rose again. Paul affirms the whole by its characteristic part; and the central place he gives to this part corresponds with the teleological trend of the Gospel narratives. Jesus' earthly life was as real for Paul as it is in the Gospels and not less intensely real because, being purposive, its end to Paul appeared realized and the whole summarized in the great and mysteriously profound experiences with which His stay upon earth terminated.

But the interests of the common Christian faith are vitally related also to the reality of the transcendent element in its apprehension and appreciation of Jesus which ex-

pressed itself through the person in the facts of His earthly experience and gave them meaning. The object of Christian faith was never a merely human Saviour. To such an one neither Paul nor the Gospels attribute this function and of such an one no resurrection story was ever told or believed in the early Church. In fact, the resurrection, by its very nature partaking as it does of both elements—the historical and the transcendent—manifests more clearly if not more vitally than the death of Jesus the inner nature of the personal object of Christian faith, upon whose reality the saving efficacy of this faith and the validity of Christianity as a religion of redemption depends. Whence then comes this element of transcendence which in Jesus' person—and manifested in His resurrection—enters so profoundly into Christian faith, conditioning the validity of this faith at its redemptive center?

The existence and influence of this element of transcendence in the faith of Paul and of the primitive Christian community being established by the historical evidence and generally admitted, the genetic inquiry is concerned not only with its form but with its truth-content; and this of necessity raises the issue of principle underlying the two generic explanations of the nature and origin of Christianity—the supernaturalistic and the naturalistic. The point of view of the historical sources is supernaturalistic; and from this point of view they ground Christian faith in the reality of its object,—in the presence in the person of Jesus of a nature corresponding to its high affirmations. This point of view is certainly possible on the theistic premise. It is not invalidated by the many spurious claims made in the name of the supernatural. The absence of true knowledge and the presence of erroneous conceptions of God do not disprove His existence or the possibility of knowing Him; and neither does the recognition of an orderly process in nature or the existence of fallacious claims of its interruption set bounds to the form in which His power may manifest itself. But if the possibility of true knowledge of God and of the manifestation of



His power immediately be admitted, then the evidence that He has revealed Himself and manifested His power in Jesus Christ is conclusive. For the evidence shows that Christian faith was caused by Jesus Himself and that He Himself was conscious of being possessed by nature of that transcendence which is the object of the element in it that gives to this faith its distinctive quality. The truth of the Christian faith on this premise is grounded in the reality personally present in Jesus Christ as represented in the New Testament,—in His possession in Himself of a nature which it truly apprehends and which is truly portrayed in the New Testament. His person—the reality which was present in Him—is thus the final explanation of the origin of Christian faith in its fundamental and distinctive elements. The formal elements in the expression of this faith, differing with different individuals, may well have had a literary history, whether we are now able to trace it in every particular or not. In the Gospels the title “Son of Man” is frequent and by its earlier usage and associations lent itself readily to the expression of an aspect of the element of transcendence in Jesus’ consciousness. The *κύριος* title, strikingly pervasive in Paul, was possessed by antecedent usage in the Old Testament of an association which rendered it appropriate and congenial to the expression of his thought of Jesus, while to many to whom he wrote an old familiar form was charged with a new and deeper meaning. But these and other titles of Jesus, whatever their history and usage, have a meaning well indicated in the New Testament and set forth, in one or another aspect, the common object of faith in fundamental agreement. In brief, from the point of view of theism—of belief in God—from which alone there is the possibility of the supernatural in history and therefore of the reality corresponding to the element of transcendence in the Christian Messiah-faith, the New Testament evidence of its actuality centers in the person of Jesus and upon the reality of this manifestation of the supernatural grounds Christianity as a religion of redemption. In this account of the origin and

nature of Christianity the resurrection of Jesus is not an isolated or incidental thing but forms with the death of Jesus an essential and necessary constituent in the reality which was present in the person of Jesus Christ for our salvation.

On the other hand, that view which denies the truth-content of the element of transcendence in the Christian faith, and with it the reality of the resurrection, explains the origin of this element in terms of precedent ideas or conceptions. Brückner<sup>48</sup> has done this in the case of the Pauline Christology, attempting to show that this element existed in Paul's pre-Christian Jewish conception of the Messiah, and that his Christology arose by amalgamation with this of a Christian element—the historical, especially the death of Jesus—under the influence of the Damascus vision. Windisch<sup>49</sup> has recently sought to enlarge the background of this view by inclusion of the "Wisdom" literature, with especial reference to the idea of preëxistence. But the criticism of Brückner by Heitmüller<sup>50</sup> for failure to recognize the influence of Hellenism upon Paul has perhaps best been met by Bousset.<sup>51</sup>

Bousset's discussion is significant because of its comprehensive character, for it includes not simply Paul but the primitive Christian community as well. Of the two elements in the Jewish Messianic expectation, the political and the transcendent reflected in the titles "Son of David" and "Son of Man", the latter was dominant in early Christian circles. This included the conception of preëxistence and judgeship over the world, the Christians contributing the idea of exaltation by which Jesus became possessed of this dignity. Bousset says:<sup>52</sup>

The first community of Jesus' disciples regarded Him as the Messiah, consciously in part rejecting the ideal embodied in the

<sup>48</sup> *Die Entstehung der paulinischen Christologie*, 1903.

<sup>49</sup> *Neutestamentliche Studien Heinrichi dargebracht*, pp. 220 ff.

<sup>50</sup> *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1904 (xxix), 351 ff.

<sup>51</sup> *Kyrios Christos*, 1913.

<sup>52</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

title "Son of David" and adapting to Him the Jewish apocalyptic figure of the "Son of Man".

But when and how did this occur? Bousset continues:<sup>53</sup>

After Jesus' death the Messiah-faith of the community could take no other [than the transcendent] form, and its birth in this new form must be dated from the vision-experiences in the souls of the disciples by which they were convinced that Jesus lived, by which the conviction was produced that in spite of death and apparent defeat—rather indeed by means of this—He had become the transcendent Messiah in glory, who would come again to judge the world. The factors that contributed to this result were various; the determining factor was the incomparable, powerful and indestructible impression which Jesus' personality left in the souls of the disciples and which was more powerful than open shame and death, misery and destruction. This state was intensified through the experience of the blasting of all their hopes by the unexpected overthrow and sudden collapse of their Hero and Master. It is a psychological law that such a disillusionment, involving the highest expectations, under the force of brutal fact, after a time of despair usually issues in a revulsion—or can do so—in which the human soul raises itself victoriously with a courageous "but nevertheless" to a state which makes the impossible possible. But then it is furthermore of tremendous significance that a conception of the Messiah had already been formed in the contemporaneous Apocalyptic which seemed to contain the solution for the altogether dark riddle which the disciples had experienced. The disciples of Jesus saved the hopes that had inspired them during His life time by fashioning them in higher and mightier terms. They cast about their Master this ready-made royal mantle, put upon His head the most magnificent crown available and made confession of Jesus, the Son of Man, who through suffering and death had passed into glory.

And again Bousset says:<sup>54</sup>

It was only by placing behind the Gospel [-message] of Jesus the figure of the heavenly Son of Man, the ruler and judge of the world whose glory, but half hidden and concealed, shone transparently through the story of His life,—only by placing Him in a great divine process of redemption of which He appeared as the crown and completion, that the community made effective the portraiture of Jesus of Nazareth. For the purely historical is never of itself effective but only the living symbol in which, transformed, an actual religious conviction is presented. And a

<sup>53</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff. The first part of the quotation is a summary and not an exact translation; but it reproduces the thought.

<sup>54</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 91 f.

time which was by no means animated solely by simple ethical or simple religious ideas but by all kinds of more or less fantastical eschatological expectations, by belief in miracle and prophecy, in a near, unprecedented, special intervention of God in the course of nature and history, in manifold means of salvation and Messiahs, in devil and demons, and the approaching triumph of God over hostile powers,—such a time needed just the portraiture of Jesus that the first disciples made, and received its eternal truth in the many-colored garment that formed its temporal clothing.

In agreement with Heitmüller, Bousset conceives of the Hellenistic communities of Antioch, Damascus and Tarsus as mediating between Paul and the primitive Christian community. Paul's Christology also is essentially transcendent but its form was influenced by the place and title which Jesus held in these communities. This is indicated primarily by the *κύριος* title, and the influence of Hellenism may be traced especially in Paul's Pneumatology which stands in intimate relation with his Christology. The tradition which Paul repeats in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians was derived from the Antiochan Church and only indirectly from the Jerusalem Church.

The sufficiency of Bousset's explanation of the origin of the Christian faith is primarily conditioned by its naturalistic principle. This underlies the whole argument and finds incidental but clear expression in the remark with which the treatment of the origin of the belief in the resurrection on the third day is introduced. Bousset says:<sup>55</sup>

In as much as every explanation of this period of time by means of an event that happened on Easter Sunday and was known to the Apostle is excluded in a critical consideration of the tradition of the resurrection in Paul, we are confronted with the problem of its derivation from some other source.

Even Brückner, from the same naturalistic premise, points out the inconclusiveness of Bousset's psychological explanation of the origin of the new faith. Brückner says:<sup>56</sup>

The manner of the impression of Jesus on His disciples should have been more accurately defined. In particular, the offense of

<sup>55</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>56</sup> *Theologische Rundschau*, 1914 (xvii), p. 173.

Jesus' death on the cross can not have been removed by such psychological experiences.

And with this reference to the death of Jesus, Brückner indicates another weakness in Bousset's theory. Brückner says:<sup>57</sup>

It is certain that the idea of the suffering Messiah of later Judaism can not be shown to have existed at that time; and it is an unsolved enigma that the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah appears as its Scriptural proof so seldom and so late. . . . Moreover the definite dogmatic statement that the resurrection occurred on the third day or after three days can scarcely have developed, as Bousset thinks, from the common popular belief that the soul of a dead person remained near the body for three days. Certainly underlying this is the general dogmatic datum that the dying Hero rises on the third day or after three days.

Brückner in his criticism of Bousset thus approaches the view of Maurenbrecher,—or a position intermediate between the “liberal” and the “mythological” interpretations. This view has the advantage which comes from combining the real and the ideal, the personal and the dogmatic, the actual and the mythological. Maurenbrecher insists that the impression of the historical Jesus does not explain the character of the faith which followed the vision-experiences of Peter and the other disciples. These visions must have had in them the element which distinguishes the resultant faith, and this is the transcendent conception of the Messiah in which Jewish and mythological ideas were combined. The Jewish alone will not explain the resultant faith, for this involved the ideas of death and resurrection, both of which are foreign to the Jewish and characteristic of the mythological conception. And it is just this combination of ideas and their application to the historical Jesus that supplied the motive power which differentiated Christianity from other religions of the time, qualified it for its world-mission and resulted in its ultimate triumph. Maurenbrecher also adds to the psychological derivation of the resurrection by antecedent influence of this combination of ideas a historico-

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<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*



national factor. In agreement with Bousset and Brückner he insists that the cause of this faith must have been implicit in the disciple's consciousness prior to its origin. He supplements the impressionistic memory-motive of Bousset's acting upon the Jewish apocalyptic conception of the Messiah not only by the mythological idea of the dying and rising God but also by the hypothesis of a special disposition in the mental inheritance of Jesus' disciples wrought in them through the national experiences of the people to which they belonged. Of the disciples confronted by the overwhelming fact of Jesus's death he says:<sup>58</sup>

At this point it appears that [the mental disposition of] these men was determined by the development of the people from which they had sprung. For centuries this people had been trained in the ability to take from every disillusionment new hope and new illusions. How frequently in the last eight centuries had the great "Now" [of God's intervention] sounded in its history. The appearance of Jesus in Capernaum and the hour of exaltation on the Mount of Olives were not new in the background of its experience. They corresponded with a view which both before and afterward influenced hundreds of men. Without this discipline of their instincts, the recovery of the disciples after Jesus' death would not have happened. But since the recovery from illusion was a commonplace thing among this people, so now from the terrible catastrophe hope was quickened again and all the more exultantly. What the disciples experienced in the appearances of the risen [Lord] was thus no individual occurrence that might have happened anywhere and at any time. It was the product of the history of this people under whose influence these individuals had been formed. This century-long training of the feeling and volition characteristic of the individual constitutes the necessary condition precedent upon which the very possibility of the experience of the appearances of the risen [Lord] by the Galilean Sea was contingent.

The multiplication of causes to account for the faith of the disciples is indicative of the insufficiency of the separate elements of the theory; and their combination is neither adequately grounded nor possessed of any unifying principle in the conditions precedent to the result to be explained. Memory of Jesus there was; and the impression of His person

<sup>58</sup> *Von Nazareth nach Golgatha*, 1909, p. 262.

upon His disciples during His earthly life was undoubtedly profound. But this alone will not explain the triumph of their faith nor its form. Apocalyptic Messianism, which was also a condition precedent, fails equally to account for the element of suffering or explain the form of the new faith. The pagan idea of the dying and rising God is non-Messianic, anti-historical, and there is not only no evidence of its influence but rather of the absence of influence upon the thought of the disciples prior to Jesus' death. Those therefore are more consistent who seek to escape the difficulties of this explanation of the resurrection-faith by eliminating not simply the resurrection but the death, and thus the person, of Jesus from the sphere of history. But this view, like the myth which it substitutes for historical fact, is—not partially but consistently—anti-historical, and is by the evidence condemned as untrue.

But if the "liberal" impressionistic theory, with the help of the pre-Christian Jewish transcendental Messiah conception, fails to explain the element of suffering and resurrection in the Christian faith; and the intermediate theory of Maurenbrecher, with the help of a historico-national psychology and the mythological motive, fails to ground the mediation of the idea of the dying and rising God in the circles in which Christian faith arose—and Maurenbrecher offers no evidence of its influence but bases his whole contention on the possibility of its presence in the semi-pagan circles of Galilee—there are but two alternatives; the mythological or "radical" theory which eliminates the historical element in Christian faith by transforming Jesus Himself into a pre-Christian myth; and the view of the New Testament which combines the two elements, the historical and the transcendent, and grounds them in the reality which was manifest in the person of Jesus Christ. The "radical" view is disproven by substantial evidence, and serves a useful purpose by exhibiting in concrete form the *reductio ad absurdum* of the naturalistic theories. The other—the New Testament view—is frankly supernaturalistic and ex-

plains Christian faith and the course and vitality of the Christian religion in terms of the reality of its object. To this object both faith and worship are due because the high predicate of transcendence is grounded in His divine nature; and of this personal object of faith and worship the resurrection is believed upon the same grounds upon which His transcendence and the atoning significance of His death are believed.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

# REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

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## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*The Threshold of Religion.* By R. R. MARETT, M.A., D.Sc., Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, Oxford; University Reader in Social Anthropology; President of the Folk Lore Society. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. 8vo; pp. xxxii, 224. \$1.50.

We have here eight essays. They have all, or almost all, been published before. They are now issued, after but slight revision, in a single volume with an "Introduction" and an "Index." The titles of the essays are I. "Pre-Animistic Religion", II. "From Spell to Prayer", III. "Is Taboo a Negative Magic", IV. "The Conception of Mana", V. "A Sociological View of Comparative Religion", VI. "Savage Supreme Beings and The Bull-Roader", VII. "The Birth of Humility", VIII. "In a Prehistoric Sanctuary".

"The papers here brought together bear one and all on the same general topic, namely, the nature of the experience involved in rudimentary religion." "Again, all of them alike illustrate the same general thesis, namely, that much of what has hitherto been classed as magic—so far as it has been noticed at all—is really religion of an elementary kind." "As regards method, while the author's general attitude is that of an anthropologist, his special interest is psychological. He approaches the history of religion as a student of Man in evolution. But his more immediate aim is to translate a type of religious experience remote from our own into such terms of our consciousness as may best enable the nature of that which is so translated to appear for what it is in itself." In a word, "he concentrates his attention on the psychological analysis of rudimentary religion."

His analysis of rudimentary religion sets forth from the assumption that, as a form of experience, it develops mainly within a sphere of its own. It belongs, as it were, to a wonder-world, from which the workaday world is parted by a sufficiently well-marked frontier. Why there should be this discontinuity pervading the activities and affairs of savage life the writer does not seek to explain so much as to describe. His purpose is to set forth "what sort of an experience it is—how "it feels"—to live in such a wonder-world. Such are the subject, the method, and the aim of these papers. That they are well done is only what was to be expected from the author's position and reputation. It is not always, however, or often, that scientific and technical essays are written with such grace, brightness and, we may add, humility. Dr. Marett has succeeded in rendering interesting, and

he has rendered as profitable as could be, a subject as to which almost nothing is known and in regard to which you can discover almost anything that you would like to find. The great and the supremely important fact which stands out on all his pages and which makes them worth while is that religion is rooted always and necessarily in the sense of the Supernatural.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Can We Still Be Christians?* By RUDOLPH EUCKEN, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena, Nobel Prizeman, 1908, Author of "The Meaning and Value of Life," "Life's Basis and Life's Ideal," etc. Translated by LUCY JUDGE GIBSON, Classical and Oriental Triposes, Cambridge. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. 8vo; pp. ix, 238. \$1.25.

This is apparently a vindication of the Christian religion; for the author's answer to his question is "that we not only can but must be Christians". It is, however, a determined and insidious attack upon it; for the writer tries to show that the Christianity which we can and must accept is a Christianity which has been so evolved and emasculated as to retain not one of what, historically at least, have been regarded as its essentials. This may seem to be a bold statement, but it is born out by the following among many like facts and contrasts: in all ages Christians have looked to Christ as the founder of Christianity, as himself "the way, the truth, and the life", but, according to Professor Eucken, he merely gave content to "a movement that was as old as the race"; we are accustomed to think that, so far as that was true, this movement was exemplified in Israel and the ancestors of that race, but the author tells us that the sources of Christianity are several; the creeds of Christendom hold that Christ is both God and man, two distinct natures in one person, but this our author emphatically rejects; Christianity Greek, Roman and Protestant has found its center in the cross, but Professor Eucken ridicules the idea of atonement as barbarous for our modern notions; Christianity has characteristically based itself on the Bible as "the only and infallible rule of faith and practice", but our author, while admitting that there are some things in religion which transcend reason, makes it the supreme guide. That is, the Christianity which we must fall back on and hold to is just Christianity with its Christianity left out.

But this raises at once at the outset a question as to the propriety of Professor Eucken's course. Has any one, has even a professor so deservedly eminent as Professor Eucken, the right to play fast and loose with terms having a definite historical meaning? The Christianity of the creeds and of the ages may be all wrong; it may be specially wrong in claiming to be the only way of salvation; it may be hopelessly antique,—all this one may try to show, and should try to show if he really thinks thus: but one may not claim that this is not Christianity and that Christianity is the avowed contradiction of



all this. It is as though one were to argue, not that a protective tariff was unsound economically, but that when rightly understood it was the free trade position. Such reasoning the man of the street would stigmatize as both unsound and dishonest; and with all due respect to our distinguished author we are constrained to ask whether in his zeal for modernity he has not laid himself open to the same criticism.

Is, however, Professor Eucken right philosophically? Granted that Christianity is outrun and that we cannot fall back on it any more than we can on monism or pantheism—how about the fundamental principles of the early universal religion to which he would have us return and which, in his view, constitute the Christianity which abides? When we examine these principles we find that they constitute, not religion, but the capacity for it, the condition of it. As such, they are, of course, indispensable. They are, then, a part of Christianity, in that it presupposes them. To believe on Christ one must have a religious nature. But this does not imply that our universal religious nature can ever take the place of religion and still less that it can supplement and make good a dying Christianity. In a word, the capacity for religion presupposes the revelation of religion. Were God to speak from heaven, we could not hear without the spiritual ear, but the spiritual ear could not help us if he did not speak. Unless, therefore, religion be used in a sense quite different from that in which it is ordinarily employed, its universal principle cannot take the place of Christianity or of any other of its historic manifestations. That is, religion and revelation are bound up together, and revelation in proportion as it becomes adequately definite will be historic.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Assurance of Immortality.* By HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. 141. \$1.00.

This is a delightful book in which the author has accomplished a great thing by putting the old arguments into such attractive form. A prominent element in its attractiveness is that we find on its every page the freshness and pleasing virility of our author's public utterance. It is persuasive in every paragraph. One thing the student misses is the definite references. In this particular Mr. Fosdick has followed the instincts of public address rather than the opportunity afforded by the essay form. The chief defect of the book is its modified view of the Deity of Jesus which is to be found not so much in open statement as in fair inferences. There is also (pp. 12, 18, 109, 112, 126, 134-5) a favored use of the words "universe" and "world" where one would rather see the word God, which gives some intimation of the type of philosophy in the background.

There are three chapters dealing respectively with the "Significance", the "Possibility", and the "Assurance" of immortality. The outline is followed with fidelity throughout and the reader is seldom left in

doubt as to the meaning. The practical aspect is never lost to the view. The quotation from William James, "It feels like a real fight", is in perfect keeping with the atmosphere of the book. In the latter pages the pragmatic aspect is prominent.

In the first chapter there is recognition to the full of the forces which have made it more difficult to believe in immortality. The inadequacy of perpetuation in influence and the absurdity of absorption are set forth. Likewise the insufficiency of "virtue its own reward" is shown. All the elements of "the greatness of man" are cumulative evidence of the necessity of immortality. The moral influence of faith in the future and the implications of a faithless view are well argued. The first chapter closes with, "the creed of annihilation induces many a thoughtful man . . . to assert the truth of immortality not because he can prove it . . . but because he finds it necessary as an adventure of faith, to make the world reasonable". The appeal of the book is to "live as though immortality were true" (p. 137). In view of the modesty of the title of the book and the acknowledgement (pp. 98, 136) that "absolute verification" of the proofs of immortality "is impossible", it is more than passing strange that Doctor Andrew D. White, founder of Cornell University, as reported in the *Continent* (Feb. 26, 1914, p. 273) should speak of the book, however helpful it may have been to him personally, as a scientific demonstration of the soul's future life.

The first step in the argument is to show that it is impossible to show that immortality is impossible. The triumph of insight over sight in the physical sciences presages much for the spiritual realm. The argument by illustration is eloquent. It remains to be said that the argument gets no further when sustained by evolution than when it denies evolution, just as physiological psychology can neither help nor hinder.

When in the early part of the third essay we find (pp. 96-7) emphasis upon the belief in immortality to the end that there may be the practice of immortality, the query rises as to essential immortality. In this connection we find some spoken of as "those destined to live forever" implying that some are not immortal.

The argument of the book rests on the orderliness of nature's order and the reasonableness of the venture of faith to explain the facts. Mr. Fosdick insists that the interpretation of God shall be in man's highest possible experience and that if this be done "Never will he have to take a path lower than the personal, or than holiness and love" (119).

Our author does not consider the "faith of the vast, obscure masses" of great importance as compared with the judgment of "those elevated souls" who from their altitude have assured us. This does not seem to signify more than that the testimony of the highest is in keeping with the ordinary on this point. It is not a question of "elevated" or ordinary. It is practically a universal soul experience. The thought which appears of greatest concern to Mr. Fosdick is, "Does a man at his best tend to think—that the earth throws away

with utter carelessness personality, her most precious treasure". An adequate definition of God would make this reasoning superfluous. On page 135 the argument is made to hang on "profoundest instincts" and that is where it must always ultimately rest philosophically. Though one would like to endorse the book in its entirety, so timely and so forceful is it, it is not quite clear that the honest moral man of the "preface" will experience any great advance toward Christlikeness, as indicated in the closing pages, by the acceptance of immortality either on merely a philosophical basis or as merely the pragmatic solution of a spiritual exigency. This fallacy is all the more significant because it is related to the deeper fallacy concerning the person of Christ. It seems assumed possible to have a divine personality without a divine person. Much is made of the "belief" of Jesus in immortality. "Jesus never stopped to argue but taking it for granted as an immediate and unquestionable intuition lived as though it were undoubtedly true." "Jesus lived immortality as one might play Mozart perfectly." There appears nowhere the recognition that Jesus lived in the full consciousness of immortality, much less in the consciousness of eternity, as when He said, "Before Abraham was I am" and as in the promised abiding Presence, and unquestionably in his high priestly prayer in the seventeenth of John. We cannot be quite satisfied to say that Jesus "believed" nor that He "assumed" and "practiced" immortality, nor to limit his knowledge to the "intuitional" nor to particularize in any other way. We can never over evaluate the teaching and example of Jesus but there is something greater than these. It is Jesus Himself. Not even in so great an interest as the assurance of immortality can we afford to neglect the Deity of Jesus nor leave it to be inferred that his deity, whatever He has, is an attained Deity, which is no Deity.

Consensus of opinion as to possibilities of immortality at most can be only confirmatory. On the other hand, consensus of desire for immortality is compelling. It is not merely an intellectual apprehension of philosophical conclusion but it is the whole soul seeking that which it *must* find. Our author (III) not only does not consider this a good line of argument but characterizes it as "utter perversion" and "caricature" and prefers to hold that it is of greater consequence that the "creative process" should not be thwarted than that the crown of creation should be crushed in the highest experience and deepest need. Furthermore if "creative process" means anything at all it is impossible that it should be thwarted. Practically Mr. Fosdick pins his faith to the intelligence in the cosmos. Though the book touches on the goodness of God, the "if" might well be changed to "since" (p. 115). The argument nowhere rises as high as the legitimate argument based on the famous verse from the Psalm, "Thou openest thy hand and satisfiest the desire of every living thing." Real assurance of immortality must rest ultimately on the goodness of God. The philosophies which do not have a conscious, good God have no immortality to offer which is worth the having. Full assurance of

hope of an individual personal immortality can be found only in faith in "Jesus Christ who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gosepl."

*Princeton.*

CHARLES MCKEE CANTRALL.

*Vital Problems of Religion.* By THE REV. J. R. COHU, Rector of Ashton Clinton, Sometime Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. With an Introduction by THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF S. ASAPH. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1914. 8vo; pp. xiv, 289.

No one will be disposed to question the propriety of the title of these chapters. Evolution, evil, religion and science, personality, freedom, conscience, religion and theology, God,—all are certainly "problems" of religion, and furthermore, all are "vital". They are not *all* that is vital in our religious construction of the universe, but each one is of tremendous significance. Perhaps the best that Mr. Cohu has done, is to make us see more clearly their intellectual importance.

Under ordinary conditions, it is unfair to an author to cull scattered quotations from his book and use these as criteria for determining the ultimate character of his conclusions. But now and then a writer appears who gathers his thought up into terse statements, often semi-epigrammatic, which give him away, stylistic straws showing which way his theology is blowing. Mr. Cohu has this art. Thus: "The Bible contains God's Word, but all of it is not God's Word" (p. 23). "We must spiritualize matter, not materialize mind" (p. 44). "What enters the heart must also satisfy the head. We cannot keep our heart-beliefs in one watertight compartment of our personality and our head-beliefs in another" (p. 222). "God and humanity are essentially at one" (p. 273). "Evolution shows animals can pass into men" (p. 276). "The Fall was akin to a Rise" (p. 283).

1. In sympathy Mr. Cohu is a pronounced evolutionist of the rather positive type. His assurance here is strikingly prominent. There is not the slightest vestige of doubt. "Missing Links" and "unbridgeable gulfs" do not occur in his theory. Not that he attempts any rational vindication of evolution: it is simply accepted as a thoroughly established conclusion of modern science (p. 102). This of course has its effect on the author's treatment of other subjects; as, for example, his view of evil (pp. 68-69), of inspiration, and of revelation (pp. 131, 134), and redemption.

2. The language in places is unguardedly pantheistic. The *language*, we say; and it is *unguarded*. For Mr. Cohu does not mean to be a pantheist, however pantheizing his language may be. For instance, the statement that "Our mind is God's Mind welling up in us" (pp. 129, 198), is open to the charge of the pantheistic taint, were it not that Mr. Cohu expressly repudiates Pantheism, clearly asserting his belief in a Divine immanence that in no way absorbs or destroys human personality (pp. 248-254. Cf. p. 67).

3. Mr. Cohu has a moral influence theory of the Atonement. His championship of this view is somewhat bold. God saves us from

our sin by the appeal of the cross. He wins us back to Himself as a mother woos her wayward child. The actual forgiveness of sin was not *effected* by Christ's suffering. It was only *revealed* by Him (p. 266). The cross is not a propitiation, or a substitution, or a ransom; it is merely a revelation of a way, of the way back to the great Heart of God, a way which we may travel ourselves; that is, if we have strength to walk it. Here Mr. Cohu is forced to abandon the great soteriological conceptions of the New Testament. Moralism is ever a diluted gospel. It has an ethic but not a dynamic. Its prescription is vain because its diagnosis is false. You cannot have a true soteriology and a false anthropology. Nor can you appeal to a dead man, and even appeals to the sick are commonly regarded as poor medicine. The humanitarian atonement is not a real atonement: it is simply an exhibition. New Testament soteriology never teaches that men are saved by "all that is highest and holiest in human experience" (p. 266).

4. Going further back, Mr. Cohu has a philosophy that comes perilously close to Berkeleyan idealism. The facts of science, he says, are not objective. "The only objective facts we know are our own sensations and thoughts" (p. 120). Color and sound have no real existence apart from our mental perceptions. "It is we who manufacture the color of a dahlia and the boom of a bell. . . . Our whole idea of the Universe, from a dewdrop to the Sun, is built up of mind-manufactured sensations, etc." (p. 111). The very existence of matter as an "independent entity" is "a gratuitous hypothesis" (p. 113). All of which shows the extreme to which Mr. Cohu is willing to go in his zealous opposition to materialism. It is "spiritualizing matter" rather violently.

Despite the above extremes, Mr. Cohu's book is comparatively free from the dogmatic extravagancies which so often characterize writers who hold similar views. To be specific: he never stoops to the petty dogmatism that makes science and religion foes equally irreconcilable and equally bigoted. He insists that each is supreme in its own sphere, and both deal with universal truth (pp. 95-97, 99). He has the correct idea of human personality as being the whole man (p. 141). In this chapter (V.) the study of the subconscious self is interesting, and might with value have been prolonged (pp. 150-154). He never rants against the legacies of Patristic theology (pp. 230-231). He does not encourage the fashionable dualism between the head and the heart, our religion must have its intellectual interpretation (pp. 222, 226). The criticism of Determinism, as in fact the whole discussion of Freedom (Ch. VI), is not so conclusive.

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BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

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## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

*Der hebräische Pentateuch der Samaritaner*, herausgegeben von AUGUST FREIHERRN VON GALL. Erster Teil. Prolegomena und Genesis



mit 4 Tafeln. Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann (vormals J. Ricker)  
Giessen. 1914. 4vo; lxx + 112 pp. 28 M.

The Samaritan-Hebrew Pentateuch has hitherto been accessible to scholars in three editions, the Paris Polyglot (1632), the London Polyglot (1657) and the separate edition by Blayney (1790). Since these three editions are all based on the same codex, a manuscript of the fourteenth century, purchased at Damascus by Pietro della Valle in 1616—Blayney's edition alone contains variant readings—a critical edition of the text of the Samaritan-Hebrew Pentateuch has long been desired by O. T. scholars. Consequently the announcement made eight years ago (*Z A T W* xxvi, 293-305) by the Freiherr von Gall of his intention to prepare such an edition was a very welcome one. The present volume is the first installment of this work—the balance is to follow within two years—and is especially interesting because it gives us a full account of the material used by the Freiherr in preparing his Text and of his method and conclusions.

The Text is based upon a comparison of 80 manuscripts, of which the majority are only fragments. In the Prolegomena the editor gives a brief account of this material. Of the 40 manuscripts which he groups under the caption 'complete manuscripts' he has made use of 24 for this work. Only a very few of these manuscripts are strictly speaking complete. Most of them are more or less mutilated, such mutilation being most likely to occur at the beginning or end of the manuscript and some of the mutilated codices have had their deficiencies supplied by portions which are of much more recent date. The age of the manuscripts ranges from the twelfth to the sixteenth century. The editor believes that there are practically no Samaritan Manuscripts which date from the first millenium A.D. It may be noted here, that he assigns the manuscript described in *JAOS* xx, 1, p. 173-9, which has been supposed to bear the date 655/6 A.D. (A. H. 35) to 1334/5 A.D. and the Nablus Roll he thinks should probably be dated 1218/9 A.D. The dates of these manuscripts are determined insofar as this can be done with any certainty by the so-called 'cryptograms' which they contain and which furnish us with more or less meagre information, as the case may be, with regard to the history of the manuscript, the name of the original scribe, the date of its completion and the history of its transmission. All the dates are given according to the Mohammedan era.

The Text given us by von Gall is, as he tells us, not the text of any one manuscript, or of any group of manuscripts, nor has he been able to formulate a theory of families or groups analogous to that which has been developed for the New Testament by Westcott & Hort and others. In choosing between different readings he has given the preference to those which contain the defective writing of the vowels, to those which strictly comply with the laws of Hebrew grammar, to those which contain the older or more archaic etymological form and to those which are favored by the Massoretic Text and by the LXX. That this method involves a certain amount of subjectivity, he readily admits. He feels however that it cannot be avoided under

the circumstances and that the fact that he gives all the variants, places the reader in a position to study the text for himself and accept or reject the editor's text as he sees fit.

The arrangement of the material is very convenient. The text occupies about the upper third of the page. It is written in Hebrew characters for convenience sake, and chapters and verses are given in correspondence with Ginsburg's *Biblia Hebraica*, ed. 2. Immediately below is given a list of the signatures of the manuscripts which contain it. The critical notes follow in three groups: the first contains variants in the consonantal text, the second gives data regarding critical and vowel signs, insofar as used in the manuscripts, the third deals with the interpunction. The text itself is purely consonantal. The only interpunction which is retained is the division into the *פסוקים* or sections, which correspond with the 'open' and 'closed sections' of the Massoretic Text and which are carefully noted in the Samaritan manuscripts.

One has but to glance at the Plates, which contain facsimile reproductions of parts of six different manuscripts to realize what an arduous labor the collation of such material must have been and we may be thankful to the Freiherr von Gall that he was willing to devote ten years of his life to so difficult and at the same time so necessary a task.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

*Root-Determinatives in Semitic Speech.* A contribution to Semitic Philology. By SOLOMON THEODORE HALÉVY HURWITZ, PH.D. [Contributions to Oriental History and Philology, No. vi.] New York: Columbia University Press. 1913. 8vo; cloth, pp. xxii + 113. \$1.50 net.

This monograph is an amplification of a thesis submitted in 1910 to the Faculty of Columbia University. In it Dr. Hurwitz discusses an important aspect of the 'biliteral theory' of the origin of Semitic roots.

Dr. Hurwitz accepts the view that "the triliteral root was developed from the biliteral in a manner analogous to that by which the pluriliteral was evolved from the triliteral" (p. 37) viz. by the addition of a determinative, i.e. of a pre-, in-, or sufformative, and consequently devotes a considerable part of the monograph (Chap. 2) to a consideration of the function of this determinative in the formation of pluriliterals. As a result of this investigation he concludes that "the consonants most active as formatives were the liquids, the gutturals, and the semi-vowels *y* or *w*, any one of which occurs either as a prefix or a suffix to the root, or as an infix after either of the first two radicals. The labials *b* and *p*, the dental *d*, and the occasional palatal *q* are found only as sufformatives to the triliteral stem. The sibilants *š* and *s* are constantly used as preformatives or sufformatives. The dental *t* is also used commonly as a preformative and occasionally as an infix; while in the later language it became also a sufformative, this use being developed from the former sub-

stantive function of *t* as the abstract ending" (p. 54). Applying the results obtained from the study of the pluriliterals he classifies the determinatives, which were used to form triliterals from biliterals under the following "six classes of stems":

- I. Stative stems:
  - a) With ו or י prefixed (פ"י, פ"ו).
  - b) With ו or י suffixed (ל"י, ל"ו).
- II. Intensive stems: With the middle consonant doubled (ע"ע).
- III. Purposive stems:
  - a) With א, ה, ע infixed.
  - b) With ו or י infixed (ע"י, ע"ו).
- IV. Causative stems:
  - a) With ש prefixed.
  - b) With א or ה prefixed.
  - c) Kindred stems with ע or ת prefixed.
- V. Reflective stems:
  - a) Direct reflexives with ת prefixed or infixed.
  - b) Indirect reflexives with נ prefixed or infixed.
  - c) Kindred stems with ל, ר, מ prefixed or infixed.
- VI. Unclassified stems:
  - a) With liquid suffixes, ל, נ, מ, ר.
  - b) With guttural suffixes, א, ה, ח or ע.
  - c) With sibilant suffixes, ש or ס.
  - d) With labial suffixes, פ or ב.
  - e) With occasional dental suffixes, ד or ת.
  - f) With occasional palatal suffix, ק (rarely פ), (p. 70-71).

And the closing chapter contains a series of lists of triliterals in the different Semitic languages, which in the opinion of Dr. Hurwitz indicate most clearly their common origin in a primitive biliteral.

Even if the general correctness of the theory be admitted, it must be clear to anyone that the analysis of forms must be very difficult in view of the number of different possibilities with regard to the nature and position of the determinative, which are involved in the above classification and also because of the frequent uncertainty as to the original meanings of words. This Dr. Hurwitz willingly admits. Thus to cite a couple of examples the referring in accordance with Vc. of the root לחם *Ni* = 'to fight' to the primitive root חם to be hot, and of מלך 'king' to לך 'to go', cf. Ethiop. and Arab. *la'aka* and Heb: הלך (ילך) is to say the least highly problematical. And we are very doubtful whether his explanation of the forms with infixed liquid is correct or whether some at least of these forms e.g. שרביט = שֶׁבֶט 'sceptre' should not rather be explained merely as examples of consonantal dissimilation. In a form such as *iltarpar* = *iltappar* in Babylonian the latter explanation is undoubtedly correct.

It must be observed however in justice to Dr. Hurwitz that his work seems to be as he claims conservative, when we consider the intricate and highly theoretical character of the subject, much more

conservative than much which has been written upon it. This is shown in several ways. Thus he disregards "Indo-Germanic phenomena in the main body of the discussion" with a view to avoiding errors into which earlier advocates of the theory have frequently fallen, believing that a kinship between these languages "though often postulated and theoretically possible is yet entirely unproved" (p. 7). He also narrows the scope of the discussion by carefully distinguishing between "root-determination" and "root-differentiation" two processes which are and should be treated as distinct and confines himself almost solely to a discussion of the former. With reference to the latter he lays down the principle "that in the process of root-differentiation at most, only two consonants of the first root can shift to form a new root, while the third remains constant; and this principle affords an additional proof of an original biliteral element" (pp. 33-4). Still more indicative of his conservative viewpoint is his contention that "when the proto-Semites were divided into the stocks known in history, the verb-roots had already become wholly or partly triliteralized, while at least some roots had even then been made pluriliteral" (p. 4). He does not believe that in the so-called 'weak stems' we have survivals of the original biliteral stem, holding rather with Lambert "that סב and מַת are later than \*sababa and \*mawt and their biliteral character is, biologically speaking a reversion to type" (p. 17). This position is as he points out the reverse of that held by the 'biliteral school'.

Such considerations as these will tend to induce the thoughtful reader to give a careful scrutiny to Dr. Hurwitz' theory of the 'sub-conscious biliteral root'. "Briefly to summarize the situation", he argues "it can scarcely be denied that a comparison of such kindred forms as: רוץ, רָכַךְ, רָכָא and רָכָה, 'to beat down, trample', הוּם, הָמָה, הָמָה, and הָמָה, 'to be turbulent, roar', רָמָה and רָמָה, 'to be silent', and חָמָה, חָמָה, and חָמָה, 'to be hot', legitimately leads to the postulation of a common biliteral base for these various inter-related forms" (p. 13). The further fact that in some forms of the weak verb the weak element is dropped e.g. שָׁב (perf.), שָׁב, and that this also takes place in the formation of denominatives from weak verbs (p. 19 f.) indicates according to the writer that the weak element was regarded as subordinate and as an addition to the primitive biliterate.

Whether we are ready to accept the statement of Dr. Hurwitz that 'the existence of such a prehistoric biliteral can no longer be doubted' or not, it must be admitted, as Professor Gottheil remarks at the conclusion of his brief introductory note that Dr. Hurwitz "has offered a solution that deserves the careful attention and scrutiny of his fellow-workers in the same field".

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

*Babylonian Records* in the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan, edited by  
ALBERT T. CLAY. New York: Privately printed. 1912.

Part I. *Babylonian Business Transactions of the First Millenium B.C.*  
By ALBERT T. CLAY, PH.D., William M. Laffan Professor of Assyrian and Babylonian Literature, Yale University. New York: 1912.

Part II. *Legal Documents from Erech dated in the Seleucid Era (312-65 B.C.).* By ALBERT T. CLAY, PH.D., LL.D., etc. New York: 1912.

Mr. Morgan's collection of cuneiform tablets has evidently been very considerably increased within the last few years. In 1908 it contained according to Johns' "Catalogue" about 400 tablets. It now contains several thousand (the highest registry number cited by Professor Clay is No. 2184). In these two volumes Professor Clay has published about 150 tablets, legal and business documents of the period of the First millenium. A number of these texts are especially valuable because of their date, being dated in the reigns of kings, from which no business documents of this character have hitherto been published. This is true of the contracts, 23 in number, which date from the reigns of *Nebukadnessar I*, *Nabû-shum-ishkun*, *Nabû-nâtôer*, *Nabû-mukîn-zêr*, and *Bêl-ibni*. Eighteen of these date from the reign of *Nabû-nâtsir*, a ruler whose chief interest for us at present lies in the fact that both the Babylonian Chronicle and the Ptolemaic Canon make his reign a starting point. The one tablet of the reign of *Nebukadnessar I* (c. 1155-1140 B.C.) is included also on account of its rarity although he lived prior to the first millenium. Professor Clay points out that these tablets are chiefly valuable because of the light which they throw upon the palaeography of that period. And he calls attention to the fact that the Aramaic endorsement on the tablet from the reign of *Nabû-mukîn-zêr* (c. 730 B.C.) is "the earliest occurrence of Aramaic on Babylonian tablets". In like manner the texts published in the second volume are valuable because of the period from which they come, since only comparatively few documents of this character which date from the Seleucid period have been published. Of these 56 Erech tablets, 6 date from the reign of Antiochus III, father of Antiochus Epiphanes, the persecutor of the Jews. As the dates of tablets of this period give both the year reckoned according to the era of the Greeks and also the name of the king, accompanied sometimes by a title, they are of considerable value historically. In this volume in addition to the autographs of the tablets Professor Clay gives nearly 250 photographic reproductions of seal-impressions on tablets of this period. Each volume contains a brief introduction and index of the proper names occurring in the documents.

Of the autographs themselves it is hardly necessary to speak, as Professor Clay's name is sufficient guarantee of their reliability and excellence. He has already published seven volumes of texts of this general character, in all about 1300 tablets, and has thus like Strassmaier made this field peculiarly his own.

These volumes are privately printed and the edition limited to 250



copies. The Seminary Library has received them as the gift of Mr. Morgan, an addition to its library treasures which is very welcome.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

*Hebräische Poesie.* Ein Beitrag zur Rhythmologie, Kritik und Exegese des Alten Testaments von J. W. ROTHSTEIN. Breslau, Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1914. 8vo; viii + 110 S. 3.75 Marks. Bound in cloth 4.75. [Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, herausgegeben von Rudolf Kittel, Heft 18.]

In this book we have a further defense of the position taken by the author in his "Grundzüge des hebräischen Rhythmus" (1909) that uniform and not so-called 'mixed' metres i.e. measures of varying length, are the rule in lyric poetry. It is directed especially at Professor Staerk of Jena, who takes the other side of the question and in so doing has attacked Professor Rothstein. Staerk in "Ein Hauptproblem der hebräischen Metrik" (B W A T. 13) contends that a number of "good old specimens" of Hebrew poetry, e.g. the Lamech-song, Gen. 4, 23 f., the Oracle to Rebecca, Gen. xxv. 23, the Blessings pronounced by Isaac upon Jacob and Esau Gen. 27, 28 f., v. 39 f. etc., as also the closing verses of the Song of Deborah, Judg. 5. 19 f. prove that mixed metres were employed in lyric poetry. Rothstein in this volume examines the passage cited by Staerk and also brings forward several others and seeks to prove that they support his side of the argument. He does this usually in one or other of two ways, either by textual emendation or though less frequently by denying that the passage under discussion is a lyric one.

The author's fondness for textual emendation appears on practically every page. Where the passage is in his opinion lyric and the metre is not or can not be regarded as uniform he does not hesitate to question the correctness of the text and has recourse to the familiar methods of the "higher critic" to bring about its restoration. Again and again he calls attention to what he considers Staerk's culpable readiness to accept the M.T., despite all the objections which have been raised against it, a readiness which he considers unworthy of a thorough scholar, and he proceeds therefore as a thorough scholar to say all that can be said to its discredit when it serves his purpose to do so, which at the same time seeking to avoid the charge of prejudice and bias in favor of his theory of metrics, a task which is exceedingly difficult under the circumstances.

The question whether the passages under discussion are lyric or not, is of course an important one. Rothstein agrees in the main with Staerk that the Prophets, for example, were not necessarily governed by the strict rules of lyric poetry even in utterances which are clearly of a highly poetic character and he recognizes a rhythmical prose, as it might be called. At the same time he contends that there was a strong tendency to uniformity even in utterances which could not be regarded as strictly lyric. The difficulty here is of course in deciding

whether the passage in question is lyric and as such subject to the alleged laws of lyric poetry or not. When he tells us for example that "it would of course never occur to an intelligent man to require strict formal uniformity of the sentences in Isa. 1, 2-4, which clearly move upon a high rhythmic level and to force them into a definite rhythmic structure by critical alterations" (p. 50)—these verses constitute, be it observed, a good example of mixed metric à la Staerk—we agree at once and are merely surprised at *his* willingness to accept this to us obvious truth. But this does not prevent his asserting that vs. 21 f. of this chapter are lyric—a Lina poem or dirge—and applying to them his principle of metrical uniformity, which application involves textual emendation. We fail to see a difference between these passages sufficient to justify such a procedure. The chief difference as far as we can see is that the one passage can be fairly easily reduced to uniformity, while the other cannot. And when he calls Gen. 2, 23: This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man, a marriage song and proceeds to apply to it as a lyric his law of uniformity, we are obliged to confess that it is difficult for us to gather just what lyric poetry is according to Rothstein. We are a little inclined to the view that it is, practically speaking, anything which is in or can be forced into lyric form i.e. into uniform metre. But to state this conclusion thus baldly would be perhaps to do him an injustice.

It seems clear that Rothstein is first a "critic" and then a "metricist". With him as with Grimme, for example, metrics is of interest primarily because of the help which it gives to the textual and higher critic. The following is therefore significant since it clearly indicates one reason and what is we believe the main reason for his opposition to Staerk's view. "On the fundamental assumption that on occasion the Hebrew Lyric made use of mixed metres, either of choice or of necessity, the science of rhythm certainly loses its importance in textual criticism, because in the same song all rhythmical forms may be brought together and intermingled" (p. 25). In other words, admit that in the Hebrew Lyric mixed metres were used and it then becomes impossible to rely on metrics in textual criticism because irregularity of verse form does not then necessarily point to textual corruption. But this tends to make metrics in the hands of a Rothstein largely a tool of the textual critic and the theory of uniform metres a kind of Procrustean bed on which many a Hebrew measure can be mangled after the approved method of the radical critic. Herein lies the weakness of Rothstein's method. For we are convinced that the theory of Hebrew versification which will most readily commend itself to the unbiased reader is the one which is most in accord with the Massoretic Text.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Essay I. *A Research into the Origin of the Third Personal Pronoun*  
 704 *Epicene in Pentateuch and its connection with Semitic and*

*Indo-European Languages.* A Contribution to Philological Science by J. IVERACH MUNRO, M.A., United Free Church Minister, Canisbay, formerly Hebrew Tutor, Bala Theological College, North Wales, Author of "The Samaritan Pentateuch and Modern Criticism". Printed by aid of the Earl of Moray Endowment for the promotion of original research, University of Edinburgh. London: Henry Frowde, Oxford Univ. Press. 1912. Pamph., pp. 32. 1s. 6d. net.

This essay is the realization of the hope expressed by Mr. Munro in his "Samaritan Pentateuch" (1911) that he would soon be able to furnish scholars with a full statement of his views regarding the etymology of the epicene pronoun הוּא and the significance of this etymology. In view of the fact that he claims so much for his investigations, asserting that they furnish not only conclusive proof of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch—"better evidence of its Mosaic authorship than if Moses had signed his name at the foot of every page",—but also no less conclusive proof of the original identity of the Semitic and Indo-European families of languages, it is necessary that his investigations be submitted to a very careful scrutiny. This "hitherto despised pronoun" must be indeed, as he claims, a "rare and precious jewel" if it can furnish us with the key to two of the most mooted questions of criticism and philology. We regret to say that although we heartily approve and commend the desire of the writer to defend the Pentateuch and would gladly welcome any proof, which he can offer of its Mosaic origin, we are unable to feel that he has brought forward in this philological study evidence which can be regarded as in any sense conclusive, but are rather of the opinion that his philological method is so unsound and unscientific as to reflect unfavorably upon his theological conservatism and to do more harm than good to the cause, which he is advocating.

The theory advanced by Mr. Munro is, in so far as we are able to summarize it briefly, as follows. הוּא for the feminine is a more archaic form than הִיא. The masculine and feminine forms of the pronoun were written in the same way at the time of Moses but were pronounced differently. These pronouns were originally verbal nouns. In the feminine the *waw* has been changed to *yodh* under the influence of a preceding *i*-sound. The earlier form was therefore הוּא *hiwa'*. But in view of the fact that many primitive nouns have *ai* between the root-letters *hiwa'* may stand for *hai-wa'*. The ' may be rejected as merely the bearer of the *a*-vowel and if to this form we add the *t* of the feminine ending, the case-ending and the mimation, we obtain the primitive form *hai-wa-tum*. The first syllable of this word contains the original passive-vowel *ai* > *i*. The original active-vowel was *au* > *u*. הוּא the masculine form goes back therefore to *hau-wum*. *Hauw* is also found in Old-Persian. These diphthongs *au* and *ai*, the *t* of the feminine ending, and the *m* and *n* of the mimation or nunation figured prominently in Indo-European, the *t* of the feminine being used for the neuter. Speaking of the relation existing

between Indo-European  $\sqrt{mt}$  and primitive Semitic  $\sqrt{mt}$  he makes the following statement: "There is also good reason to believe that a very large number of the Indo-European races disliked the sound of this word, which they must all at one time have possessed, so that laying the emphasis on the last letter *th* they dropped the former part and proceeded to build up a new word as  $\theta a\acute{v}\epsilon\iota\nu$  in Greek, *Dau mori*, *Dauth-s mortuus*, *Dau-thus mors*, in Gothic. See Curtius, *Gk. Etym.*, Eng. trans., vol. ii, p. 163. Just as  $\tau\acute{o}$  the Greek neuter article, can now be traced to the old feminine ending *t* or *th* of primitive Semitic-Indo-European of  $a\acute{l}va\theta$  *haiwath* of which *al* is preserved as  $\eta$  the Greek feminine article, and *tad* the Sanscrit neut. article has taken a new dental ending, so the old Semitic  $\sqrt{mt}$  *mith* makes plain that  $\theta$ , the last letter of the original root, was formed by the addition of a sonant nasal in Greek into  $\theta a\acute{v}\epsilon\iota\nu$  to die, and by the addition of a dental as in some other Indo-European languages (see Murray, *English Dict.*, *Dead* and *Death*), e.g. Gothic given above, into the numerous words for and connected with death, beginning with a dental." He then gives a couple of other etymologies of a similar character.

It is of course impossible to enter into a discussion of all the points raised in this essay and we must content ourselves with considering the question whether *hai-wa-tum* can with any sufficient warrant be called a primitive Semitic-Indo-European pronoun and whether this investigation throws any light upon the problem of the age and authorship of the Pentateuch.

The difference between pronouns and nouns in the Semitic languages is so marked that it is generally recognized. Brockelmann (*Grundriss d. vergl. Grammatik d. sem. Sprachen*, vol. I. p. 296) says: "The pronouns in all languages belong to an earlier stage of development than nouns and verbs." Barth (*Pronominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*) calls attention in his *Vorbemerkungen* to three marked points of difference between the pronouns and the nouns and verbs. They do not have three radical consonants, but their roots are short, formed usually of a single consonant and vowel. They do not take the case endings. And lastly they do not differentiate the feminine from the masculine by means of the sufformative *-t*. It would be easy to give abundant proof of this. But the facts are so obvious as to make this unnecessary. It is true of Hebrew equally with other Semitic languages. What then becomes of this hypothetical *hai-wa-tum*? It exists nowhere. It is built up on the assumption that the pronoun was originally a verbal noun and as such must originally have had feminine ending, case ending and mimation. But as has just been stated the fact that the pronoun did not receive these endings clearly indicates that it is distinct from the noun. And in view of the characteristic shortness of the pronominal roots the expanding of the simple form  $\text{היא}$  into *hai-wa-tum* is contrary to analogy. It is especially remarkable that Mr. Munro should insist upon adding the feminine ending *t* to the form *hiwa* or *haiwa*, because one thesis, which

he defends with great ardor in this essay, a thesis, which is accepted as proved by Professor Sayce, is to the effect that the vowel *i(ai)* is originally passive and the vowel *u(au)* originally active in the Semitic languages. And as it would seem that one of the strongest arguments which he could find in support of this contention would lie in the use of these vowels in the personal pronoun of the third person singular, it is all the more surprising that he should insist on appending the feminine ending of the noun to a form of the pronoun, which according to his own theory is feminine already by virtue of its vowel. This primitive form *haiwatum* consequently not only does not exist in Semitic, but is built up upon a false theory of the origin of the pronouns. Its existence in proto Indo-European is even more doubtful, if possible. His *alvaθ* is clearly merely a graecizing of *haiwath* and its existence is inferred because it can be split up into *al=ḥ* and *τθ*, a most remarkable demonstration! But since this *θ* is merely the feminine ending in Semitic which as we have seen has no place here, the argument rests solely on the identity of *haiw* (Munro's form!) and Old Persian *hauv*, from which *al=ḥ* would be derived, an identification, which is to say the least very problematical, especially as *haiw* is a hypothetical form (see above) and *hauv* seems to be a demonstrative and not a personal pronoun.

Mr. Munro's argument for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is given in his "Samaritan Pentateuch", although he has furnished a few additional data in this "Essay". It is essentially the argument from archaisms, which was advanced by Keil a number of years ago. The great difficulty with it is our inadequate acquaintance with the essential facts. It may be that in early times the words for *he* and *she* were pronounced so much alike, viz. *hu* and *hü*, that they could be properly and as a matter of fact were written in the same way, viz. *היא*—this view has been ably advocated by König. And it may be that soon after the time of Moses the pronunciation of *hü* was modified to *hi* (written *הי*)—according to Mr. Munro, this change took place under the influence of the new Canaanite environment. If this is actually the case, the argument for the early date of the Pentateuch is undoubtedly a strong one. But unfortunately we are not in a position to affirm definitely the truth of either of these contentions and consequently cannot afford to make unguarded and unwarranted statements. Despite his great erudition, Mr. Munro unfortunately does not sufficiently distinguish between possibility, probability and proof and with the very best of intentions comes perilously near making the conservative view of the Pentateuch appear ridiculous.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

*Reden und Aufsätze.* Von D. HERMANN GUNKEL. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1913. Pp. vii, 192. Mk. 4, 80, geb. Mk. 5.00.

Eleven essays are collected in this volume which is dedicated to the



Collegium Academicum of the University of Christiania in acknowledgment of the degree of Doctor of Theology conferred upon the author. Like everything that comes from Dr. Gunkel's pen, they are uniformly interesting and suggestive, some of them brilliant pieces of writing. All of them were published before in various periodicals such as the *Deutsche Rundschau*, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, *Christliche Welt* and other more technical journals. Dr. Gunkel's standpoint as a foremost exponent of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school is too well-known to need description here. It colors every page of this book. In the preface he seeks to correct the sense which has come to be widely attached to the term *religionsgeschichtlich*, as if it meant a method which dealt with the history of religions, whereas, he assures us, in its original intent it merely meant to emphasize the history of religion as an ideal development over against the excess of literary criticism, which had unduly forced the chief end of biblical science into the background. This note of protest against overdoing the critical side, especially in its analytical aspect, recurs in several of the essays. We are told that, while agreement in the main results has been attained, it ceases to exist, when an analysis is carried into the region of detail, the uncertainty increasing at each successive step. This is one of the points in which the school to which Gunkel belongs happens to coincide with the conservative opposition to the Graf-Wellhausen methods. That there are others will appear from the following brief survey of the main import of the eleven papers. The first is devoted to the memory of Bernhard Stade. It describes his eminence within the Wellhausen school, and characteristics as a scholar. It is pointed out that the interdependence along the whole line in his work between the view taken of the development of religious ideas and reconstructive literary criticism at times exposed his results and those of the Wellhausenians in general to reasoning in a circle. Stade's non-receptive attitude toward the recognition of extensive Babylonian and Egyptian influence is also remarked upon. Some of the "universally accepted" conclusions of the Wellhausen school are admitted to be on the point of supersedure, but this is coupled with the confident assertion that the basic structure will stand.

The second paper deals with the Aims and Methods of the Exposition of the Old Testament. It takes a noble view of what the work of the Old Testament exegete at its best ought to be. The disconnectedness of the old method ought to give way to an organic attempt to penetrate beyond linguistic, textual, archaeological detail into the personality of the author. The exegete must, of course, be scholarly equipped, but his greatest requirement is that he shall be a creative or at least re-creative artist. These are golden words, but it is a pity that the whole procedure recommended is meant to stop short with the subjective personality of the biblical writers. For ascertaining through this the mind of the Spirit as auctor primarius Dr. Gunkel has no thought, for, as is once and again stated in these essays, the old theory of inspiration is hopelessly discredited. All that the ideal

exegete can hope to attain by his labors is a History of Biblical Religion not a Biblical Theology of the old-fashioned kind.

The third essay unfolds the principles underlying the author's article on Israelitish Literature in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*. The ideal held up here is that of a *Literaturgeschichte*. It seems to us that the purely accidental view taken of the origin of the Biblical writings precludes not merely the attainment but even the projection of such an ideal. Such a history of literature is impossible not merely because of our ignorance in the most important matters, but also because of the limited material. A recognition of the factor of inspiration affords the only possibility of organic treatment. Dr. Gunkel has to content himself with the distinction between certain *Literaturgattungen* and the tracing of the history of the same, so far as that is possible.

In the next paper entitled Simson the theory that the Old Testament hero was originally a mythological figure, or Sun-God, is combatted. The stories are legendary in character and reflect the ancient hostility between Danites and Philistines.

The fifth contribution gives a popular exposition of the story of Ruth. It is held that the connection between Boaz and the Davidic family was not original to the narrative but subsequently introduced.

The sixth essay deals with the Psalms. A comparison with Babylonian and Egyptian Psalms yields the result that the production of Psalms in Israel antedates the exile. A comparison with the Psalms in the Apocrypha shows that there is no Maccabean element in the Psalter. The oldest Psalms are collective, not individual, for the Psalms ultimately derive from the cultus. None the less in the Psalms we possess the ego is very frequently individual not collective. But whereas the collective Psalm is pre-prophetic in origin, the individualizing spiritualizing Psalm (*geistliche Psalmendichtung*) stands under the influence of prophetism.

There follows a paper dealing with the Eschatology of the Psalmists. This too was learned from the prophets. But post-prophetic, we are warned, should not without more be confounded with post-exilic.

The two next essays deal with Egyptian parallels to the Old Testament, the eighth more in general, the ninth with special reference to the Egyptian *Danklieder* published in 1911 by Erman from memorial stones in the Theban city of graves. The similarity of the latter to certain Old Testament Psalms is pointed out, but the author is very reserved as to offering a theory for its explanation. A direct dependence on Egyptian models is not favored. It is held to be more likely that this type of songs was already known to the Orient in general from the period of 2000-1000 B.C., and so reached Israel through the mediation of the Canaanites. Whether the origin of the type was in Babylon and passed from there to Egypt is left an open question.

Paper ten deals with Jensen's "The Gilgamesch-Epic in the Literature of the World". The phantastic, unscientific character of Jensen's comparisons is strikingly exhibited.

The concluding article deals with The Odes of Solomon. As in the previously published article in the *ZNTW* Gunkel here takes the view that the Odes are the work of a Jewish-Christian Gnostic about 150 A.D. Harnack's hypothesis of a composite origin, partly Jewish, partly Christian, is rejected. New translations of some of the Odes are given with several important conjectural readings. Two, defects in the Odes, from a Christian point of view, are emphasized: the consciousness of sin and of the need of deliverance from guilt is lacking, and the sacred history of the Old and the New Testament has almost entirely passed into oblivion. The singer of the Odes lives far from every thought of historical happenings in a world of spiritual concepts and transcendental processes. Hence the Church rightly cast off his work, "for the prophets and Jesus are more than the Odes of Solomon."

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GEERHARDUS VOS.

*Kyrios Christos.* Geschichte des Christusglaubens von den Anfängen des Christenthums bis Irenaeus. Von D. WILHELM BOUSSET, Professor der Theologie an der Universität Göttingen. Göttingen Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 474.

A treatise on the term *κύριος* as applied to Jesus would seem to deal with a sufficiently specialized subject. But, as the sub-title of Dr. Bousset's work informs us, we receive in it no less than a History of Christological Faith from the Beginnings down to Irenaeus. And even this scarcely covers what the book actually offers, for in reality it approaches to being a sketch of the earliest history of Christian belief in general, including some aspects that are not technically Christological, although the author in the preface disavows this wider purpose on the ground that the time is not ripe as yet for describing the origin of Christianity in the milieu of the Hellenistic-Roman civilization. The value of the book—and it is great irrespective of one's agreement or disagreement with its conclusions—is due largely to this breadth of outlook proceeding from a point that by common consent was of central importance and of propelling force in the earliest development of Christianity, the view taken of and the relation sustained toward Christ as Lord. As might be expected Dr. Bousset writes as a consistent "*religionsgeschichtler*". He repudiates the distinction between Biblical Theology and History of Doctrine not merely, but is eager to obliterate the lines of demarcation between the Christian religion and the surrounding spheres of faith and practice in the midst of which it grew up. He further brings to the front more seriously than has been attempted by anybody before, at least in such a comprehensive way, the principle that the forms of religious belief to a large extent took their rise and shape from the cultus, in other words that doctrine grew out of worship, rather than the reverse, as is usually assumed to have been the case. If to this be added the fact, that the general principles just stated are applied on the basis of a thorough belief that Hellenistic syncretism (the mystery-

religions, Hermeticism, early Gnosticism) most powerfully influenced the young Christian religion in several important aspects of its expanding life, and that thus for the first time the theory of the large indebtedness of Christianity to Hellenistic sources is here consistently worked out and placed in due correlation with the preceding historical development, enough will have been said to explain the uncommon interest attaching to the work under review. The book is bound to make for progress in the discussion of the themes it handles, first of all through bringing to greater clearness the implications and bearings of this most recent form of explaining the origin of many characteristic New Testament doctrines, and not less in the second place by rendering possible a mere intelligent criticism of a hypothesis which is fast becoming fashionable and in liberal circles will hold the ascendancy for some time to come.

In a history of Christology *from the beginnings* one not unnaturally looks for at least some discussion of the consciousness and teaching of Jesus in regard to Himself. But this beginning of the beginnings is deliberately slighted in Dr. Bousset's scheme of treatment. The belief of the early-Palestinian church with reference to Jesus forms the point of departure of the discussion and it is dealt with entirely as a given fact without any attempt to connect it with antecedent facts or convictions pertaining to the life-time of Jesus. To be sure this procedure is formally justified since in Bousset's opinion the *κύριος*-title was first conferred upon Jesus after the church had passed over from its purely Palestinian to a Hellenistic environment, and therefore does not play a rôle either in the life of Jesus or in the earliest Apostolic belief. But on that very ground the first and second chapters dealing with the mother-church might have been omitted. And in a book which in other respects does not care to keep within the strict limits prescribed by the title, some digression at this all-important point might well have been permitted. A Christological history without some positive account of the life and mind of Him from whom the whole Christ-movement sprang, resembles a torso. Probably other than purely formal considerations have contributed to this. By scholars of the type of Bousset so much is declared unauthentic in the Gospels and put to the account of later dogmatizing that scarcely enough remains to reconstruct the original figure of the Saviour. Bousset, to be sure, continues to believe in the historicity of Jesus. But in the present work he does not use the Gospels to obtain information on that subject. They are simply treated as sources for the belief of those who as the oldest bearers of the tradition stand back of them, and in their later elements as sources of the subsequent dogmatic development. Even in regard to so fundamental a point as Jesus' own attitude towards the Messianic question, the author does not care to commit himself. There is so much Messianizing tendency in the Gospels that the problem how much of a nucleus there originally was for this later incrustation to attach itself into becomes difficult of

solution. The author practically agrees with Wrede in regard to this matter. While rejecting the latter's peculiar literary explanation of the *Messiasgeheimnis*, and with Joh. Weiss attributing the secrecy to the influence of the idea, that Israel's hardening must have been foreseen and willed, and actively brought about by Jesus, none the less the pervasiveness and disastrous effect, from a historical point of view, of this element are no less emphasized than in Wrede's view. And as it is with the Messianizing tendency, so it is with the alleged tendency of the Gospel-tradition to magnify the miraculous elements in the life of Jesus or to embellish this life with all sorts of features drawn from Old Testament prophecy. After reading what the author has to say along these several lines one cannot help feeling, that the reliable material left in his hands to construe the historical Jesus with is totally inadequate for such purpose, and that over against the mythologists his position must be considered extremely weak.

The most distinctive feature of the book consists in the insertion of a new midway stage in the development of early Christianity. Hitherto only the primitive Palestinian church and Paul were reckoned with and the great problem has been how to explain the coëxistence of these two within the same fold and the links of connection or steps of transition from the one to the other. Now a pre-Pauline Hellenistic church chiefly centered in Antioch, but also existent elsewhere, is postulated and to it are attributed the introduction into Christian faith and practice of some things usually considered characteristically Pauline, chief among which is the designation of Christ as *κύριος* in the specific religious sense. Of course that the church at Antioch and the church at Rome, and perhaps others, were not founded by Paul is nothing new; the novel thing is that these churches are made active centres of religious production at a stage previous to their coming under the influence of Paul, and that they are assumed to have predetermined by their belief the subsequent teaching of Paul, who simply accepted the new type of Christianity there developed. For one who puts faith in the Book of Acts such a theory is of course preposterous. In the account there given no time remains between the rise of the Antiochian church and Paul's appearance on the scene with his distinctive gospel, for any such weighty intermediate development to have taken place. If this or any other church played such an important rôle, no trace certainly has been preserved of it in the narrative of that book. On the contrary the impression is distinctly conveyed in Acts that in matters of doctrine the Hellenistic churches were receptive and not productive. Particularly as concerns the *κύριος*-title, this is by Luke put into the mouth of Peter and others in the account of the early days of the Jerusalem-church, and that in its specific, pregnant sense. But Bousset, even after Harnack's partial rehabilitation of the Book of Acts, still adheres to the old skeptical position in regard to its contents especially in the earlier chapters. He prefers to gather from the Gospels what the earliest form of denominating or addressing Jesus was in the



mother-church. It was not *κύριος* but Son-of-Man. The instances of *κύριος* in the Gospels are all explained as anachronistic reflections of later usage, and this applies not merely to the objective *ὁ κύριος* in the third person, as found e.g. in Mk. xiv. 14, but also to the more numerous instances where it occurs in the vocative of address to Jesus. Bousset will not admit the possibility of such a *κύριε* being the equivalent of an Aramaic ܪܒܝ as an honorific title given to Rabbis. Such a usage did not exist and consequently the later higher sense of *κύριος* cannot have arisen out of it. Nor can it be explained from the transfer to Jesus of the Septuagint *κύριος* for Jehovah. That ܪܒܝ or *κύριος* were ever designations of the Messiah does not appear. The true explanation is sought in this that in the cults of Asia-Minor, Egypt and Syria the god or cult-heros frequently bore this name. It was in analogy with this that the Syrian Christians spoke of Jesus, their cult-heros, as *ὁ κύριος*. He was for them what the Dea Syria, Atargatis and Dionysos Dusares and other gods or demi-gods were for their worshippers. His elevation to this rank took place not as a conscious deliberate act, but as the result of an unconscious process in the collective psyche of the church. Paul found it as an existing custom, made it his own and further developed it in harmony with his own peculiar pneumatic Christology.

For this hypothesis there is no other basis than the mere parallelism only partially established of the religious nomenclature between the pagan cults and Christianity. Dr. Bousset places great reliance upon the observation that in both circles *κύριος* was specifically a cult-name. So far as the pagan religions are concerned this may be true, for these were little else but cults, the religion being coëxtensive with its communal expression. But Christianity from the beginning was far more than a cultus, and it cannot be proven that *κύριος* with Paul or anywhere else in the New Testament has any exclusive or even preferential connection with the cultus. Of course it is easy for Dr. Bousset to prove that it entered into the public worship of the church and had its place in the sacramental language, but this at best only shows that the title was a common all-around designation of Christ and decides nothing as to its specific provenience. Nor are we quite so sure as Dr. Bousset that the title formed no part of the Messianic terminology of Judaism before the Christian period. The transcendental conception of the Messiah which prevailed in Apocalyptic circles would favor its use; the argument about lordship and sonship of the Messiah with reference to David as recorded by the Synoptics seems to imply it, for lordship over David, even as a mere inference from the Psalm, is not something that could be conceived otherwise than on the basis of a general lordship: he who is Lord over David a fortiori is Lord over all. It is only fair to mention that Bousset regards this gospel-episode unhistorical and finds the later controversies between Jews and Christians as to the status of the Messiah reflected in it. There is further a difficulty in conceiving how the Syrian Christians could even in unconscious assimilation place

Jesus on a line with the pagan deities, if hitherto He had not borne the *κύριος*-name. If on some other basis He possessed the title we can understand that Christians should have employed it sometimes perhaps with an implied comparison or in protest against its application to other gods. But that without such antecedent use, they should have borrowed it from a pagan source seems hardly credible. After all these first Hellenistic Christians were not pagans but must have possessed a strong monotheistic anti-pagan instinct, which would have kept them from such a step even in the unconsciousness or semi-consciousness of their collective psyche. Still further, the evidence afforded by the term Maranatha in favor of a Palestinian origin of the designation cannot be so easily disposed of as Bousset thinks. He calls attention to the bilingual origin of the church at Antioch. But why any special sacredness should have attached to the Aramaeic form, if it originated in a bilingual church, cannot be explained, whereas the matter becomes clear at once, if it originated in the mother-church of Jerusalem, which by its prestige was able to invest even the form in which the phrase was born with sacred associations. From an incidental expression like that of Galatians i. 19 "James, the brother of the Lord" we gather that at that time the title *κύριος* was current in Jerusalem; and the chronology precludes that it should have been an importation from Antioch. We shall continue to believe as heretofore that in the mother-church already Jesus was known as the *κύριος*. Luke's representation in Acts to this effect is all the more to be trusted, since in the Gospel, although frequently speaking of *ὁ κύριος* for his own person, he yet does not, with a couple of exceptions, introduce this way of speaking into the mouth of the Gospel-personages, so that there is a clearly-marked difference, pointing to a perception of the difference in historical situation, between the Gospel and the Acts. Although occasionally used before, the title is according to Luke's record, a title specifically of the risen and exalted Lord. The statement of Peter, Acts ii. 36 that through the resurrection God made Jesus both Lord and Christ, implies this. And this statement is so peculiar, so difficult to explain from the later standpoint to which Jesus' deity and his *κυριότης* had become synonymous, that we may find in its very phrasing a proof of its authenticity.

Dr. Bousset's statements do not make clear to us how Jesus became the cult-hero of the Antiochian church. Was merely the new name originated there, or also the new position to which that name gave expression? Did Jesus not as yet occupy a place in the cultus of the mother-Church? Could He have failed of securing this, if He was recognized as the (future) Son-of-Man, that is as the coming judge and glorious joint-ruler with God? And if the cult-dignity of Jesus reaches back into the earliest days of the church, does not the implied recognition of His deity also reach back equally far? Cult is after all something from which deity is not well separable. And if the cult of Jesus is of that early origin, the question becomes perti-

ment, whether the source of the recognition of his super-human dignity will not have to be pushed back into the yet earlier period of the earthly life. Is not after all the theory of the self-revelation of Himself as God by Jesus a more simple solution of the problem than any other that has so far been offered in the line of a production of the idea out of the subjective consciousness of the disciples?

A word may be said about the prominence ascribed by our author to the title *Son-of-Man* in the early period. If we take into connection with this his obvious scepticism in regard to its authenticity upon the lips of Jesus, it will be seen that this theory reverses the representation given of the matter by the New Testament documents. Here the title is at home in the speech of Jesus, it is well-nigh absent from the speech of the church. Bousset reaches this curious standpoint by not permitting either the Gospels or the Acts to testify for the period with which they respectively deal and then utilizing the Gospels as indirect witnesses for the time in which the tradition embodied in them was in process of formation and for which others would consult the Acts. But, whatever one may think of this attitude towards the Gospels, the theory does not explain how the title *Son-of-Man*, if it played such a prominent rôle in the belief of the mother-Church, came to be dropped immediately afterwards, leaving hardly a trace of its use either in Paul or in the other New Testament documents, except in the Fourth Gospel. Nor does it explain how a title that was freely used of Jesus in the third person by His followers and from there carried back into the story of His life on earth, came here to be restricted to a self-designation never employed about Jesus by others.

Coming to Paul there is one feature of the author's presentation of the subject that has strongly impressed us. This is the recognition in several places that Paul feels himself not the creator, but the receiver from an earlier source of many important elements of Christian belief and practice. This recognition loses none of its value by being coupled in the writer's mind with the theory already reviewed of a Hellenistic intermediate stage of development as having produced some of these elements. The observation of the fact is independent of the explanation given it. Much of the Pauline faith in its richness is thus carried back into the pre-Pauline stage. For those who believe that such elements, were of supernatural provenience and originated from the person of Jesus, this recognition is a valuable asset. The line between the earlier church and Paul is much less sharply drawn according to Bousset than it frequently has been drawn in earlier representations. And with this is connected still another feature. In the interpretation of the Gospels the author approaches at many points more closely to the received orthodox exegesis than the average liberal exegete used to do. As an instance we may mention the interpretation of the trial of Jesus in which it is recognized as the plain import of the Gospel-version, that Jesus was condemned on the ground of claiming divine sonship in the sense of

metaphysical equality with God, and not merely on the ground of claiming Messiahship. Here again it does not matter that the writer himself considers this representation unhistorical. The gain we wish to register is an exegetical one. All along the line there is perceptible an exegetical retreat to the old orthodox positions, although it is covered by a recourse to novel and in our opinion unwarranted critical theories about the origin of the ideas embodied in the Gospels.

In the author's interpretation of Paulinism several points call for comment. The Pneuma-conception is not derived from the Old Testament nor from Hellenic philosophy, but must have the same contemporary sources as the parallel-conceptions discovered in Philo, the Hermetic writings, and Gnosticism. In all these the pneuma stands for the absolutely supernatural as opposed to the natural human element. Dr. Bousset cannot escape the recognition that to a large extent in these parallel systems (the later Gnostics, who may be dependent on Paul, excepted) the terminology is a different one, not the pneuma but the nous or some other term standing for the supernatural factor. This pneuma as the element of the supernatural is further identified by Paul with the *κύριος*-Christos, and the whole conception both in its general and in its specialized Christological form is again derived from the cultus. It was in the cultus that the primitive Christian felt himself in the pneumatic state as an enveloping atmosphere, it was in the cultus likewise that he felt himself in rapport with the risen Lord; Paul has simply broadened and spiritualized these two ideas and made out of the pneuma and the pneuma-*κύριος* the native element for the entire Christian life in all its manifestations. Here again we do not feel convinced by the writer's argumentation. Of course the cultus shares with other things the powerful moulding influence of the pneuma-concept, but that it does so to a larger extent or in a more original way than the other phases of Christian life, is not clear. It is still our conviction that the wide range of the Spirit's influence which forms so striking a feature of Paul's teaching has its ultimate source in the Apostle's eschatological conception of the pneuma. Because the Spirit is the Bearer of the whole future life, and because the future life already projects into the present Christian state, therefore, and not for any reason connected with the cultus, the Spirit becomes a pervasive dominating force at every point in the believer's life. And if this be its true background then the pneuma-concept can not be explained by comparing it with the more or less parallel conceptions found with Philo and the early Gnostics. In regard to another feature of the same doctrine, viz., the personal mystical relationship which Paul establishes between the believer and the Pneuma-Kurios, Bousset himself feels bound to admit that but few and very weak parallels to this can be found in Hellenistic religion. All that can be adduced for this consists of a couple of pantheistically-tinged sentences from the Hermetic writings. In connection with soteriology the author finds fault with the Pauline type of Christianity because of its approximation to contemporary outside influences on two important points. The first concerns the abso-



lute supernaturalism which finds expression in the antithesis between *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα*. The Christian state is said to destroy the continuity in the life of man, because in making him *pneuma* it does not restore or develop what was originally given in his nature, but supplants the latter by something altogether new. The second concerns the mythical soteriology which the Apostle is believed to have first introduced into the new religion, by grafting upon the original interpretation of the death and resurrection of Christ the widely-spread pagan ideas concerning the dying and rising deity which while at first nature-myths had received in the mystery-religions a more spiritual significance, thus imparting to Christian experience the character of a joint-dying and joint-resurrection with Christ. In regard to the former of these points Bousset thinks that it constitutes one of the aspects of Paulinism in which the latter opened the door for the later Gnostic inroads into the Christian Church. Gnosticism is only the consistent carrying out of the doctrine of a metaphysical schism between nature and grace. In answer to this it may be observed that the author has one-sidedly interpreted the Pauline statements about the *σάρξ*. It is not true that the *σάρξ* in its technical sense represents the original natural condition of man. Insofar as it is synonymous with sin it is not the product of creation. Paul nowhere affirms it to be so, and to charge this monstrous doctrine to him even by implication, for the sole reason that he does not explicitly repudiate it, or says in so many words that the *σάρξ* was produced in man through sin, is hardly fair. In Rom. v. the conception of the rise of death, and consequently of the *σάρξ* from which death is inseparable, out of the one deliberate *παρά-πτωμα* of Adam forms clearly the background of the Apostle's argumentation. When this is allowed it can no longer be claimed that the Pauline soteriology breaks the continuity between nature and grace, for Christ restores precisely what the entrance of the *σάρξ* destroyed. Of course it is quite true that the Apostle's doctrine of salvation contains side by side with this another strand. It represents the *pneuma* as doing more than neutralizing the influence of sin. It lifts man to the higher stage of the supernatural life, which the first Adam even before he sinned did not possess. Insofar there is a *novum*, something superimposed in the Christian state. Still it would be incorrect to find in this a suspension of the continuity or identity of life. Bousset in adopting Reitzenstein's interpretation of the term *πνευματικός* in contrast to *ψυχικός* is more cautious than the latter for he makes it to mean only no longer *mere* man (p. 132), whereas according to Reitzenstein it would actually mean no longer man, the *ψυχή* having ceased to exist and the pneumatic man having become deified.<sup>1</sup> It is worth observation that the distinction between the two strands that enter into the Pauline doctrine of the work of the Spirit is clearly marked by the twofold antithesis *σαρκικός—πνευματικός* and *ψυχικός πνευματικός*. The psychic man is the natural man as such. The sarkic man is the

<sup>1</sup> *Cpr.* however p. 203 of Bousset's book, where the term "deification" is used in connection with Paul's words in 2 Cor. iv., 6.



sinful natural man. It is certainly significant that in 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff. where Paul puts over against each other the creation-state and the eschatological state of pneumatic life, he does not characterize the former as sarkic but as psychic.

As to the other point the fault found with Paul's mythology of salvation, we can only reply that the charge stands or falls with the pagan derivation of the Apostle's soteriology. If the idea of dying and rising with Christ should not have this provenience, but be explainable, as Schweitzer has promised to explain it, on the background of the eschatological distinction between the two ages, then there would be no mythology in this matter at all. To be sure Bousset's criticism at this point cuts more deeply than this. It ultimately is directed against the whole Pauline conception of sin as a matter of nature and not merely a state of mind. Hence the distinction between the simple gospel of Jesus centering in the sole idea of the forgiveness of sin and the supernaturalism of the Pauline religion of salvation. Of the thesis that the best and highest in man must be given him from on high and *ab extra*, it is claimed, not the slightest trace exists in the teaching of Jesus. Hence Bousset approves in principle of Wrede's way of formulating the difference between Jesus and Paul. But the fundamental fault of this whole way of looking at things lies with the liberal misinterpretation of the teaching of Jesus. The soteriological element in Jesus' Gospel was not confined to his proclamation of the forgiving grace of God. If this were all then a great gulf between Jesus and Paul would indeed exist. But the salvation which Jesus preached was closely connected with his eschatology and meant deliverance and eternal life in the day of judgment. If this be compared with the Pauline doctrine, and the latter correctly viewed in its own eschatological setting, then it will be seen that, notwithstanding all difference in detail, there is no actual opposition, but a deeper unity at bottom between the two.

We have no space to dwell at length on the author's exposition of the Johannine type of Christianity. The absence of the *κύριος*-title from the Gospel (with the exception of Chap. xxi, considered a later appendix) is explained from the peculiar Christ-mysticism, to which the designation of the Savior as "Lord" appeared inappropriate and which has found its characteristic expression in Jesus' own characterizing the disciples as "friends", no longer "servants", xv, 14 ff. This seems hardly in accord with the majestic, transcendental features borne by the Johannine Christ in other respects. And it might be questioned if the avoidance of *ὁ κύριος* and the preference for the simple Jesus as a designation of the Saviour in the body of the Gospel cannot be better explained from the desire of the Evangelist to emphasize the true humanity of Jesus over against the docetic heresy. The reëmergence of the title in Chap. xx, 28 and xxi, 7 ff. seems due to the difference made by the resurrection in the relationship between Jesus and the disciples, as in Acts also *κύριος* is a post-resurrection title. The central idea of the Fourth Gospel is found to be that of deification through vision of the deity, and this again is explained

from the joint-influence of the mystery-religions which culminated in an *ἐποπτεία* of the godhead, and the astronomical-astrological form of piety widely prevalent in that age and also traceable in Philo, with whom it passes over into a less rational, mystical apprehension of the divine. The author, to be sure, is compelled to admit that, apart from 1 Jno. iii. 2, and here the statement is eschatological, the Gospel never speaks of "deification" and there is no warrant to read this meaning, after the manner of the later Greek theology, into the conception of the obtaining of eternal life. Nor is it necessary to interpret the efficiency ascribed to the word of Christ in the light of the magical function exercised by the word in the mysteries. For whatever analogies to the Logos-conception may exist elsewhere, in that connection the word is never personified as it is in John. As for the prominence of "light" and "life", this the Gospel has in common, it is true, with Gnosticism, particularly with the Hermetic literature, but here the question of date is yet far from settled and a dependence on the Fourth Gospel by no means excluded, although Bousset eagerly adopts the early dating of the Hermetic ideas by Reitzenstein. That the representation of eternal life as a present possession as distinguished from an eschatological outlook proves the dependence of the Gospel on Hellenistic mysticism can be maintained only by striking out as unauthentic the eschatological utterances in Chap. v, 28-29, vi, 39-54, and minimizing on the other hand the presence of the same idea in Paul, thus placing the Johannine theology at a greater distance from the Pauline teaching on this point than actually exists.

We have contented ourselves with touching on the way in which the author deals with the great epochs in the New Testament developments of truth. There is much in the other chapters, dealing with extra-canonical material, that is exceedingly interesting and instructive, especially in the chapters on Gnosticism and Irenaeus. The whole book bears witness on almost every page to the rich learning and great constructive power of the writer. There are not many pages in it which an orthodox reader will be able to read without dissent, but there are a great many from which in spite of this, and perhaps for this very reason, he will be able to learn.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

*The Christology of St. Paul.* Hulsean Prize Essay with an Additional Chapter by the REV. G. NOWELL ROSTRON, M.A., Vicar of St. Lawrence, Kirkdale, Late Principal of St. John's Hall, Durham; Late Scholar of St. John's College, Cambridge. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. Pp. xv, 249. (Library of Historic Theology.)

Rostron's book offers a good survey of the problems of Paulinism so far as these are viewed in relation to the orthodox faith of the church. It does not deal with the Christology alone, as the title might lead to expect, but, on the principle that the Person and the work are inseparable and react and cast light one on the other, it draws within the purview of the discussion the whole range of

soteriology. It was inevitable under these circumstances that the treatment of many topics, and some of these of the first importance, should become somewhat general and sketchy crowding out some large aspects of the Christological question itself and much more or less relevant detail throughout. New points of view are not presented, but the author shows himself familiar with the recent literature bearing on his subject. His standpoint is that of the Nicene faith in regard to theology proper, and in regard to soteriology he upholds the vicarious interpretation of the atonement as genuinely Pauline. As to the sources of Paul's teaching, while making allowance for the Jewish and Hellenistic element and the primitive Christian tradition, he takes the principal ground that the Apostle's doctrine is a transcript of his life or experience. To some extent this is undoubtedly true and to emphasize it is necessary over against the older intellectualizing of the process which gave birth to the specifically Pauline ideas. On the other hand we believe it is easy to go too far in this direction and to make such a general recourse upon the experience cover up the existence of problems which yet wait for a solution. Unless the experience be taken in a very specific sense of the reception of supernatural knowledge, it fails in many places to explain the product which is supposed to have issued from it, because on closer examination the ideas resulting are seen already to be inherent in and indispensable to the experience. If on the other hand experience be taken as the correlate of supernatural communication, why not call it revelation, and explicitly acknowledge that in a very important sense Paul's doctrine was not subjectively developed by him, but received *per modum revelationis* strictly so called.

The most recent phase upon which the study of Paul has entered through the comparison of the mystical side of his teaching with alleged analogous trains of thought in the mysteries hardly receives the prominence which at the present juncture it deserves. It is touched upon only in a passing way and the general opinion expressed that merely the form and in no sense the substance of the ideas involved is derivable from the source. Here especially the lack of genetic treatment or the reduction of all genesis to experience makes itself disadvantageously felt. Those who make much of the indebtedness of Paul to Hellenistic syncretism derive from that source not merely the form but the substance of the mystical side of the Apostle's teaching itself, or at least maintain that he drew it from the general atmosphere, out of which also the mystery-religions grew up and in which they thrived. In view of this it is of some importance to consider whether the ideas in question cannot be as naturally or even more naturally explained as a legitimate outgrowth of previous factors inherent in pre-Pauline revelation; the general category of experience hardly suffices in this connection.

There are some detailed points in regard to which the author in our opinion deviates from the excellent exegetical and doctrinal judgment which on the whole his work exhibits. It is hardly permissible

to grant that the ἐξ οὐράνου of 1 Cor. xv. 47 may have an implied reference to the preëxistent heavenly state, and yet to controvert the view that the preëxistent Christ possessed a human element in His make-up. For the reference in the passage is distinctly and pointedly to the "Second Man", and there is no logical escape from Dr. Edwards' conclusions, except by insisting upon it, that the Apostle here speaks of the genesis of the glorified Christ through the resurrection, and that the preëxistence does not come into view at all, a position which is exegetically also the most plausible, and to which Rostron himself a little later on seems to incline. In discussing the famous Christological passage Phil. ii., 5 ff. the author makes the hazardous statement that "so far as Christ by the necessities of His life on earth was obliged to limit the exercise of His cosmical functions, so far did God the Father directly and mediately take them upon Himself" (p. 128), and thus would seem to fall in with a certain type of Kenoticism with reference to which in the preceding discussion on the whole his attitude is rather reserved than otherwise. In his revulsion from the neo-Apollinarianism of Sanday, who would make the Deity fill the place of the subliminal consciousness of the human Christ, the author seems to go too far in discrediting the subconscious as an integral element in the religious nature. We would hesitate to subscribe to the statement that "the subconscious . . . has no moral character in itself." On other points, we are glad to notice modern vogues in the interpretation of Paul are resisted e.g. the shifting of the emphasis from the crucifixion to the incarnation, which Westcott has done so much to popularize.

The book can render excellent service to all students of the Apostle's teaching who feel in need of reassuring themselves of the substantial agreement of Paulinism with the historic faith of the Protestant church. In the discussion about the continuity between Jesus and Paul the other charge so frequently made, that Protestantism is a quasi-Paulinism and not a genuine reproduction of the great Apostle's teaching, should not be lost out of view. That we are in accord with Paul is as important a principle to maintain as that Paul was in accord with the Master.

*Princeton.*

GEERHARDUS VOS.

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## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*The Balkans: A Laboratory of History.* By WILLIAM M. SLOANE, Member of the American Academy; Professor of History in Columbia University; Author of *The French War and the Revolution*; *Napoleon Bonaparte: A History*; *French Revolution and Religious Reform*, etc. New York: Eaton and Mains. 1914. 8vo; pp. viii, 322. \$1.50 net.

Between the years 1903 and 1910, we are informed in the Preface, "the author made three fairly extended journeys in lands which had once been a part of the Turkish empire. What he was able as a mere

tourist to observe appeared to have value as a specimen of history in the making." These observations were later published in the *Political Science Quarterly*. The present publishers having requested permission to reissue these articles in book form, it was found necessary, in view of the extensive changes so suddenly effected by the recent Balkan War, to revise the entire text. The result, as it lies before us, is a volume that combines, in a most interesting and instructive fashion, the impressions of a keen and discriminating observer of men and things, the results of a painstaking study of the diplomatic sources pertaining to the latest phases of the subject, and a wealth of historic judgments that only an expert in this branch of science could formulate. The work is a lucid, judicial and thoroughly comprehensive treatment of the Balkan question,—just the kind of book that students of contemporary European politics, as well as countless general readers, have been wanting as a guide to the curiosities of this "ethnological museum", as Professor Sloane calls the Balkan peninsula, and to the numberless "experiments", to adopt another of his figures, which during the last few decades have been made in this "laboratory of history".

The first chapter, "Turkey and European Politics", gives a rapid review of the history of these lands from their invasion by the Turks up to the Treaty of Berlin. Then follows a vivid sketch of the rule of Abdul Hamid. The various peoples that have inhabited the Balkans in historic times are then enumerated and their ethnographical relations to one another set forth. Chapters IV and V trace the beginnings of the Balkan nations, special attention being given to the social, economic and religious conditions of the people. One of the most instructive portions of the work is that dealing with the Revolution of 1908. Its causes and its consequences are discussed in a most illuminating manner. With some repetition the events leading up to the Balkan Alliance are next reviewed in detail; the latest war and its mournful results are described; the relations of the six Great Powers to the Balkan States are minutely set forth, while in a concluding chapter the "Hopes and Fears" of Europe are balanced against one another in the light of the smouldering embers on countless battlefields of those unhappy lands.

The Preface bears the date of March 15, 1914. Events have been following one another with such terrific speed this summer that a pathetic interest must now be attached to the fear the author himself expressed (p. 241): "It seems highly probable that our essay in contemporary history may be antiquated before it is printed." Of course, the reference is only to the very latest phases of the history: the past, so far as this volume is concerned, is secure. As Professor Sloane himself says, "However the ultimate decision may turn in the Balkans, this book contains most, if not all, that will be generally known for some time." And if, on the one hand, the author seems to share in the general conviction that prevailed till the month of July of this year, that there are "reasons for great encouragement not to say for elation, when we consider the course of events during a half



century" (p. 274), and that the "Balkan fires are likely to be banked for an age to come" (p. 292); nevertheless, on the other hand, the historian cannot forbear recording as with prophetic instinct (p. 288): "The Dual Monarchy, in spite of the isolation of Albania, is dissatisfied with the settlement made at Bucharest and seems determined to prevent the solidification of existing conditions. It is afraid of the new and larger Serbia. It is accused of secretly supporting Albanian disturbers on one of the Servian frontiers, while on the other the quarantine regulations and their enforcements are made as exasperating as possible. . . . What is worst of all, it seems likely to demand a protectorate over Roman Catholics dwelling in Serbia similar to that which it claims to exercise over Roman Catholics within the Albanian frontiers." The book is furnished with three maps to illustrate the changes, due to the War, in the boundary lines of the Balkan States.

An Appendix contains the treaties and military conventions made in 1912 between Bulgaria and Serbia, and between Bulgaria and France.

*Princeton.*

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study.* By W. B. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1913. 8vo; pp. ix, 272. \$2.25.

The publication of a substantial book in English on Schleiermacher must needs still be considered quite an event in the theological world. In a sense, indeed, it is doubtless true that even in his native land this epoch-making preacher, professor and writer has had to wait until quite recent years to come into his own. Not that his fellow-countrymen have been either able or willing to ignore him. On the contrary each passing decade has found them striving with ever-increasing zeal and thoroughness to understand him. But such was his intellectual versatility, his philosophic acumen, his theological creativeness, so subtle, so profound, so varied has been his influence upon thought and life, that practically a century has had to elapse before the titanic proportions of his figure could be seen in the true perspective of history. But the English and American literature on Schleiermacher has been scant in amount and quite unsatisfactory in quality. It is, indeed, rather anomalous, considering how many classes of writers have had to pay their respects to him, whether as friend or foe, that even to this day so few of his works have been done into English, and that the critical and really valuable studies of him by British or American authors may be counted upon the fingers of one hand. We have, therefore, been eager to welcome this new member in Clark's series of "The Great Christian Theologies", and a perusal of the work makes it a pleasure to recommend it for what it professes to be, "a critical and historical study" of Schleiermacher.

The author begins with a brief account of Schleiermacher's life, especially of his religious and intellectual development. A preliminary attempt is here made to assess the various formative influences that

commingled in this remarkable personality—Moravianism, the Enlightenment, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Plato, Romanticism, Spinoza, etc. Dr. Selbie gives the impression that in his judgment the Romanticism in Schleiermacher has been commonly overestimated. The much discussed relation of Schleiermacher to Spinoza is thus represented: "There is no doubt that he owed to him a real intellectual inspiration, but his following of the sage was always corrected and conditioned by his use of Plato on the one hand, and of Kant on the other. It was, however, to Spinoza that he owed his description of the content of religious experience, the meagreness of which is one of the disappointing elements in his theology. . . . His failure to give full play to the conception of the Divine personality must be ascribed to the same cause." Two chapters are devoted to Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion, as revealed in his celebrated *Reden über die Religion* (the many quotations are from Dr. Oman's excellent translation). The author speaks with much sympathy of Schleiermacher's attempt, rendered necessary by the state of theology at that time, to do ample justice to the element of experience in religion, but he admits, on the other hand, that Schleiermacher went quite too far in his opposition to the Kantian ethics. "The Doctrine of God" is next presented. The chief source here is the *Glaubenslehre*. But neither in this work nor in any other does Schleiermacher state his views on this subject in systematic form. This makes the task of the interpreter and critic exceedingly difficult, the more so because it seems to be impossible to embody some of the elements of the teaching into a selfconsistent whole. The basal trouble must be located in the attempt to ground the doctrine of God simply in the feeling of absolute dependence—dependence, in the first instance, upon God as the Absolute Causality. In itself this formula is not utterly reprehensible: it could, conceivably, be successfully used to set forth a large measure of vital Christian truth. But it is at best a vague expression, and Schleiermacher, with all his enthusiasm for historical theology as a science, was altogether too much of a subjective empiricist to be able to make this phrase bear anything like an adequate measure of the rich content of the idea of God given in historical Christianity. Just how far the entangling alliance with the Spinozistic terminology is to be blamed, it is hard to say. Schleiermacher evidently strove mightily to repudiate pantheism. But he never rose to a satisfactory conception of the personality of God, nor, as was to be expected, did he find in the "Christian consciousness" any necessity for a metaphysical Trinity. To be sure, in those portions of the *Glaubenslehre* where the idea of redemption gives a richer color to the doctrine of our necessary dependence upon God, it is much easier to enlist the distinctively evangelical terms of the Bible in the service of his fundamental conception of religion. Nevertheless, as the author clearly shows in connection with his exposition of Schleiermacher's views of the person of Christ, the whole method of this theological reconstructor, meritorious enough as it was in again making the Christological problem a specifically religious one, was too arbitrary to permit an adequate

treatment either of the person or of the work of Christ. There cannot but be an unstable equilibrium between this supernaturalism that must posit a sinless Christ, and this naturalism that has no place for his resurrection, ascension or return to judgment, and that finds a miracle wherever anything finite is construed as a religious sign or symbol. Dr. Selbie duly appreciates what Schleiermacher has done for modern theology by his emphasis upon the necessity of an experience of the saving grace of Christ as a condition for any satisfactory knowledge of God. On the other hand, he clearly sets forth the defects, especially on their historical side, of Schleiermacher's Christology and soteriology. On the whole, however, we cannot but feel that his judgment is too favorable, as regards both Schleiermacher's negative attitude toward confessional Christianity and his influence upon Christian doctrine during the last century. For is it not after all to Schleiermacher that the overwhelming evils, as well as the real but minor and incidental blessings, of modern subjective empiricism are chiefly due? Great as was his service in trying to bring the whole of theology into a unity, and in vindicating the primordial authority of natural theology, both absolutely, and, with respect to his own day, relatively, as against a onesided supernaturalistic dogmatism, still his failure to do justice to the special revelation of historic Christianity has made him sacrifice truly scientific theology to religious phenomenology with its inevitable trend to naturalism.

We shall not pursue the interpretation and critique into the remaining sections of the treatise, which deal with Schleiermacher's views of the Christian life from the more individual and experiential side of the work of Christ, and with his doctrine of the Church. Enough has been said to indicate the method, scope and spirit of the book as a whole. The last chapter is a balanced estimate of Schleiermacher's place in modern theology.

Dr. Selbie may fairly be said to have introduced Schleiermacher and his theology to English readers in a fuller and more satisfactory form than has hitherto been attempted. We are not unmindful in this connection of the excellent analysis of the *Glaubenslehre* recently published, with an historical introduction, by Prof. George Cross, of the Newton Theological Institute, Mass. But the work under review covers a larger and more difficult field. Our only regret is that considerations of space have put such severe restrictions upon the author's treatment. For one thing the great name that gives this volume its title deserves an ampler historical setting than that here given it. Then, too, even taking "theology" in a rather narrow sense, it is somewhat disappointing to find so few allusions to those other two works of Schleiermacher's which in their way were quite as influential as his *Glaubenslehre* and the *Reden*: we refer to his *Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums* and his *Ethik*. It must be said, moreover, that the author leans more heavily, if not longer or more frequently, than is pleasant to behold, upon some of the German students of Schleiermacher (Lichtenberg, Pfleiderer, Ritschl, the Dorners). Indeed, many of the best paragraphs are those in quotation-marks.

Doubtless, this has some compensations for the reader of a book on such a subject: it makes him feel that his guide is taking him the right way. But it is hardly just to the guide whose own knowledge of the way is quite sufficient to inspire the needed confidence in himself.

There is a good index and a two-page bibliography containing the more recent literature on Schleiermacher.

We note a few typographical and other errors: p. 39, "his" for "is"; p. 41, "whom" for "who"; p. 41, "them" for "they"; p. 44, "same" for "name"; p. 55, "try and" for "try to"; p. 144 "whom" for "who".

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*The Religious Life of the Anglo-Saxon Race.* By M. V. B. KNOX, Author of "A Summer's Saunterings", "A Legend of Schroom Lake", "A Winter in India and Malaysia", etc. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1913. Large 8vo; pp. 536. \$2.00 net.

Much interesting information has been gathered together in this volume—according to an advertising circular the author spent ten years in the task—but it is somewhat difficult to ascertain the principle upon which the materials have been selected. The title seems to be too broad and too narrow to suit the heterogeneous contents: too broad, for much that is ordinarily considered as belonging to religious life is altogether omitted or only casually referred to; and too narrow, for large portions of the work are devoted to things which are in no sense peculiar either to religious life as such or to the religious life of the Anglo-Saxon race in particular. The author states his purpose to be that of tracing "the forces of the religious life that have aided the English-speaking race to become so mighty and successful"—an aim, surely, that ought to make no historical investigator feel himself unduly restricted, especially when, as in this instance, he considers it his duty to follow this "English-speaking race" whithersoever it has gone over the face of the earth. It is but natural, therefore, that in trying to cover so vast an area within the compass of a single volume the author can give us only hasty glimpses of many things, no impressive views of anything. Nor is our bewilderment relieved by the presence of any table of contents or chapter-headings. The best part of the book is the first fifth of it, which presents, with concrete detail, the religious life of the early, the pure Anglo-Saxons. As for the rest of the work, it offers little that is distinctive in the treatment of the Norman conquest and all that came thereafter in the civil or ecclesiastical history of the British Isles and their colonies.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*The Heidelberg Catechism: Historical and Doctrinal Studies.* By GEORGE W. RICHARDS, Professor of Church History in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Lancaster, Pa. Philadelphia: Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States. 1913. 8vo; pp. xiii, 363.

These scholarly and stimulating discussions concerning the history and worth of the Heidelberg Catechism are one of the most important fruits of the Three Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration, in 1913, of the publication of this document. The work is issued as the 1911 volume in the series of the Swander Memorial Lectures before the Faculty and students of the Seminary at Lancaster.

The book is divided into three parts. Of these the last—making up about one half of the volume (pp. 171 to 358)—consists of a reprint, with an English translation, of the original German edition of the Catechism published by John Mayer at Heidelberg in 1563. No copy of this edition could be found for republication at the time of the Tercentenary Celebration in 1863, but the very next year a copy was discovered in Bremen, in the possession of Pastor Treviranus, and reprinted in that year by Albrecht Wolters at Bonn. Professor Richards has made use of a copy of this reprint which has been in the possession of the Seminary Library at Lancaster since 1901, and which is here given to the world as the first reprint of the original edition made in the United States. The English translation annexed on the opposite pages is that of the Tercentenary edition of the Catechism (1863), in the margin of which the author has suggested a considerable number of corrections and improvements.

Part I is historical, consisting of five chapters: A Sketch of the Catechumenate Before the Reformation; Evangelical Catechisms Before the Heidelberg Catechism; The Reformation in the Palatinate and the Conversion of Frederick III to Calvinism; Preparation and Publication of the Heidelberg Catechism; The Reception of the Heidelberg Catechism. The work is abreast of the latest special investigations in this field, and gives a clear and accurate account of the successive stages in the process that yielded the Heidelberg Catechism as one of its noblest products. The story of the formation and spread of this confessional standard is placed in a luminous historical setting. We cannot, however, pass without challenge the statement (p. 26 f.): "One of the definite and permanent results of the catechetical development in the Reformed Churches was the distinction made between religion and theology, between faith and dogma; a catechism having to do with the former and not with the latter." In the light of Dr. Richard's theological manifesto in Part II, this assertion will occasion no surprise; the wish seems to be father to the thought. But on the whole, the treatment of this historical material is most admirable.

Part II is doctrinal. The author first sets forth the distinctive features of the Catechism by a series of comparisons with the teachings of Catholicism, Socinianism, Lutheranism, and "high" Calvinism. In the main he agrees with Professor Lange that the Catechism, while true to the Calvinistic type, is in spirit moderately Calvinistic, preserving, besides manifold influences from Calvin, Bullinger, and all the earlier Reformed makers of catechisms, a considerable remnant of Melancthonianism and other elements from the German Lutheran Reformation: "Calvinism modified by the German genius". The



Catechism is then brought to the test of "contemporary theological thought", the standards for measurement being "the theological positions set forth in works like William Newton Clarke's *An Outline of Christian Theology*, William Adams Brown's *Christian Theology in Outline*, and Réville's *Modern Christianity*". Of course, the result is obvious. It has been stated in advance: the Catechism "does not anticipate, directly or by implication, the theological thought of our day." Fault is found with the Catechism because of "the dualism which is a characteristic feature of the old Protestant theology"; because of its too narrow or at any rate too impersonal "object of faith" (the Creed, the sacrifice of Christ, *Questions* 21, 67); and above all because of its failure to put a sufficient emphasis upon social service and the social order, in other words because of what the author calls its "individualistic and other worldly" piety. We find ourselves in sympathy with many of these critical statements touching the deficiencies of the old formulas, but when the author abandons polemics and takes up dogmatics on his own account, we cannot subscribe to all of his views; not, for instance, to the following: "Redemption is effected by revelation, atonement by incarnation, and satisfaction is made of the whole nature of God and of the deepest needs and the highest aspirations of man". The remaining two chapters of Part II deal with the problems of religious pedagogy: the Heidelberg Catechism as it was related to the old conception of religious education, and as it must now be related to the demands of the new conception of religious education. The principles of this system are those with which we have been made familiar by the works of Shailer Matthews, Henry C. King, and Washington Gladden.

Considering the fact that this volume was designed in the first instance as a contribution toward a worthy celebration of the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the Heidelberg Catechism, some readers are likely to have their festal joy dimmed and their gratitude for this "precious religious heritage" somewhat cooled, when they enter into the chilly critical atmosphere that permeates the second part of the work. But the author of set purpose wanted to close "with a problem rather than a panegyric". Nor ought we to forget that his words of praise for the venerated pioneers of the Reformed faith have been neither few nor feeble, and that, as he himself says, "loyalty to the fathers of the church of the Heidelberg Catechism means far more than to repeat their formulas and to assent to their doctrines. It is to seek truth, to love righteousness, to obey the voice of the Spirit, and to devote one's life to the glory of God in the service of humanity."

The work closes with a selected bibliography of five pages.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

*"De Questierders van den Afsaat, in de Noordelyke Nederlanden. Met onuitgegevene Bylagen. Door Dr A Eekhof.s'Gravenhage Martinus Nyhoff 1909."*

There has always been a great deal of uncertainty in the matter of

Indulgences. The theology of the subject never till this day has been definitely formulated by the Roman Catholic theologians, as has been clearly stated by Dr. Henry C. Vedder in his recent work "The Reformation in Germany." And yet it has been clearly traced in its evolutionary process by various writers. But its theological status remains nebulous, even after the fact of the authorization by the Church itself of the work of P. A. Maurel "Die Abiässe, ihr Wesen und ihr Gebrauch" Paderborn 1860.

Of the true inwardness of the history of Indulgences, of the secrets of their manipulation we knew comparatively little.

The study before me, an academic thesis for the degree of Doctor of Theology in the University of Leyden, covers 108 pages, to which are added as appendices a number of wonderfully illuminating original documents, filling a larger space than the text itself; and therefore it constitutes a valuable contribution to the history of the subject.

The material here published was till now practically unknown. It consists of a mass of ancient parchments, buried for centuries under a thick layer of dust in the episcopal archives at Utrecht. The author spent about three years in the study of this material and only those who have occupied themselves with palaeography can estimate the labor involved. The most valuable of these papers, as stated, have been reprinted in the appendix.

In the Middle Ages Indulgences stood close to the very center of the religious life. The Council of Trent decided (Sess. xxv. Dec. 4, 1563) "that the power of Indulgences was given by Christ himself to the Church and that this power was used by her from the most ancient times". Cardinal Cajetan said in 1517 "that before the beginning of the thirteenth century no mention is made of the subject". But Cajetan was evidently wrong for our author (p. 5) goes back to the tenth century and Urban II in 1095, when preaching the first Crusade, promised an Indulgence to the crusaders, as a well known thing. True Indulgences therefore were authorized before the eleventh century. The development of the theological question we find in Halosius, Albert Magnus and especially in Thomas Aquino. The fundamental principles involved are the "treasure of merits" of Christ and of the saints and the power of the Church to apply these merits. With the application of the principle of "compensation", civilly applied to end blood-feuds, to the doctrine of purgatorial suffering, Indulgences entered upon a new phase of development and ultimately became the cause of the Reformation.

The Church suffered from a perennial shortage of funds and the sale of Indulgences formed an admirable and easy source of revenue. The spoils were systematically divided. For the "Jubilee Indulgences" the following scale prevailed—one third for the Pope, one third for the political power, one third for the war against the Turks. This scale was changed according to circumstances. The accounts of the Utrecht archives are very suggestive in this direction. Indulgences were sold for private purposes as well as general, for building new churches, and restoring old ones, for building dikes, for ringing bells during a

thunderstorm, for the maintenance of monasteries, etc. They were granted for visiting Rome during the "Jubilee year", for visiting great cathedrals, for service in the crusades, for visiting the Holy Land, etc., etc. Lotteries for Indulgences were even established e.g. at Bergen Op Zoom in 1518, a practice according to Dr. Vedder still prevailing in South America. The relics of the saints played an important part in the sale of Indulgences and the churches were therefore well supplied with them. These relics were kept in chests (arcae) and shrines (scrinia), usually with a glass cover so as to make the relics visible. They were carried about in processions and greatly stimulated the sale of Indulgences. These relics were frequently leased by their owners for the purpose above mentioned for a fixed price, and the men who carried them about were called *quaestuarii*, and with the description of the life and labors of these agents employed in the Sale of Indulgences, this study concerns itself.

*Quaestuarii* as such were known as early as 970 A.D. and the Crusades, which were very expensive, greatly multiplied their number. Their life was not always above reproach and therefore the 4th Lateran council prescribed fixed rules for their conduct. "They must be modest and worthy men, not given to the visiting of taverns and unbecoming places, not given to vanity and extravagance and they are forbidden to wear the garb of an order not their own." The Synod of Narbonne in 1227 insisted on "letters of appointment" and in 1274 the Synod of Salzburg decided that these letters must be annually renewed, whilst that of Prague in 1365 forbade them to visit the same place more than once per year. That of Cologne in 1423 decided that they must be priests, whilst even after the beginning of the Reformation the Synod of Regensburg in 1523 demanded of them a simple life, strict accountability and an oath that they had not bought the right of the sale of Indulgences for money. The council of Trent in the 21st session, in June 1562, finally suspended the sale. It is evident therefore that the subject of Indulgences agitated the Church for many centuries and the historic process of *their origin and decline* is extremely interesting to the historian. The minute investigation of the matter in a limited sphere of operation, as presented to us in this thesis, must therefore necessarily be very valuable. It is evident that the "quests" were conducted as a regular ecclesiastical business. Sometimes a special sale had the right of way and during the term of its duration all other "quests" were forbidden. These sales were coöperatively administered by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities and were very beneficial for both. But they exhausted the finances of the public and the local clergy therefore not rarely were bitterly opposed to them and this antagonism sometimes led to serious popular disturbances (p. 33).

In Chapter III the author gives us an opportunity to see the "questores" or "quaestuarii" at work. His style is vivid and enlivened here and there by a subtle humor. Some of the "quests" are described in detail. First of all that of St. Hubert (p. 34), the patron saint of the

Utrecht cathedral. The bones of this saint, buried in the abbey, have disappeared but some sacred relics remain viz. his stole, comb, staff and horn. The cure of rabies was apparently his specialty and in the treatment of the disease a thread of this stole of St. Hubert was placed in a small incision, made in the forehead of the victim, and with certain added ceremonies a cure was always effected. This "quest" was known as early as 1330 and the sale of indulgences founded on it was condemned as late as the sixteenth century.

Another celebrated "quest" was that of St. Martin of Tours, whose relics greatly stimulated the sale of Indulgences and were leased to the see of Utrecht. A third "quest" was that of St. Anthony, the father of monasticism, the romantic tale of whose relics is here told in graphic terms. Discovered by a miracle they were carried to Alexandria, thence to Constantinople and finally by Duke Jocellinus of Flanders, in 1059, to his native country, where they reposed in the monastery of Belle, in the diocese of Vienne. The St. Anthony relics were deemed specially efficacious in epidemics of the plague and of "ignis sacer". Their popularity was offset by the fact that some hogs, dedicated to him as their patron-saint and belonging to the clergy, had the freedom of the road in the Middle Ages. No one dared to interfere with them or molest them and they caused great damage to farmers and gardeners, and yet no "quest" was more profitable or more widely patronized than that of St. Anthony. The privileges of the quaestuarii of this saint lasted till the close of the 15th century and the "quest" itself was prosecuted as late as 1555, well in the reformatory period. Besides these three, numerous other "quests" are mentioned by the author (pp. 66-67). Small wonder that the common people ultimately lost faith in a process of sanctification, which became an economic menace as "quest" after "quest" drained their resources to the last farthing. The study of this thesis will convince one that Dr. Vedder is right when he maintains that economic conditions not less than religious convictions led to the Reformation. The arrival of the quaestuarii was announced beforehand, the local clergy were compelled to meet them and to conduct them to the church. The day was a holyday and all labor was forbidden, and after a sermon by one of the visitors the sale of indulgences began. One can therefore readily see how burdensome the sale of indulgences must have been to the common people. The knife cut both ways. They were forbidden to work on the day of the sale and they were stripped of their money. Remember in this connection the injunction "that no two quests were to be prosecuted in a given place in the same week".

Soon these quaestuarii became a distinct fraternity, which received men and women alike as members, at a fixed entrance fee. All members wore a medallion, which belonged to the order and was to be returned at death. A formal oath was sworn at initiation. In the late middle ages the quaestuarii were usually at the same time occupied with the dissemination of antiheretical literature. But the author tells a somber story of the slow but steady degenerating process of



the pursuit of these quests, in the dawn of the Reformation, of bitter clashes between them and the populace, of the discovery of frauds in connection with the cures promised by the quaestuarii (p. 94), etc. Considerable sums were paid by some of these ecclesiastical corporations, interested in the sale of Indulgences. It is interesting to note how the rates of the leases decline as the Reformation draws nearer and makes progress. Before this era the complaint had often been made that the land was "shaved", but by the middle of the sixteenth century the proceeds of the sale of Indulgences were so little that the "quests" were practically abandoned. The Lutheran heresy was justly charged by Rome with being instrumental in totally destroying this very considerable source of ecclesiastical revenue (p. 104).

This perhaps more than anything else led Trent in 1563 to abolish these "quests" and this decree was confirmed by Pope Pius V in 1567, in a papal bull. And yet the evil was never wholly eradicated. As late as 1820 Indulgence was promised at Brussels for visiting a certain church. The case of Lourdes would seem to be a continuous "quest" and Dr. Vedder, in his "History of the German Reformation", mentions a case in Brazil, where souls were actually "raffled" out of purgatory.

As a historical contribution, this work of Dr. Eekhof is of the greatest value to students of prevailing pre-reformatory conditions especially in the fields of sociology and ecclesiology.

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HENRY E. DOSKER.

*"Het Arbeidsterrein der Kerk in de Groote Steden. Academisch Proefschrift, ter verkryging van den graad van Doctor in de Heilige Godgeleerdheid. Door WILLEM GERHARD HARRENSTEIN. Kampen: J. H. Kok. 1913.*

Another doctoral thesis, this time of the Free University of Amsterdam. In the nature of the case, this study cannot interest outsiders, as it must those who are fully conversant with the social and ecclesiastical conditions prevailing in the Netherlands, and yet much in it is of absorbing interest, especially the statistical tables, which enable us to compare Continental and American ecclesiastical conditions.

In Chapter I the author discusses the dangers of the Church in the large cities, an inevitable consequence of the marvelous growth of these centers of population. in the last fifty years. In 1864 Germany had only seven cities of 100,000 inhabitants and upwards; in 1911 it had forty-eight. And whilst in 1864 only 5 per cent of the population lived in large cities, this had increased in 1910 to 23 per cent. In this whirling mass of humanity religion is at a discount. An investigation by Tews at Dresden disclosed the fact that the working classes there did not pretend to attend divine worship, nor did they read any sort of religious literature. The churches had not increased with the growth of the population, neither there nor elsewhere in Germany, or for that matter on the continent. Nay, sad to say, the ratio of the number of churches to the total of the inhabitants in the large cities is steadily declining. And in Germany this fact concerns



Protestants and Catholics alike. Nor are things better in France. In Paris, in Notre Dame de Clignancourt, a parish of 121,000 souls, with one priest and seven chaplains, only 21,000 people attend church. The state of things is naturally more encouraging in the large Dutch cities, for the Dutch are by nature a religious people, as are the Scotch. And yet even there statistics are far from satisfactory.

The author points out another danger, which stands closely connected with the growth of the cities and that is that this growth has displaced the churches as centers of the communal life, and that the population has moved away from them. Rome alone tries to keep pace with this extension by building new churches. Thus the Reformed Church in Amsterdam has only thirteen churches for its 200,000 members and has built since the 18th century only two new churches. Rome on the contrary has thirty-seven churches and 110 clergymen for its 125,000 members and is steadily building.

The author then takes up the problem of church-attendance by the masses and by the members of the church. In Germany Dibelius places this attendance in the smaller cities at 6 per cent of the church membership, which naturally makes the general percentage negligible. In the larger cities he places the figures at 1 per cent or even less. R. J. Campbell places the attendance at the churches in England at 25 per cent, which I believe is altogether too high. If he refers to church membership maybe the figures will stand, but if they refer to the population they are far too high. France and Austria tell the same story. The Dutch with all their innate religious sense, can boast for Amsterdam only from 37 per cent to 27 per cent of the church membership (mind you not of the population) and Rotterdam only from 33 per cent to 27 per cent. Our own so frequently lamented ecclesiastical conditions will bear, I trust, a comforting comparison with these figures.

The author then discusses the problem of the restoration of the city churches to greater efficiency. With admirable fullness he traces all that has been done in Germany, in this direction. The attempts of Wichern and Sulze are minutely described, the first with his "Christian Association", independent from the Church as an organization, the latter connecting himself closely with it. Men like Stock and Ruckteschell, Holström and Ussing build on their foundations, with individualistic modifications of the general plan, and yet the results of all their efforts are in the main disappointing.

Next in order the author takes up the discussion of the Parochial system of Church-work. The study of the word itself (pp. 49, 50) is especially interesting, Rome found in its "parochy" the local revelation of the body of Christ. The bishop as the head of this local ecclesiastical institution controlled all its operations. And from Rome the Reformed Churches have borrowed the term. The author therefore rejects this term and would rather speak of the "splitting of the city-church"—"de splitting der stadskerk". This may be done in various ways—1 by dividing the Church according to wards, 2 by forming independent churches. These again may be what he calls

"preachers' churches" or independent ward-churches, to be established according to the number of local pastors, or according to neighborhoods, or according to the number of church-buildings.

Now comes the discussion of these various methods. The Roman Catholic scheme of parochial division is rejected, as per se impossible under the Protestant conception of the Church; he equally rejects the idea of dividing the local Church into ecclesiastical wards, with a more or less definite ecclesiastical independence. Then he comes to what he calls "the preachers-churches", wholly independent ecclesiastical organizations, which draw from all the city and largely depend on the popularity of the preacher. He then approaches his ideal of an independent church in every ward of the city, but he rejects at once the idea of absolute independence. The unity of the "local Church" may not be violated. This idea of local union is a hobby with practically all the leaders of the Reformed Churches of Holland, especially those of the former "Doleantie". He claims that such local union was the apostolic ideal, although he admits that the point is not fully established exegetically (p. 92). His preference is therefore to split the local Church into "neighborhood churches" ("buurtkerken") sympathetically united together by the homogeneity of their membership, independent for all practical purposes, yet so organically united with the local Church that the principle of union above mentioned is not violated. I confess that the proposed outworking of this plan has left on my mind a somewhat hazy impression.

In the final three chapters the field of labor of these semi-independent organizations is discussed, both as regards those who are in the Church and those who are without; and last of all the plan and sphere of woman in the work of the Church is outlined. This final discussion would prove peculiar reading to our American churches, who have assigned to their women so large and influential a place in the operations of the kingdom of God.

As to the study as a whole, it is deeply interesting to one who is familiar with Dutch conditions. It has a very marked local coloring and reflects something of what has been called by unkind critics of the Reformed Church-life in Holland—"Modern scholasticism". For foreign readers the fundamental difficulty with the whole discussion would seem to be the assumption of the indivisible unity of the local Church (p. 85). To us who live in the midst of large and imposing developments of the sectarian life of the Church and who yet believe in the practical unity of the Church and in the coöperation of all evangelical Churches, this theory looks like a chapter of a very ancient volume. The author admits himself that the question is not definitely settled (p. 92) and yet the Reformed Churches are in the habit of speaking of the fresh revelation of the Church ("wederom tot openbaring komen") when in any given place, one of the churches of their own denomination is organized. And the entire discussion of this brochure is based on the assumption of this visible and local unity of the Church, in any given place. Let them abandon this idea and the whole question settles itself. According to our Reformed

form of government, the conciliar bond of union lies between individual churches and the "Classis" or "Presbytery". Dr. A. Kuyper, who in his "Tractaat van de Reformatie", was an ardent defender of this local unity of the Church, with one "consistory" or "session", later on in his "Pro Rege" abandoned this position. And as we see it, here lies the immediate solution of the problem of the city church, which has been so minutely and laboriously discussed in the pages before us. It is a pity that the author could not have fully familiarized himself with the status of this problem in England but especially in America, the land of full fledged sectarian development. What he calls "preachers churches" are not quite as loosely organized as he seems to imagine (p. 76), even though their membership ranges over a whole city, which by the way is rarely the case. These organizations are quite generally "neighborhood churches". But the Church in Holland has no more power than we have in America to prescribe to a man definitely what church he is to attend. An artificial solution of the problem, like he proposes, would after all only be a partial solution.

And yet whether we agree with the author or not one is forced to admire the patience and thoroughness, the scholarship and study of details, which enable a man to handle a subject like this as it is handled here.

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HENRY E. DOSKER.

*De Pro Acta der Dordtsche Synode in 1618. Academisch Proefschrift, ter verkryging van den graad van Doctor in de Heilige Godgeleerdheid.* T. DE VRIES Dz. Rotterdam: MCMXIV.

Before me lies a third academic thesis for the degree of Doctor of Divinity, like the former in the Free University of Amsterdam. This interesting study is the more remarkable since the author, having already entered the active ministry, found time for these exhaustive investigations during a busy pastorate.

The Synod of Dordt is the only Protestant ecclesiastical assembly of its kind which to some extent at least can lay claim to the title "Oecomenical". It was a most interesting assembly of divines and concentrated its attention on the Remonstrant or Arminian question. But it did many things besides and yet of all that transpired in it only the Arminian question has been treated with anything like exhaustive historical fidelity. The rest has received only superficial attention. Of the Post-Acta, i.e. the proceedings of the Synod, after the foreign delegates had returned home, the very text of the minutes is a matter of debate till this day. And of the Pro-Acta, i.e. the proceedings preceding the Arminian debate, little or nothing was ever accurately published. And it is not too much to say that our author has succeeded in filling this gap, by digging up a wealth of hitherto practically unknown historical material of the utmost value. The bibliography of the subject is remarkably full, consisting not only of printed Acta of provincial and national Synods, but also of matter preserved in archives, annotations, unprinted MSS and other sources.

The text fills 335 pages, to which 53 pages of Appendices are added. Of surpassing interest are the numerous footnotes of the author, mostly quotations in Latin, French, German and Dutch.

The author's style is remarkably vivid and he succeeds in holding the attention of his readers to the very last.

The subjects here considered are: 1. The composition and *modus operandi* of the Synod. 2. The translation of the Scriptures. 3. Catechetical instruction. 4. The baptism of heathen children received in Christian families. 5. The preparation of candidates for the ministry, and 6. Book-censorship.

The reception of the delegates of foreign countries, the entertainment of these foreigners, the hospitality of the city of Dordt, the little sideshows, for the special delectation of the commissioners so well known to our modern conventicles, the appearance of a grewsome comet, the eminent satisfaction of the commissioners—all these things are vividly portrayed by the author, who certainly wields a facile pen. All in all a most realistic picture of 17th century life is here presented.

The most minute regulations were made in regard to the seating of the delegates, according to ironclad rules of precedence and among all the foreigners, the English commissioners, headed by the bishop of Llandaff, received the greatest honors. After them came the Palatines, the Brandenburgers, the Hessians, the Swiss, the Genevese, the Bremers and the men of Embden, Nassau and Wetterau. The Dutch universities were separately represented, but neither the foreign delegates nor the university men were permitted to vote for the organization of the Synod (19), whilst on all subsequent occasions they voted with the rest (20). On Nov 13, 1618, they all went in solemn procession to the Doelen, a large building, where the Synod convened. Desks covered with green baize were provided for all the delegates, the hall was well lighted and warmed by huge fires in open grates, whilst to the amusement of the foreign delegates "footstoves" were provided to keep their extremities from chilling. Large galleries were open to the public, except when the Synod met in committee, which happened very rarely. At the start the questions were raised whether absentees could be considered in the election of the officers of the Synod; whether it would not be better to elect a moderator from one of the provinces, where the religious question had not been specially agitated or even from the foreign delegates; and whether both Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants were eligible. Martinus replied for the States-General that the election was wholly free. The second question was answered by the election of Bogerman of Friesland, a province where the religious question had been but little in evidence. The entire moderamen of the Synod however was Contra-Remonstrant, but their opponents were not excluded from membership, since Utrecht had a mixed delegation. Notwithstanding this the Remonstrants spoke of a "pro-Synod" (34). The plan of action of the body was laborious and diffuse, which led to the wasting of time, to the great chagrin of the foreign delegates (43). For the

sake of the foreigners all the deliberations were conducted in Latin. The attitude of the British commissioners to the Arminians caused some friction (53), and this may explain the fact that Arminianism made tremendous inroads on Anglicanism, after 1619. The reading and approval of the minutes were marked by irregularity and lack of system (55).

On page 60 the author begins the discussion of the so-called Pro-Acta, and first of all comes the consideration of the new Bible translation, to which 98 pages are devoted. It is not necessary to enter into the details of this discussion, which began on Nov. 19 and occupied the attention of the Synod till Nov. 27. The results are familiar to our readers. When the Synod adjourned in 1619 it was hoped to have the new translation finished in five years, but this hope was not realized till 1636-37. The author has furnished, in these pages, the fullest available data for an intimate knowledge of this remarkable Bible translation, the more remarkable since of the translators finally elected only 2 of the 12 were professional scholars; of the revisers only 4 out of 14, and of the names proposed for the latter office only 6 out of 37. An eloquent testimony to the average scholarship of the Dutch ministry in the early years of the 17th century. Of special interest is the discussion of the question of the Apocrypha of the O. T. (88 pp.), which showed a remarkable division of opinion. Especially the English delegates plead for their retention in the printed Bible, whilst many advocated a classification of these books, rejecting some in toto and ascribing to others considerable merit, e.g. Baruch, Wisdom, Macc I etc. (102). A curious proof of the polyglot condition of the Dutch tongue, in this period, is found in the fact that the revisers of Drenthe begged to be excused from their participation in the task "because they had few men who were skilled in the use of the Dutch tongue". As everywhere else the Dutch Bible of 1636 refined and unified the national language. The Apocrypha were finally ordered printed, though in a distinct place and with a different type and thus they appeared in the earlier editions of the Staten-Bybel, but they were soon dropped from the smaller popular editions. In this connection it is well to remember that the directors of the British Bible society eliminated them from the English Bible only in 1825, "after a long discussion".

The second question discussed by our author viz. that of preaching regularly on the Heidelberg catechism is of less vital interest to us since the regular exposition of the catechism, in the public ministry of the word, was largely confined to the Dutch churches, although training in the truths of the various catechisms, especially with an eye to prepare young communicants for an intelligent confession of their faith, was a common characteristic of the churches of Germany, Switzerland, and Scotland. The minutes of the Synod are a mute witness to the great unpopularity of this kind of ministration, on the part of both pastor and people (158, 162, 208). Ministers were admonished to continue these ministrations "even if only their own families attend them". The discussion and legislation of the Synod



in regard to this matter bore little or no immediate fruit, although in the end the practice triumphed in the Dutch Church and strange to say finally became quite popular among those who had the truth at heart. An interesting fact was brought to light in this discussion viz. that of the pernicious activity of Rome and especially of the Jesuits to control, wherever possible, the religious teaching in the schools, by introducing their own little textbooks (184, 196, 208). Especially the Walloons and the provinces of Gelderland and Drenthe complained of this evil. Of greater interest is the third point under discussion viz. the question of the baptism of heathen children, adopted or living in Christian families. This question came before the Synod from the directors of the East India Company and the author devotes to it 39 pages.

Two queries were laid before the Synod: 1 Whether baptism, administered by merchants, submerchants and assistants (all officials of the Company) or other persons, not authorized by the Church, may be recognized?

The author makes no mention of the fact that we have here unquestionable evidence of the hold, which Roman Catholic Sacramentarianism still had on the common mind in the Protestant Church at this period. A fact which is further elucidated by the advice of the Bremers (233). "In mortal peril they must be baptized by their masters." "Since they must care as well for their eternal as for their temporal welfare." The Swiss deny the need of such baptism, "since the question proceeds from the old error, by which greater stress is laid on the external ordinance than is proper and less on the ordinance as instituted by Christ". The Synod wholly ignored this first question. But the discussion waxed hot on the second question: "Whether the children in East India, who have wholly entered into the families of Christians and who have a Christian protector, who promises to train them in the Christian faith, shall be baptized?"

Here the advices of the foreign and domestic delegates are intensely interesting. Many desire to distinguish between small and larger children. In favor of the baptism of the former were the delegates of England and Hessa. All the others advised even against their baptism. Of the domestic advisers the professors were in favor of baptizing adopted infants, as were also the delegates of Zeeland and Frisia and the Walloons. All the rest, even the Remonstrants of Utrecht, laid stress on the fact that they were born *outside of the covenant and therefore could not be the recipients of its seal*, but must be trained in the Christian faith before they could be baptized. Towards the close of the debate the fact was brought out that many of these children were the illegitimate offspring of the officials of the East India Company and of native women; also that many of them were slaves, who later on might be sold again and that not a few were children taken from their parents by force and without their consent. The Synod therefore refused to give the approbation asked for.

The East India Company officials then invented a compromise.

Since such children could not be baptized, they "laid their hands upon them with prayer after the example of Christ, Mat. 19, and thus commended them to the gracious care and guidance of God" (256). It took some years before the consistory of Batavia saw its error and abolished this dangerous innovation (p. 257).

We need but briefly consider the remaining two points viz. that of the preparation for the ministry and that of the license or rather censorship of the press.

The discussion of the first point permits us to visualize the chaotic conditions prevailing and the lack of concert between the various provinces. Then as now but few men, and those usually poor, sought the ministry (pp. 261, 269). One cannot but wonder how such preparation furnished the churches with the able ministry, of which it could justly boast.

Complaints were made of the licentiousness prevailing in the universities, even in the special "seminaria" erected in these universities. The question of "student preaching, then as now, was a burning one. The practice spoiled the students and made them vain, and yet without it they had no practical preparation for their life work. In some provinces they were even allowed to administer the sacraments and to solemnize marriages (271). The advices of the foreign delegates proved that the evils complained of were universal, and those of the home delegates but emphasized the fact of the utter lack of a universal practice. Thus the Utrecht Remonstrants claimed for a student for the ministry all that an ordained man could do; but practically all the provinces bitterly attacked this position (282) and the Synod utterly rejected it (294, 295). But when we look for a final decision, looking to uniformity of action, the author has to admit that such action was never taken (293). The Synod regulated neither the academic nor the practical preparation for the ministry. "The liberty of the churches and the different customs in the different provinces" stood in the way of any such action. The only fruit of all the discussions was this that more serious thought was given to the matter and that the way was thus prepared for the uniform practice of a much later date.

As to book-censorship Chapter VI makes a serio-comic impression on the reader. Both foreign and domestic voices were raised in a dismal chorus of complaint about the unrestrained liberty of the press. The feathers of some of these fathers must have been ruffled by some keen lampoon, if we can read between the lines. Lampoons, gibes, caricatures, anonymous and abusive tracts are everywhere in evidence. Godless and heretical books appear without the name of the authors or even printers. Such are the complaints. What was to be done in the matter?

Earlier synods had advocated a "censura librorum" and warnings against such literature from the pulpit (306), but these remedies had apparently only stimulated the trade. All the foreign delegates poured out their vials of wrath, it was evidently a universal evil. The only voice raised for the liberty of the press was that of Deo-

datus, who advised the brethren "to reckon with the character of our people who love liberty". He was afraid of all ultra-reformatory efforts. But he proved a "vox clamantis", for all the rest insisted on a rigid censorship of books, works of art, songs, etc. It all ended in a farce. The moderamen of the Synod was instructed to subsume all the advices handed in, into some scheme of action, which was to be presented to the States General that they, by a decree, might put a stop to all these evils and prohibit them in the future (330). But the moderamen conveniently forgot all about the matter, which later on did not again come before the Synod. It is true the States General, on their own initiative, issued a decree of a general nature, stante Synodo, 22 Dec. 1618, but this decree did not satisfy the fathers (332).

The Church was kept out of the censorship-business. Things remained as they had been, no one paid any attention to the decree of the States; forbidden books, caricatures, libels and songs appeared as of yore and nearly two hundred years later, the Constitution declared in 1798 that "the liberty of the printing press is holy". Only anonymous screeds were forbidden, and even Napoleon forbade only seditious libels. For the rest the press was absolutely free, and the revised Constitution of 1815 made this a principle of fundamental law forever. The efforts of the Synod of Dordt to curb this liberty were a sad survival of the Romish past.

I have read this study with unabated interest from start to finish and find it strongly illuminating of the life of the Dutch Church in the opening years of the 17th century.

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*Der Einfluss Augustins in der Theologie und Christologie des VIII. und IX. Jahrhunderts.* Von WALTHER SCHULZ. Halle a. S. Verlag von Max Niemeyer. 1913. 8vo; pp. xi, 191.

This is an outline of Augustine's influence on the beginnings of mediaeval theology and christology. The doctrines specifically detailed are the existence and Essence of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Person and Work of Christ. Augustine's influence is argued from the prevalence of Augustinian terminology and the distinctly Augustinian flavor of the doctrines under discussion. Numerous citations are given from Alcuin, Agobard, Paulinus, Christian Druthmar, Hincmar, Paschasius Radbertus, Rabanus Maurus, John Scotus Erigena, Ratramnus, Prudentius, Servatus Lupus, Remigius, Florus Magister, Fulgentius von Ruspe, Candidus von Fulda, *et al.* There is scarcely a prominent theologian of the time who is not drawn upon to corroborate the author's thesis. The result is a parade of foot-notes almost copious enough to be voluminous. Well-nigh half the book is reference-notes, which by their abundance and length make the study an exceedingly valuable one; a splendid compilation of Latin proof-texts sufficiently comprehensive and relevant to fortify the point in question. The author is clearly at home in the theological literature of the two centuries of which he writes.

The influence alleged does not necessarily denote identity of thought or expression, though such identity is frequently found in the citations given. It does mean a pronounced similarity in the idea and this same similarity often extends to the form of expression. There are, of course, important differences. Alcuin, for instance, makes use of Augustinian formulae on space and time without understanding them in the Augustinian sense (pp. 62-65). He uses the expression *Homo in deum transivit*, which is quite un-Augustinian (p. 105, note 1). They also diverge on the idea of the *proprietas* in the doctrine of the persons of the Trinity (p. 128). Scotus Erigena simply reproduced the Neo-Platonic elements of the Augustinian theology (p. 12). His Trinity was Greek (Alexandrian, Origenistic) rather than Augustinian (p. 74; cf. p. 84). His theory of creation totters between Augustinian and Neoplatonic influences, and is emanistic (pp. 77-79). Alcuin as well as his contemporaries, following Augustine, held to a verbal as distinguished from a real *communicatio idiomatum* (pp. 147-149, 156-7), and in this the theologians of the ninth century agreed with them (pp. 163-166). In the discussion of the absolute Being of God (pp. 9-20), we would have given more attention to Gottschalk.

In the preface (p. 3) the author observes that to the question: In what way Augustine's Theology, Trinitarianism, and Christology influenced the early mediaeval theologians? no satisfactory answer has yet been given, owing to the fact that there is as yet no sufficiently exhaustive (erschöpfend) material for such an investigation; and though, consequently, his study may seem premature, nevertheless he is convinced that the attempt should be made, and may be of use for a more accurate knowledge of the theological labors of that time. Any student of Augustine or of the *opera theologica* of the eighth and ninth centuries will be grateful for this penetrating research, and many will doubtless accept its conclusions (pp. 188-191) that both as to problems and methods the leading dogmaticians of the eighth and ninth centuries were the pupils of Augustine.

A few suggestions may be added by way of corrigenda. Is not *semper ternus* for "sempiternus" (p. 37, note 1)? Put "n" for "u" in "und" (p. vii., sec. 2a); in "augustinischen" (p. 84, line 16); in "pertinebant" (p. 95, line 3 in note). Read "gleicher" for "gleichber" (p. 88, l. 11); "Fleischwerdung" for "Eleischwerdung" (p. 93, l. 6); "non" for "mon" (p. 132, note 4); "stattgefunden" for "sttattgefunden" (p. 163, l. 7); "columba" for "columna" (p. 171, note 4, line 7). Omit the second "ad" (p. 165, note 2, line 4).

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BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

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## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*The Christian Faith: A System of Dogmatics.* By THEODORE HAERING, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Tuebingen.

Translated from the second revised and enlarged German edition, 1912, by John Dickie, M.A., Professor of Systematic Theology in Knox College, Dunedin, and George Ferries, D.D., author of "The Growth of Christian Faith." Two volumes, 8vo; pp. xii + xii, 952. Bibliography and Index. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 1913.

Haering's *Der Christliche Glaube* was published in the autumn of 1906, and was briefly but sufficiently noticed in this REVIEW for January 1908 (pp. 166-7) by Dr. C. W. Hodge. The appearance of an English translation of its second edition—which was published in 1912—would in itself call for nothing more than an intimation of that fact, with some remarks, perhaps, upon the nature and extent of the changes introduced into the second edition, and the quality of the English rendering. On the former matter there is no need to enter into detail: the changes made are rather of the nature of expansions than of alterations. Of the latter matter we cannot speak with entire satisfaction. The sense of the original is doubtless conveyed in the translation. But the clearness with which the original was credited by its German readers ("marvellously perspicuous" is Titius' characterization of it) is certainly conspicuously absent from the translation; and all the charm which they also attribute to the book as a popular religious discussion is dissipated. We have found the reading of the English version somewhat heavy going.

An adventitious importance has been given to the English translation, however, by the unmeasured (and let us say at once, gravely misleading) praise which has, on the occasion of its appearance, been lavished on the treatise. An influential journal, widely circulated in both hemispheres, for example, announces it as "theology at its best". Had the proper qualification been inserted, and the book announced merely as Ritschlian theology at its best, little exception would need to be taken to the characterization. Haering's theology is exceptionally good Ritschlian theology. But no Ritschlian theology can be really good theology. Ritschlianism would not be unfairly described as the form taken in the later years of the nineteenth century by Socinianism, squeezed into the molds of Neo-Kantian philosophizing. And in the nature of the case, Socinian theology is bad theology, no matter in what philosophical garb—and, we may add, no matter with what religious fervor—it may be set forth. Haering brought to the exposition of Ritschlianism a warm religious nature, deeply steeped in Swabian Pietism, and, from the publication of his maiden-book (*Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben an Christus*, 1881), in the first days of "the movement" (the first literary symptom of the existence of "the school", was the publication in 1876 of Herrmann's *Der Metaphysik in der Theologie*), he has been diligently engaged in pouring the new wine into these old bottles. The wine has in the process no doubt taken on some of the flavor of the bottles, but the bottles have certainly burst. Despite the many modifications it has received at his hands,—all of them, happily, in the direction of a fuller recognition of essential Christian truth,—and despite the profoundly re-



ligious tone which he has cast over the whole exposition, what Haering gives us remains just Ritschlianism, and that is to say just Socinianism—Ritschlianism, Socinianism in the richest religious expression possible to them, perhaps, but Ritschlianism, Socinianism still.

When we say Ritschlianism, however, we say not only Socinianism but Socinianism in a decadent form. A quarter of a century has elapsed since Albrecht Ritschl died (1889), and the stir which his theological teaching began to make during the last decade of his life has already quieted down, and the movement which he inaugurated has largely merged in the general course of unevangelical thought. Perhaps it would be too much to say that his system has been already "relegated to the ineffectual past", for there still remain with us men of mark,—among whom Haering holds a conspicuous place—who have drawn a great part of their inspiration from it. But these are mostly men somewhat advanced in life; and it is not without its pathetic side to witness the publication by them, in their declining years, of system after system of a dogmatics, which, to put it brusquely, has had its day. There may not be wanting, indeed, some indications that the true state of the case is not altogether concealed from themselves, and that, in presenting their several transcripts of the Ritschlian system, they write consciously as much as historians of thought as they do as religious teachers. Haering, for example, not only makes no pretence of writing "definitive dogmatics", but even asserts roundly that there cannot be any such thing: "the dogmatics of any one generation", he repeatedly declares, "comes in the next to belong only to the history of dogma" (e.g. p. 31). He has even erected what he calls "the mutability of dogmatics" itself into a dogma, and finds for it crisp gnomical expression. "Theologies," he remarks (*Z ThK*, xx, 1910, p. 166), "change as doth a garment, and only the gospel abides."

In utterances like this there is obviously betrayed, however, much more than mere distrust of the permanence of one's own system in act of being expounded. What is uncovered is a veritable despair of dogmatics as such; or, to put it in its true light, a profound disbelief in the real—or "universal" as it is fashionable to phrase it—validity of what is yet somewhat oddly called religious knowledge. It is the same point of view which finds expression in the rampant individualism of Haerlin's declaration that the results of dogmatics "can never be the same for all theologians, just because and so long as the forms of piety which are described are not the same" (*Schw. Th. Z.* xxiii, pp. 17 ff.); or in Herrmann's even more disintegrating representation, which not only gives to each man his own necessarily peculiar dogmatics but will not permit any man to have a self-consistent dogmatics even for himself, since each several one of his "ideas (*Gedanken*) of faith" will necessarily bear traces of the peculiar occasion out of which it individually arose (*Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, 4, pp. 625, 615). The root of these disturbing deliverances is pointed out by Herrmann himself when he warns his brother Ritschlians off from the notion that a universally valid expression of

faith is possible, on the ground of the inseparable correlation of that assumption with that conception of revelation which sees in it a supernatural communication of truth (*Z Th K*, xvii, 1907, p. 29). Only an objective revelation of truth can supply a basis for an objectively valid dogmatics. And as the Ritschlians will not have an objective revelation of truth, they are in no position to give us anything better than individualistic, which is to say, subjective dogmatics.

Haering, of course, as a good Ritschlian points to revelation as the source of all religious knowledge. But to Haering, of course, as to his fellow Ritschlians, revelation is not "propositional" but purely "personal". To Christians at least (p. 144), it is summed up in the "personal life" of Christ (p. 293). Nothing can exceed the emphasis with which Haering insists upon this. "The revelation of God in Christ," he tells us (p. 262), "is the source, norm and basis of all Christian religious knowledge." Again (p. 317), "The revelation of God in Christ is the ground and norm of all religious knowledge." Further (p. 317), "As revelation is the ground, so is it the norm of Christian knowledge of God as regards its content and compass, as well as its nature." As regards its content, God is what He reveals Himself to faith in Christ as being. As regards its compass, God is nothing except what He is according to His revelation of Himself in Christ. The Christian *Glaubenserkenntnis* is, in a word, as is repeatedly asserted, *ganz und gar* the knowledge of the revelation of God in the "personal life" of Christ. No mode of statement is omitted which could emphasize the exclusiveness of the personal revelation in Christ as the source of Christian religious knowledge. But as this revelation is "personal" and not "propositional" it requires to be interpreted. The instrument by which the personal revelation of God in Christ is received and translated into religious knowledge is described as "faith". Sometimes, indeed, Haering speaks of the revelation in Christ as if it directly produced "faith": "the revelation of God in our religion," he says (p. 201), "is a revelation which produces faith, i.e. trust." But this is at once varied to the somewhat different form of statement, that God's "revelation consists in a self-attestation capable of producing faith". What is meant is apparently that God's manifestation of Himself in Christ is of such a sort that faith may find a basis for the knowledge of God in it—if it will. For Haering is very jealous of what he looks upon as the "freedom" of faith, and will not have the knowledge of God thrust upon any man by sheer revelation. In his view there are therefore two factors which must coöperate in the production of religious knowledge,—Revelation and Faith: and only in their conjunction can religious knowledge arise. "It is a revelation which faith has to interpret, and it is faith which has to interpret the revelation" (p. 421). Revelation alone cannot give religious knowledge; and, though neither can faith alone give it, yet it is faith which works up into knowledge what in revelation is only the raw materials for it. If without revelation there is no object of knowledge, without faith there is not only no

subject able to assimilate this knowledge, but no "knowledge" as yet to be assimilated. Religious "knowledge" is the product of a voluntary "faith" working upon a "revelation" which at the most is a mere "manifestation". On the face of it, here is a purely subjective theory of religious knowledge.

Haering, it is true, makes some effort to escape from this subjectivity; to avoid making faith, in effect, the creator of its own object. We find him, for example, vigorously asserting that "judgments of value", in the sense in which that concept is employed by him and his fellows, include in themselves "judgments of being". He strongly protests, indeed, against the representation that a value-judgment leaves the reality of the object of it undetermined (pp. 65 ff.). He protests further against the representation that the reality of its object is affirmed only on the ground of its value; that it is, in other words, an assumption or postulate resting on subjective experience. This appears to mean that a judgment of value presupposes the recognition of the reality of the object whose value is affirmed, and the recognition of it on some other ground than its value. Nevertheless, when an instance in point comes under discussion, and we are told dutifully (p. 67) that "the validity of judgments of faith"—here the judgment of value concerning God—"depends on the living conviction that the supreme reality in question"—that is, God—"manifests itself"—it is at once added, "but only to one who consents to recognize its reality as of value for him personally, not in the irresistible way in which the laws of logic demand recognition". The fat is obviously again in the fire. The will is brought in as the decisive factor in conviction: such a conviction is distinctively a voluntary conviction, and in this differs from the conviction wrought by logical reasoning, which, in contrast with it, is a compulsory conviction. This surely implies that the conviction in question is purely personal,—that is to say "subjective"—and cannot impose itself on another,—that is to say is not of universal validity. On what grounds could we impose on others convictions which even with ourselves we recognize as not imposed but as voluntary? Another, obviously, shares such convictions, if he shares them at all, also only voluntarily; that is by a purely personal, subjective act. The process by which the individual obtains a religious conviction, then, it would seem, is that by a voluntary act he recognizes value for himself in the object before his mind; and when it thus, by this voluntary act on his part, acquires value to him, it becomes "real" to him in a "living conviction". On the face of it, this is an extraordinary thing for it to do. But in any case, have we not here a purely subjective process? The ground adduced for the alleged reality of the object certainly appears to be its recognized value to the subject. And that value surely to all appearance is attributed to the object, not because of any compulsion of recognized fact, but by a voluntary act of the subject's own. That a "living conviction" of "reality" can arise in this fashion is sheerly incredible. All convictions, of whatever kind, are the product of course of evidence, and are not producible at will; and each con-

viction naturally rests on evidence fitted to produce that particular conviction. Judgments of being must rest, therefore, on evidence of reality, not on "recognition of value"; as indeed we have seen Haering himself compelled to allow—in words.

These remarks have brought us to the center of Haering's doctrine of Faith. It is not easy, to be sure, to determine precisely what he means by faith, despite the fundamental place held by this conception in his system. One reads the inordinately long Apologetical Introduction to his treatise with suspended mind, looking, and ever looking in vain, for some clear definition of the exact sense in which the ever-recurring "faith" is employed; and the want is not supplied even in the section of the Dogmatic part of the volume which expressly treats of Faith. It emerges, however, with sufficient clearness that faith is with Haering distinctively "voluntary conviction". It is without significance for our present point that he sometimes broadens his definition so as to include feeling as well as volition in the source of faith; as in the (for the elucidation of Haering's view) pregnant sentence: "Faith, on the ground of determinations (*Entscheidungen*) of the volitional and emotional spirit, in coöperation with the historical self-revelation of God, is sure of a reality which is inaccessible to theoretic understanding (*Erkennen*), compulsory knowledge (*zwingendes Wissen*)" (p. 257). As "voluntary conviction", he is never weary (as in the sentence just quoted) of setting "faith" over against "compulsory knowledge", a thoroughly misleading opposition (*cf.* the, no doubt insufficient, strictures of Titius, *Theologische Rundschau*, 1907, p. 378), which nevertheless forms the hinge of his whole treatment. According to this distinction, convictions which we cannot choose but have are knowledge; convictions which we have or not as we choose are faith. He even occasionally falls into the unhappy habit of setting "knowledge" and "faith" unqualifiedly in contradiction to one another, as if either we could believe what we know to be false, or that need not be true which we know. Thus in speaking of reservation in prayer with respect to earthly things, he remarks (p. 536), "It does not spring from faith, but from fear of the power of knowledge"; and again he tells us (p. 540) that certain reservations in defining miracles result from a feeling that "a decision on this point has already been pronounced from another quarter, from the side of knowledge." In such contrasts "faith" is in danger of appearing purely arbitrary. In any event Haering makes its complete voluntariness so of its essence that he exhibits an almost morbid fear lest its "freedom" should be curtailed. "Compulsion", he declares (p. 209) "is the greatest enemy of all faith." God can propound faith to us, but He cannot produce it in us: He can only ask, "whether we bestow our faith on Him in Jesus", "whether we are willing to let ourselves be laid hold of by His love revealed in Jesus". So alien is compulsion to faith, indeed, that it is laid down as axiomatic, that "in the interest of faith", there cannot be any revelation which "compels assent on grounds of logical necessity"; and even that "there cannot be any testimony to" a revelation, "so homogeneous in itself



and so uniformly authoritative, that it is not left to the believing community to fix the grade of authority which shall belong to each part of the record". The very nature of the divine revelation with which faith deals is thus accommodated to the nature of faith as necessarily voluntary: God Himself cannot "rush" the jealously guarded defences of its voluntariness. In the sphere of knowledge, in a word, compulsion may rule—we must accept what presents itself to us as true: throughout the whole realm of faith, freedom reigns—what we accept here we accept at our own option. Faith thus comes forward in Haering's system as a contribution which we ourselves bring to the production of religious knowledge. There can be no religious knowledge without faith, and faith lies in our own power. Whatever religious knowledge we have we work up at our own option out of non-compulsory materials. The function of faith in the production of religious knowledge is, indeed, so magnified that it almost seems at times as if it were supposed to bring something to its objects which lends them a reality not possessed by them in themselves.

This is not to be obscured by representing what is meant as merely that it is only to religious susceptibility that religious data appeal. It has become quite common nowadays to say that the whole object of Ritschl and his followers in their doctrine of "value-judgments" and "faith" is to maintain that only one with religious susceptibility is competent to form a judgment in religious matters. If this were the case, certainly no writers could write more misleadingly or indeed more trivially. No one has ever doubted that only a religious being can apprehend religious truth, as no one has ever doubted that only a moral being can apprehend moral truth; or—to push the matter to its conclusion—that only a rational being can apprehend truth at all. It requires as special an endowment to know that two and two make four as it does to apprehend the excellence of virtue or to perceive the beauty of holiness. But that it is not this truism which Ritschl and his followers wish to express by their doctrines of "value-judgments" and "faith" is plain from the circumstance that it does not cover the ground claimed by their contentions. We do not need to go further here than to ask what becomes then of this immense emphasis on the voluntariness of faith? Our religious susceptibility is not subject to the control of will. Does the susceptibility which responds to the moral quality of a virtuous act, or which, say, is sensitive to the music of a sonata of Beethoven, either exist or not, only at our option? By virtue of the presence of the susceptibility in the subject the object is apprehended more adequately than otherwise it would be—that is all. Nothing is apprehended which is not "there" independently of its apprehension, and no increase of reality is brought to the object by its more complete apprehension. Value judgments, judgments of appreciation, in other words, are not substitutes for judgments of being but supplements to them: they are superinduced on them and make only for more adequate knowledge of what is already less adequately known on other grounds.



The blight of Haering's conception of faith as an essentially voluntary act affects his whole system, and vitiates even his most promising concessions to an objectively valid Christianity. The function he assigns to revelation, for example, as a factor in the production of religious knowledge carries with it necessarily a strong assertion of the actual historical existence of Jesus Christ, the personal revelation of God; and an equally strong assertion of the historical trustworthiness of our records of Him. Haering therefore explicitly recognizes that, since Jesus Christ is the source and basis of Christian faith, "for all others than those contemporary with that historical revelation which produces faith, there must be historical primary sources of information (*geschichtliche Urkunden*, 'historical records') regarding it" (p. 279). Though he does not go the length of Kähler's "whole Biblical Christ", in positing the object of faith, he cannot satisfy himself with Herrmann's meagre and vague "inner life of Jesus". He argues that we must be historically assured of much about Jesus before He can serve as a revelation of God to us. To Kähler's astonishing declaration that there is not a single fact concerning the historical Jesus of which we can be historically sure, he opposes the recognition that "a certain measure of historical credibility (*Glaubwürdigkeit*) is indispensable, and its place can be taken by no amount (*Gewalt*) of religious value" (p. 281). That Jesus may work upon us as a revelation of the love of God we must know Him; and to know Him—seeing that He is a historical figure—we must have trustworthy historical accounts of Him. Haering even goes so far as to include in the trustworthy historical knowledge that we must have of Him, the knowledge of Him as the conqueror of death. He therefore makes the trustworthiness of the accounts of the "resurrection" of Jesus—as to the "fact" of it only, however, not as to its "mode", as he too explains in the customary effort to deny the resurrection while seeming to allow it—necessary to the creation of Christian trust in the complete sense. Indeed, he seems almost inclined to throw his circle out more widely still, and to bring (contrary to his fundamental principle) the preparatory "revelation" of the Old Testament itself into the compass of the grounds of faith, and even the march of God's providence in the world, and nature itself,—when viewed from "the storm-free center of the revelation of Jesus". But no sooner do we begin to congratulate ourselves on such apparently notable concessions than we are rudely called back to the qualifications which eviscerate them all.

If Haering is willing to say flatly that "it is all over with faith" if it can be shown that "Jesus is only a creature of faith" (p. 217), he will not say that faith cannot exist unless it can be shown that Jesus is not a creation of faith: he will allow that "knowledge" can destroy "faith", he will not allow that "faith" needs the aid of "knowledge", or indeed can profit by "knowledge". No sooner does he declare, then, that faith requires the historicity of Jesus for its validity than he begins to qualify. We must ask after the measure of historical trustworthiness which history can supply, and which

faith may demand. And Haering's contention is that history can neither supply nor faith ask certainty,—but only probability. No doubt, he sometimes speaks as if he were only denying that history can supply or faith demand precise “demonstration”, in the strict sense of that word as the designation of a mode (not degree) of proof. But his real meaning goes further than that. “If the tradition concerning Jesus possessed compelling credibility (*zwingende Glaubwürdigkeit*)” he argues (p. 217), “we should have what we have elsewhere had to renounce in the name of faith, on account of faith's very nature,—that intelligent men would be compelled to believe, or rather, not to believe, but to recognize as indisputable fact. On the contrary, there is no such compulsion in the sphere of history, so soon as we pass beyond the establishment of external facts and simple connections”. The statement is, perhaps, not perfectly clear in all its suggestions; but this much seems plain—history does not yield facts which intelligent persons, conversant with the historical evidence, are compelled to accept as facts—beyond at least certain external facts in their external connection. History presents to us (beyond this) only data which we may (however intelligent and however well-informed historically) accept or reject with good conscience—at our option.

History does not make, for example, the reality of Jesus Christ,—such a Jesus Christ as may be recognized as a revelation of the love of God—so certain that every intelligent man, conversant with the historical evidence, must assent to it as indisputable. All that history can bring us, as Haering goes on to explain (p. 218), is a sufficiently high probability (*Wahrscheinlichkeit*) to enable the “religiously susceptible” “to surrender themselves to the impression of this person” “with a good conscience”. If the religiously susceptible man makes this venture of faith, he may indeed attain through this to a certainty of the existence of this Jesus. But assuredly, then, the certainty he thus attains is the product of his faith, not of the historical evidence,—since, says Haering, this certainty “but for that surrender would be unattainable” (p. 218). We seem here perilously near to making Jesus—the Jesus in whom we find the revelation of the love of God—“only the creation of faith”: and, in that case, Haering himself being witness, “it is all over with faith”. Haering does, indeed, go on to say that the purely historical evidence of the existence of this Jesus must be sufficient to compel the man who will not accept it “to admit, in order to maintain his good historical conscience, that he is kept from giving his assent, not by compelling grounds of a historical character, but by a theory of the universe opposed to the Christian” (p. 218). Apparently this means that though there cannot be compelling grounds in history for affirming that Jesus existed—the Jesus in which faith sees the revelation of the love of God—neither must there be compelling grounds discoverable in history for affirming that He did not exist. History is not to say the decisive word as to the fact, one way or the other. All that can be asked of history—all that history can give—is room for believing in Jesus, on other grounds,—grounds apparently of “religious susceptibility”. Historical evidence cannot

establish it; but historical evidence must not exclude it. It may be proper to ask here how the history which cannot give compelling evidence of the existence of such a Jesus, can be supposed to be possibly able to give compelling evidence that He did not exist. Are not these equally historical facts? If we deny that history is capable of making the existence of such a character certain, do we not in that very act deny that it is capable of making His non-existence certain? And is not the upshot simply then, that history cannot give any certainty in such a matter at all; and our actual conviction with respect to it, whether positive or negative—must rest upon and be the product of our own subjectivity? In a word, does not Haering appear here in a purely anti-historical rôle? What, then, becomes of his theory of religious knowledge, which requires for its production the two factors of "revelation" and "faith"? If the "revelation" itself depends for its reality on the "faith"; and without "faith" can be looked upon only as a possibility not absolutely refuted by objective historical evidence—are we not on the plane of a pure subjectivity? Is not, in any express sense the Jesus in which "faith" finds the revelation of the love of God, in that case, the creation of "faith" itself?

We have other misgivings also about the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, upon which Haering hangs the entirety of the Christian's religious knowledge. We can for our own part cheerfully allow that the revealing Christ is more convincingly accessible to us in the historical records than Haering will admit. We could grant him what he cannot accept from us, then,—a thoroughly trustworthy access to Christ. But how can we be assured that the holy love of God is revealed to us in this Christ's "personal life"? Haering scouts all external evidence, such as that of miracles and the like, and presents instead this: "the drawing near on God's part in a historical personality must prove itself real, through God's inmost being revealing itself in his whole life and work" (p. 204-5). We are to know that this life and work is a revelation of God (otherwise unknown) not because it is convincingly attested as such, but just because "God's inmost being reveals itself in the whole life and work". Circular reasoning could scarcely be more bold. How can we know that God's inmost being is revealed in this person's whole life and work, unless we already know God and know what His inmost being is? And what in that case becomes of our complete dependence on the revelation in Christ for our knowledge of the God of holy love? Haering continues: "God's will of love towards sinners must confront us in the work of this personality in a manner so effectual that His work can be explained as the work of God, and consequently excite in us trust in the love of God". But how can we recognize God's will of love for sinners in the work of this personality unless we previously know of God's will of love for sinners? The question becomes indeed a very pressing one, on Haering's ground, What reason have we for believing that God is love?—though he gives us to understand that the entirety of his theology is summed up in that proposition. According to Haering we can know nothing of God

except by revelation, and this revelation is for Christians (for non-Christians there are hints that a substitute may be found) wholly included in the personal life of Christ. Not in what Christ teaches, nor in the details of what He did: but in the general drift of His life as historically transmitted to us (in a probable record) and received in a religiously susceptible soul. But how can this general drift of Jesus' life, even though transmitted to us with entire trustworthiness in history, reveal even to the religiously susceptible that God is love? On Evangelical ground the revelation of the love of God in Christ is clear enough; for herein in love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins; for God commendeth His own love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. But on Haering's ground? On Haering's ground we have no other reason for believing that God is love, except that Jesus Christ lived and wrought in that firm belief—if indeed we can assure ourselves, amid the uncertainties of historical testimony, that He did so live and work. It is as subject of faith,—Himself exercising perfect trust in God—that He becomes the producer of faith in us. We believe that God is love for no other reason than that Jesus believed that God is love. Is it more than a case of spiritual contagion? And is such spiritual contagion enough to base our whole hope in life and death upon? Haering is perfectly right when he declares that we can postulate "pardoning love" to the Righteous God as a fact, only on the basis of an actual revelation. But he will admit no revelation in word. Where, on his ground—without any Divine Son of God and without any Atonement wrought in His blood—do we get any actual revelation in fact of the pardoning love of God? In his view Jesus was sinless: how, in his "personal life"—not in His teaching—does He manifest to us specifically "the pardoning love" of God?

Obviously we are at the center of Haering's Christology when we raise such questions. Like all good Ritschlians it is the work of Christ which chiefly interests Haering and he accordingly (like all the rest) begins with it, and only infers from what he supposes Christ to do, what he is willing to allow that Christ is. The work of God is all included for him in this—that He reveals God to us as holy love, though, as we have seen, it puts him on his metal to make out that He does this. Of course, every body knows that from the beginning Haering has stood out among the Ritschlians as the one among them all who was striving to formulate the most adequate doctrine of Atonement. Gustave Ecke, pointing out the shortcomings of the teaching of Ritschl and Gottschick (the most completely Ritschlian of the Ritschlians) feels able to speak of "the surmounting of these shortcomings by Haering". And indeed Haering must be given the credit of having made effort after effort to find some "objective aspect" for Christ's work on Ritschlian assumptions (*Ueber das Bleibende im Glauben*, 1880; *Zu Ritschls Versöhnungslehre*, 1888, *Zur Versöhnungslehre*, 1893). What he has put forward with this end in view, however, he has had steadily to retract (a fair



brief account of the course of his thought here may be read in Bensow, *Die Lehre von der Versöhnung*, 1904, pp. 106 ff.), until in the present volumes not a vestige—or perhaps we may say literally just a vestige—of it remains. He still divides the work of Christ, viewed as regards its content, into His prophetic and His priestly work; and describes the former as wrought by Christ “as God’s personal Revelation of Himself for us”, and the latter as wrought by Him as “our Representative before God”. He thus appears as still fain to discover some Godward side to Christ’s work. But he discovers none. The best he can do is to represent that God is pleased with the perfection of Christ’s revelation of His holy love to men. How this redounds to our credit remains meanwhile, as Wendt points out (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1907, 23. coll. 646-7), unexplained; and we may add inexplicable.

As Haering still speaks thus of a “priestly” work of Christ, in which He “represents” us before God, so, continuing his careful use of old categories which have lost all their content to him (he actually orders his treatise on the Trinitarian categories of “Faith in God the Father”, “Faith in Jesus Christ, the Son of God,” “Faith in the Holy Spirit of God and Christ”, though he does not in the least believe in the Trinity), he still speaks also of a “kingly” work of Christ. His exposition of the work of Christ is thus cast in the familiar molds of His office-work as Prophet, Priest and King, while yet there is assigned to Him none other than His “prophetic” work. The Kingly work of Christ is the work of the exalted Christ, and that Haering throws stress on this work of the exalted Christ stamps him at once as belonging to the Ritschlian “Right”. Though he thus asserts his belief in a continued saving work for the exalted Christ, however, Haering is careful not to let it be supposed that he considers such a belief an essential element of the Christian religion: he thus preserves a place among good Christians for his fellow Ritschlians of the “Left”, who will not hear of any saving work for the “hidden” exalted Christ (p. 660). And in his own Ritschlian fear of mysticism (no “Christ Mysticism” for him) he is careful to confine this work of the exalted Christ within very narrow limits and not to permit it to add anything of importance to His work on earth—not advancing here in substance of teaching beyond what he had already taught in his earliest work (1881). When he describes “the work of the exalted Lord” as consisting solely “in the fact that He makes His historical work on earth operative” (it is meanwhile not made clear *how* He does this), he is only remaining true to the necessary implications of Christ’s saving work as he conceives it, which he makes to consist wholly in the revelation of the love of God to us through His trustful life in complete recognition of that love.

When we think of the exalted Christ we naturally think of that Resurrection by which, according to the Scriptures, He entered upon His glory. Haering’s dealing with the Resurrection is very characteristic. He adverts to it twice (pp. 211 ff. 627 ff.), and then leaves us not quite certain what he believes with respect to it. He allows that



it is essential to complete Christian faith to hold that, when the disciples "saw the Lord, they were not self-deceived, that He actually showed Himself to them as the Living One" (p. 211). All theories of merely "subjective vision" must then be rejected (p. 629). Beyond this, however, he will not go. He too wishes to draw a distinction between "the fact" and "the mode" of the resurrection; and thus to cover up the actual denial of all "resurrection" by those who talk of an "objective vision"—or, as Haering prefers to phrase it, "a vision which has an objective basis". His chief concern is that all should agree that it is unimportant what we think became of the dead body, so only we understand that the person Jesus did not at death pass wholly out of existence—as if we could talk of a "resurrection" of what never died, or as if Jesus' disciples required assurance that He, like other men, still lived after that experience which we call death. We may infer that Haering attaches great importance to this attitude towards the question of our Lord's resurrection from the circumstance that he repeats it in his booklet, called *Persönlich-Practisches aus der christlichen Glaubenslehre* (1911), and there expresses his thanks to his theological friend Max Reischle for "well-considered and pious words" on "the mode and manner" of the resurrection of Christ, to which "nothing essentially new has been added since" (p. 108). What Reischle has to say on the matter, however, whether in his articles in the seventh and eighth volumes of the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* or in his later *Christliche Glaubenslehre in Leitsätzen* (edition 2, 1902) is merely that while the resurrection experiences of the disciples cannot be scientifically proved not to have been a delusion, yet they are assured facts of faith, though even to faith "the question as to the *how*" of them remains unanswerable. That is to say we can be sure only "that the crucified One really lives as the Lord of His kingdom and revealed Himself to His disciples as the Living One". What Haering thinks so fine in Reischle, therefore, is only, his teaching that we cannot be sure that Christ ever rose from the dead, but we need not concern ourselves about that—all that is important is that His spirit did not die with the body and has entered into His glory.

With the idea of the exalted Christ there is associated the thought of prayer to Him, and Haering is accordingly led at this point to face this question (p. 665). He treats it with the chary caution with which he deals with all such matters. He permits us to pray to Christ; but he adds: "All invocation of Jesus is adoration of God who is revealed to us in Him." That is to say, we do not invoke Jesus as He is Himself God, but only as an intermediary through whom God reaches us and we Him. The notion has its affinities with Karl Thieme's insistence that Christ deserves our adoration because of His "representative unity" with God.

With this introduction Haering proceeds formally to discuss the "Divinity of Christ" (pp. 667 ff.). He is willing for Himself to employ the term, "Divinity" of Christ,—but only as an indication that "saving faith" embraces God and Jesus in one act of confidence; and

so, "in the view of saving faith" Jesus "belongs on the side of God". But, we may add, no more truly than "as He who reveals God, He belongs really to us" (p. 669). Just because He is the revelation of God, we are told, He "is not God; otherwise He would not be a revelation of God" (p. 670). Accordingly, throughout the whole treatise, Jesus is treated frankly as a human being, in his nature not different from us, His brethren.

It would naturally be supposed that with this view of Jesus' nature, Haering would make as short work of the notion of the pre-existence of Christ as, say, his fellow Ritschlian, H. H. Wendt, in his contemporaneously published *System der Christlichen Lehre*, whose "Dynamistic Monarchianism" differs from Haering's only in its greater frankness of expression. Strange to say, however, Haering appears to feel compelled to attribute some sort of preëxistence to Jesus. We say he appears to do so; for despite the somewhat lengthy discussion given to the matter, it is not made perfectly clear. He speaks of the preëxistence of Christ as one of the *Grenzgedanken unsrer Glaubenserkenntnis*, "limitative-notions of our faith-knowledge"—a truly Germanic phrase which our translators render, not with complete lucidity, "conceptions which mark the limit of the knowledge which we have of faith" (p. 695). Precisely what Haering means by a "limitative-notion" is not, however, obvious, and little light is thrown upon it by his explanations (pp. 704 ff.). These close with these words: "The *logical right* of the notion may be maintained by its friends in the measure in which they take it seriously that it is really a limitative-notion, one which surpasses the power of our knowledge—this being understood in the sense of the theory of knowledge of the Critical Philosophy, which does not maintain limits of knowledge arbitrarily but recognizes those that really lie therein" (p. 706). We are apparently referred here to Kant, who employs the term—or rather its cognate, *Grenzbegriff*—on a single occasion, of "the inconceivable something behind the phenomenon". "Finally, however, the possibility of such *noumena* is wholly incomprehensible, and what lies outside the sphere of phenomenon is (for us) empty, that is, we have an understanding which extends itself *problematically* further than that, but no intuition (*Anschauung*),—and not even a conception of a possible intuition, by means of which objects outside the field of sensibility are given to us and the understanding can extend beyond this in an *assertory* way. The concept (*Begriff*) of a noumenon is therefore only a limitative-concept (*Grenzbegriff*), intended to confine the claims of sensibility within proper bounds, and therefore only of negative use. It is nevertheless not arbitrarily invented, but hangs together with the limitations of the sensibility—without being able to posit anything positive beyond the limits of the sensibility" (*Kritik d. rein. Vernunft*,<sup>1</sup> p. 255). Accordingly, Rudolf Eisler (*Wörterbuch d. Philosophischen Begriffe*, 1910, I, p. 462) tells us that "Kant understands by a limitative-conception (*Grenzbegriff*) a conception which sets limits to, circumscribes, the claims of sensibility, and which at the same time leads to the limits of our knowledge, inasmuch as it

posits something to thought without being able to define it qualitatively, positively". For himself, Eisler broadly defines limitative-conceptions (*Grenzbegriffe*) as "conceptions which contain as content the existence of a transcendent object, without embracing (adequately) along with that its qualities; or conceptions which lead to the confines of the knowledge whose contents are valid at once for the subjective and for the objective reality". If we are to be governed by these definitions, it would seem that we must understand Haering, in representing the preëxistence of Christ as a limitative-notion, to be declaring it something which we must declare to be real, while yet we renounce all claim to comprehend what it is.

But if we will turn to the discussion of the same matter by Otto Kirn (*Grundriss der Evangelischen Dogmatik*, ed. 1, 1905, p. 92; ed. 2, 1906, p. 99; ed. 3, 1910, p. 107),—with whom in general Haering shows strong affinities—we will discover that the representation of the preëxistence of Christ as a limitative-conception (*Grenzbegriff*) is consistent, among Ritschlian theologians, with denial of, not its comprehensibility merely, but its reality as well. The passage is instructive enough to justify giving it in its entirety. "The Logos idea" says Kirn, "contains thus the ultimate explanation of the historical manifestation of Christ; but it gives us no knowledge of *His pre-historic being*. Logos means revelation, and the revelation of God to us belongs to history. The attempt to speculate upon the hypostatic distinction of the Logos from the Father, leads inevitably to subordinationistic ideas which do not do justice to the Christian faith. For only communion through Jesus Christ with God—in the most unlimited sense of the word—preserves to the Christian revelation its absoluteness and to the Christian salvation its certainty. The *Sonship of Christ* to God also enables us to illuminate the life-connection of the historical Jesus with God, but not the eternal, intra-divine life-process which forms the basis of the historical redemptive revelation. The attempt to pass beyond these limits, such as is made by means of the notion of the eternal generation of the Son yields nothing further, but only reduplicates the faith-knowledge oriented to history. The idea of *preëxistence* forms therefore a limitative conception (*Grenzbegriff*) of our theological thought. It declares that the historical Christ has eternally His central and universal place in God's will of salvation, and that the content of His life, His redemptive holy love, comes from God and is an eternal content of the supernatural life of God. We would, therefore, more correctly speak of the *super-historical* character of the revelation of God in Christ than of the *pre-historical* existence of Christ with the Father." Here the preëxistence of Christ is represented as a "limitative-conception" and yet explained as only "ideal", as the phrase goes. An elaborate argument is devoted to showing precisely that Christ did not exist "really" before His earthly career began. It does not follow, therefore, that Haering intends to represent the preëxistence as real, from the mere fact that he calls it a "limitative-notion".

Nor are all our hesitations at once dissipated by the circumstance

that Haering explicitly speaks of it as "real". The Ritschlians (perhaps Haering conspicuously among them) are so accustomed to employ phraseology consecrated by long usage in novel senses or in new applications, that it behoves us to scrutinize their language closely before accepting it in what may seem to us its obvious meaning. Not to go beyond this very matter of the preëxistence of Christ, H. H. Wendt, on the low ground of his frankly acknowledged Dynamistic Monarchianism, can still find an element of truth in the doctrine of the preëxistence of Christ, and can still speak of this preëxistence as "real" not "ideal". "We have," he remarks, "merely not to refer the idea of real, eternal preëxistence to the historical man Jesus Christ as a whole, but to that which was divine in Him, to the Holy Spirit which He bore in Himself. And this eternal preëxistence of the Holy Spirit is not a *personal* preëxistence, like that of the Logos in the Athanasian conception. *Real* preëxistence, was not possessed by the 'Son'. For 'Son' of God is not the Holy Spirit but the personal man Jesus in which the Holy Spirit showed Himself operative. Of this man we can only affirm *ideal* preëxistence; that He as mediator of the redemptive revelation, which was to lead to the establishment of the Kingdom of God, belonged to the eternal redemptive plan of God and was the object of God's loving prevision and provision" (*System der Christlichen Lehre* II, 1907, p. 579). It is no doubt sufficiently bizarre to speak of the eternity of the God who employed the man Jesus as His organ as, in any sense, a "real preëxistence" of Jesus Himself. But this is the way the Ritschlians employ language.

Coming nearer home to Haering, we may profitably observe how the question of our Lord's preëxistence is dealt with by his life-long theological friend, his fellow-Swabian, Max Reischle. Reischle feels able to speak of "an eternal Being of Jesus Christ" after a fashion wholly incomprehensible to us, and is able to connect this with the idea of the Logos, thought of, however, not as a distinct hypostasis in the Godhead but only as "an aspect, tendency, mode of operation of the Divine Being Itself". "If, however, we raise the question," he proceeds, "whether we are to carry into the eternal Being of the *θεὸς λόγος*, also the personal life of the historical and exalted Christ, distinct from that of the Father" (for it is only to the historical and exalted Christ that a distinct hypostasis is allowed, p. 62), "only so much as this can be said: Since the action of the Logos is intelligible to us only with respect to and in the person of Jesus Christ, we can never in our faith think away this personality from the conception of the Logos; but we must always think, as of the eternal God as Father of Jesus Christ, so also of the eternal Logos or of that eternal self-determination in God, as related to Jesus Christ. But what the nature of this relation is, we are, as finite beings, incapable of penetrating, and still more of making it the starting point in an explanation of the incarnation of Jesus," "Thus," he adds, "we are in the question of the eternal origin of Jesus Christ, ever again brought back to this—the believing recognition, not only *back of*, but

in His earthly personal life, and in the activities of the exalted one, of the eternal Divine Being determining the time-course" (*Christliche Glaubenslehre in Leitsätzen*.<sup>2</sup> 1902, pp. 199-120). There is a distinct refusal here to allow to Christ any personal preëxistence, and the reduction of His preëxistence to that of the impersonal Logos inseparably connected with Him in our thought, while the meagreness of this result is partially covered up by a suggestion that we are, as finite creatures, incapable of understanding such relationships, and a reference to the manifest presence of the eternal God with Jesus Christ. If our necessary thinking of God as Father of Jesus Christ, he intimates, does not carry with it the consequence that God was always the Father of Jesus Christ, neither does our necessary thinking of the Logos in connection with the person, Jesus, carry with it the consequence that the Logos was always connected with that person.

The impulse to suspect that Haering's doctrine of the preëxistence of Jesus may also evaporate under our gaze into some such mist as this, arises not only generally from its astonishing incongruity with the scheme of his teaching as a whole, but more particularly from the immense difficulty of taking it literally in the face of his decisive rejection of the doctrines of the Trinity on the one hand and of the Two Natures of our Lord on the other. With him God is a monadic Divine person and Jesus is a monadic human person, and on those postulates it seems impossible to construe to thought a real personally preëxistent Christ. He cannot be thought of as a personal distinction in the Godhead; for there are no personal distinctions in the Godhead. He equally cannot be thought of as some sort of a "middle-being": whatever else Jesus is to Haering, He is a genuine man, a human being with all the qualities of humanity. Will he then project Him back into eternity as some kind of a "heavenly man", despite His strong asseveration that He "belongs to us"? The monstrosity of these notions in the general context of Haering's thought bids us pause before we take his words at their face value. Is it not more probable that like his fellow Ritschlians here he has some subtle meaning in mind, which does not appear on the surface of his words, especially since he tells us that his advocacy of the preëxistence of Christ will commend itself in proportion as we accept the notion strictly as a "limitative-notion", that is to say as something quite incomprehensible to us? Meanwhile, it must be admitted that he seems to ascribe to Christ as a fact, whatever we are to say of the mode, a real personal preëxistence. "This *limitative-notion*," he says, "may be formulated" ("by those who accept it" seems to be added in the later text), "as follows: the love of God, effective to us in Christ as the Son, is so truly love of God, effective self-revelation of His nature, that it is eternally directed to Him, the vehicle of this eternal love, not only in the sense of ideal preëxistence,—to Him as the temporal-historical correlate of the eternal love of God,—but also apart from His earthly existence, as love of the Father for the Son, in the mystery of the eternal life of God, or then, accordingly, because no other word stands at our disposal, in real preëxistence; and—this



the other side of the same notion—this Son, eternally loved by God, is, as sent by the Father into the world, so come into the world by an act of love of His own" (p. 704). It certainly seems to be said here not only that God's love for the Son is eternal, but that the Son whom God loves is eternal; not only that the Son was sent into the world by God, but that He came into the world by an act of His own. All things considered it does not appear strange that Haering's confidence in such a "limitative notion" should not seem quite complete. He speaks of its "advocates", to be sure, as "convinced". But he agrees that they must not "make assent to it an essential element of saving faith itself"—that is to say of the necessary content of the Christian religion—"but", he adds in the later revision of his text, "shall rather leave open the possibility that, in the progress of knowledge with regard to the Christian salvation, it may be superseded" (p. 707).

We have been interested to observe how Haering's critics, sharing his general Ritschlian point of view, understand him on this matter. A. Titius (*Theologische Rundschau* x, 1907, p. 460) seems merely to record the fact that Haering holds such an opinion. "The doctrine of Christ's real preëxistence," he writes, "is accepted" by Haering, "with respect to its kernel indeed as a 'providentially supplied limitative-notion' (p. 449), but along with that also not as an 'essential element of saving faith itself.'" H. H. Wendt (*Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1907, 23, col. 647) seems to drop a sly suggestion that Haering's recognition of a real preëxistence for Christ may possibly be classed in Haering's view along with that knowledge which passes away. "With circumspect reserve," he writes, "Haering permits the New Testament ideas of the real preëxistence of Christ to pass as limitative-notions, which the Christian community may retain, 'so as to lose nothing of the mystery of God's revelation of love in Christ, until in other conditions of existence a more perfect knowledge of it discloses itself' (p. 499)". E. Günther (*Die Entwicklung der Lehre von d. Person Christi im xix Jahrhundert*, 1911, pp. 330-1) deals with the matter at more length, but also, it seems, with a slight undertone of sarcasm. "Perhaps the most difficult point in Haering's Christology," he says, "is his doctrine of *preëxistence* as a 'limitative-notion'. If he advances beyond the so-called ideal preëxistence this is wholly from motives derived from religion and the New Testament. The ideas of the love of the Father who gives the Son and of the humble self-surrender of the Son who came into the world by an act of love of His own, are to him too valuable to be relinquished. The origin of the Pauline and Johannine Christology is also a problem for Haering, which however, is not capable of being solved—or perhaps is already solved—from analogies and connections derived from Comparative Religion (pp. 443-448). But he who will not abandon the notion of the real preëxistence should give it expression on the one side only as the ultimate culmination of the immediate conceptions of faith, and on the other with the conscious reservation that there can exist for us in this region no knowledge (p. 450). We may con-

jecture that in this reference many will rather be disposed to speak of the limits of thought than of 'limitative-thoughts' (*die Gedanken-grenze als Grenzgedanken*). They will, however, be gladly ready with Haering 'without curtailment of their particular gift, encouraged rather by a noble rivalry, weary of mere negations, to unite in a real affirmation' (p. 452)." Whatever they may think of the procedure, neither Titius, Wendt, nor Günther appears to doubt that Haering intends to teach a real personal preëxistence for Christ.

We shall not follow the details of Haering's system further. With his reduction of the person of Christ to the dimensions of a mere man (despite that "rock in the sky" of a problematical incomprehensible preëxistence), and of the work of Christ to merely impressing men with the conviction that God is "holy love" (despite the ineffective efforts to discover in this some value to God); with his reduction of God Himself to mere Love—whatever that may mean—(despite the incongruous insistence against his master, Ritschl, that "righteousness" and "wrath" have a place in the Divine nature): it is easy to understand what a "reduced Christianity" he sets forth. The fundamental difficulty lies of course in the lack of "external authority". It is not to be wondered at that one, who, having discarded the authority of the revelation of God embodied in the Scriptures, finds his task as a theologian only in "giving expression to the religious interpretation of the gospel which is attainable at the period" at which he writes—that is, who seeks his guidance not in a sure word of God but in shifting public opinion—should be able to set forth only a meagre and lowpitched system of doctrine. Or that he should sit rather loosely to what he does give us. Certainly there is observable in the teachings of such writers, and not least in Haering, a certain "elasticity" as it has been euphemistically phrased. He has his own faith-judgments; but so also have others: why should he demand exclusive recognition for his own? So, to take examples only from matters which have come before us, Haering will not "dogmatize" on the "mode" of the resurrection of Jesus; on the saving activity of the exalted Christ; on the employment of the term "divinity" with reference to Christ; on even his poverty-stricken notion of some sort of preëxistence for Christ. In his hands Christianity takes on the appearance of a highly elastic cord in rapid vibration; there may be a solid cord somewhere, but all that appears to sight is a vague and tenuous lozenge of unstable and unsubstantial material. Despite the parade of Apologetical substructure a sense of unreality gradually grows upon the reader as he proceeds through the volumes, and he closes them with the feeling that he has not been given a solid system of Christian doctrine; not even a "gospel"—a body of glad-tidings—which Haering would no doubt prefer that it should be; but only a collection of the more or less plausible religious opinions of a good man conscious of lacking any firm ground for his feet.

*Some Loose Stones.* Being a Consideration of Certain Tendencies in Modern Theology Illustrated by Reference to the Book called "Foundations". By R. A. KNOX, Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford. Second Impression. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1913. Crown, 8vo; pp. xxiv, 233. Indices.

Mr. Knox is a member of that coterie of young Oxford Fellows out of which come the "Seven Oxford Men" who wrote the Liberal Manifesto called *Foundations* (see the notice of it in this REVIEW for July 1913; xi, 3, pp. 526-508). Not being of their way of thinking and, naturally, being aware of the approaching publication of the book, he greeted its birth with a brilliant satire, parodying Dryden's *Absalom and Achitophel*, under the somewhat lurid title of *Absolute and Abitofhell*. There were those who thought that if the book was to be attacked at all, it would better be seriously attacked; a proposition the universal validity of which would not have been allowed, to be sure, by John Calvin, say, or Pierre Viret,—though we are not sure that Mr. Knox would care to support himself on the judgments of precisely these great men. At any rate, having enjoyed his burst of laughter, Mr. Knox has turned to earnest remonstrance and has written this volume of criticism in which he traverses the main positions taken up by the authors of *Foundations*. He still, however, conceives himself to be engaged rather with the writers of *Foundations* than with their doctrines; or rather, perhaps we should say, he conceives himself to be engaged with their doctrines primarily not on their own account but as expressions of the personalities of their propounders. He insists that he is not writing a theological book: he is rather occupied, he suggests, in "a study in psychology". What interests him particularly is the psychology—the "far more intricate psychology", he says, than that of "the Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Fathers, or of the Schoolmen"—of "the modern theologian". The most wonderful thing about our wonderful "modern theology" to Mr. Knox, is, apparently, that there are people who can think that way.

Even the attitude of the Modern Theologian to his task seems to Mr. Knox an odd one. The Modern Theologian is apparently less concerned in the discovery of precisely what is true about Christianity, than in the ascertainment of how much can be made easily to pass as true among "modern men". He seems oppressed by the mass of scientific opinion around him; but what daunts him is not so much the effect of this scientific opinion on his own faith, as "its effect on the faith of other people". Therefore, there enters into all his work an apologetic tone which produces even "at times a cynical indifference to absolute truth." "For we are not concerned, now, to find how we can represent truth most adequately but how we can represent it most palatably. We ask of a doctrine, not, 'Is it sound'? but 'Couldn't we possibly manage to do without it'?; not, 'Is it true'? but 'Can I induce Jones to see it in that light'?" Jones has been to College and has heard of Hegel. He is a good man: "*anima naturaliter Christiana*, and all that." But when it comes to Christian Doc-

trine, Jones has difficulties. Concessions are in order: it will not do to estrange Jones' "modern mind"! Mr. Knox is outraged by such an attitude. "The great argument used now against any theological proposition," he breaks out, "is not, that it is untrue, or unthinkable, or unedifying, or unscriptural, or unorthodox, but simply, that the modern mind cannot accept it. It is the modern mind that accepts this, and rejects that, that expresses itself in terms of A rather than in terms of B, that thinks along these lines rather than along those, that shrinks, or ratifies, or demands. And after reading a few paragraphs of such ostensibly psychological discussion, I find myself sorely tempted to exclaim in an equally psychological spirit: 'If the modern mind has really got all these peculiar kinks about it, then, in Heaven's name, let us trepan it!'"

Even this however, is, according to Mr. Knox, not the worst of the matter in the case of the authors of *Foundations*. The Jones to whom they are so assiduous in adjusting their teaching is a "back number". "In a word, our objection is, not that Jones is unreal, or unimportant, or unrepresentative, but that he is sixty." It was forty years ago that Jones went to College: and the strenuous efforts which the authors of *Foundations* are making "to convert our great uncles" must strike the really "modern mind" as a sad anachronism. The world has moved in this generation: *tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis*. This "modern mind" to fit it into the queer corners of which the authors of *Foundations* are so busy whittling down Christianity, always an impertinence, has become fairly non-existent. Jones has receded into the background; and his grandchildren are of a very different temper. They wish no "accommodations" of doctrine made for them. "I have never met (outside of Senior Common Rooms) any demand from questioners for re-statement or accommodation of my beliefs to theirs; they want rather to know what the Church does say, in order to see whether they can accommodate their beliefs to mine". "Against all this complicated process I am convinced that the cry of the average man is, 'Tell me what you do believe and always have believed . . . and then I will see about it.'" "The modern mind does not want pulp. It wants something that it can close its teeth on." "More dogma is wanted, pulpitfuls of it." The actual mind of the day demands not quieting compromises but clearly-cut differentiations and consequent consistency of convictions.

The fundamental difficulty of the Modern Theologian leading him to sit loosely to Christian truths lies, Mr. Knox thinks, in his method of approach to them. He approaches them by way of hypothesis instead of by way of presupposition, or *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*. Looking at them only as so many propositions proposed for consideration, and approaching them (professedly) wholly without prepossessions, he sets to work framing hypotheses, on the ground of which they may be accounted for. Obviously any number of conflicting hypotheses may be framed: there are few bodies of alleged facts which may not find some kind of explanation on any one of a score or of a hundred hypotheses. And at the last resort, there

always remains the simple explanation of the amazing report brought by the child: "the little boy lied" (more or less). There is no limit to the number of hypotheses which may be suggested to account for any body of alleged facts, except the limits of the fertility of the imagination. And there are no final grounds of discrimination between the several hypotheses proposed. More than one will account for the facts on the assumption that it is true. And each man becomes enamoured of his own hypothesis and twists the facts to make them accord with it. We soon find ourselves in the midst not merely of a confused mass of hypotheses but also of a confused mass of doubted facts; and we seek in vain for a firm footing. Everything however is different if we approach a body of truths presented for our acceptance with presuppositions rather than hypotheses in our hands. Presuppositions are solid things, on which we can take our stand. We already believe, say, in God, and in a personal God who acts purposively; and in a God of love who intervenes in a sinful and miserable world for its salvation. We bring these things with us as facts of which we are assured, not as hypotheses which we are testing; and what a different aspect is taken on by the body of Christian doctrine! Now everything is clear, and solid and sure. And the difference hangs, says Mr. Knox in effect, wholly on the difference in standpoint.

Mr. Knox, it will be seen, is an "authoritarian". And that is well. We cannot get along in this world of fact without authority. Without authority we may assure ourselves, it may be, of what must be; we cannot be assured of a single thing that merely is. And Christianity, as a historical religion, is a religion of facts and is therefore built up, in all that makes it that specific religion which we call Christianity, on authority. We may be theists without authority but not Christians. The blows which Mr. Knox strikes in the name of authority are without doubt fatal and he does especially good service when he exposes the inconsequence of the attempt to substitute religious experience for authority as the foundation of conviction. "As a matter of modernist psychology," he writes, "this appeal to experience is very interesting. The modernist will not allow himself to be regarded as in any way prejudiced in favor of one particular theological system. He therefore collects together the testimony of innumerable other people, principally Bishops, mediaeval nuns, and contemporary charcoal-burners, who were and are, beyond any shadow of dispute, prejudiced theologians—prejudiced by what they believed upon a basis of purely traditional authority. And the result of this appeal is summed up as if it were the most modern of all critical investigations, an essay in psychology. But if *a priori* assumptions are to play no part in modern theology, spiritual experience must play no part in modern theology, for spiritual experience is based on *a priori* assumptions" (pp. 193-4). "The whole argument from experience," he comments, "seems to rest on the assumption that you can first make people believe, on the strength of Bible documents or inherited tradition, certain clearly defined dogmas; and then, when they have got



accustomed to this way of thinking, you can come and knock away the supports on which the belief rests, Biblical and traditional, and say, 'We have now proved the truth of these doctrines, because we have reared on them so splendid an edifice of faith'" (p. 190).

Valid, however, as is Mr. Knox's appeal to authority; and sound as is his contention that authority lies at the basis of all Christian faith; it must be confessed that he gives no adequate account either of the ground or the nature of the authority to which he makes appeal. His argument thus hangs in the air, and the impression is created that the authority on which Christianity rests is accepted by its votaries by a purely arbitrary act of will. This is indeed, to all appearance, true in Mr. Knox's own case; otherwise, we surely would catch in his numerous allusions to it some hint of a rational basis of his acceptance of authority. He is, it would seem, just a "traditional" Christian and is inclined to give validity to the traditional Christianity which he accepts, chiefly one would imagine, despite his solid refutation of that ground of faith, because of the beneficent results of his acceptance of it. He would scarcely expect us to take literally "the crude metaphor" by which he attempts to illustrate his attitude to Scripture and tradition (p. 33): "You have a motor-car with two headlights, each throwing out its rays obliquely in either direction. The hedge on each side is illuminated by one lamp only, but in the center of the road the two lights converge, and mark out a triangular area of brilliant clearness. The two lights of Scripture and Tradition (if we may pursue this crude metaphor) may be said in the same way to provide sufficient guidance for our course only when they overlap. Beyond this area, speculation is at liberty to botanize in the hedge-rows." If we were really to "pursue this crude metaphor" Mr. Knox would have left himself no authority at all. If neither Scripture nor Tradition has any authority by itself—and he apparently deprives each severally of authority—they cannot have any authority when combined—on the principle at least in which Mr. Knox tells us he was brought up (p. 190), viz. that  $O + O$  yields still  $O$ . Authority is not a thing of degrees: it is either absolute or non-existent. He must therefore look upon either Scripture or Tradition as by itself authoritative if their combination is to be authoritative. And it is quite clear that it is to Tradition, not to Scripture that Mr. Knox really accords authority. When he says therefore: "It is only at the point where Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition combine to form a defined doctrine, that he"—he who thinks with Mr. Knox—"pretends to stand on sure ground in virtue of a presupposition" (p. 33), we can but understand him to mean that his faith rests not on Scripture *simpliciter*, but on Scripture, as interpreted by Tradition—that is to say that he finds his authority not in Scripture at all but in tradition; in other words that he is a traditionalist in the sense of the Church of Rome. Authority to him thus spells tradition, and tradition spells "Church", and "Church" spells practically Rome. Mr. Knox in a word is a High Anglican, indistinguishable in his theory of authority from the general doctrine

on this subject of the Roman Church, except, perhaps, for a little drawing back when the place of the Pope in the definition of dogma comes into consideration (*cf.* p. 193). His pleading for a commanding place for authority in religion is largely vitiated, therefore, by the circumstance that his own view of the nature, seat, and ground of authority in religion is baseless and untenable.

This fundamental inconsequence in his own point of view does not prevent Mr. Knox, however, from exposing the inconsequences of the "Modernist" point of view, as illustrated in the authors of *Foundations*, in a very trenchant manner. In successive chapters he traverses the greater number of the essays in *Foundations* and points out in them tendencies of method and treatment which annul their conclusions. He speaks himself of having dealt only very cursorily with Mr. Moberley's essay on the Atonement. But we are not sure that the strictures on this essay do not constitute the best piece of criticism in the volume. The notion that our Lord offered for us a "vicarious penitence" is very properly scored. Can there be such a thing as "vicarious penitence"? If there can be, can it take away sin? And if it can take away sin, must it not be because it, as suffering, is "*actually allowed to count* in the eye of divine justice as satisfaction for sins which we have committed"; and if this is so, how does it avoid the criticism that "it is immoral that the sufferings of one man should be accepted as satisfaction for the sins of another"? The essence of the matter is touched in a passage like the following. "But this surely is clear, that if we are to hold the full traditional view of the Atonement, we must suppose that the brand left by our sins is not twofold, but threefold. They leave a mark on our own souls—true. They leave a mark on the lives of men around us—true. But over and above all this, they leave a mark in the book of life, a black mark on our records, which no human penitence can efface. There is an objective disturbance in the moral order which our sins have created, and only one thing could right it, the Sacrifice of Christ, to which we have contributed not a jot or a tittle on our own part. And there can be neither Catholicism nor Evangelicism where this fact is not realized" (p. 171). Some of the remarks on the deity of our Lord and the Incarnation are equally pungent, and that whether the attempt to substitute the category of will for that of substance in construing the one doctrine or the notion of kenosis in construing the other, is under discussion. To be "of the same mind" with one another is not to have numerically only one "mind" among us; and when two beings will the same thing it is not clear that they are therefore but one. And if anything such as the Kenotists assert happened at the Incarnation we certainly cannot say that Jesus was God, but only that He was a man who once had been God. The Virgin Birth and the Empty Tomb (though Mr. Knox stumbles sadly with reference to our Lord's resurrection-body) and the Ascension are all dealt with in adequate fashion. Mr. Knox is willing even to become aggressive here. "Mr. Streeter says he knows of no living theologian who would maintain a physical Ascen-

sion in this crude form. I have no claim to be a theologian. I can only say that as a person of ordinary education I believe, as I hope for salvation, in this literal doctrine: I believe, that whatever change may have glorified the Risen Body when it passed beyond the cloud into a new mode or sphere of existence the earth has ever since the Ascension been lighter by so many pounds' weight, and the sum of matter in the world the less by so many cubic inches of volume" (p. 85). Such "materialism" may shock some ears: but the issue ultimately comes to just that.

There are, of course, other passages with which we feel less satisfaction. We do not quite go with Mr. Knox in his dealing with miracles; especially in his inability to separate between Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles. We certainly do not go with him in his treatment of Scripture: especially in his discussion of the eschatological utterances of our Lord. His Romeward tendencies—which are numerous and decisive—are an offence to us. His obsession of "freedom" is equally regrettable. Even here, however, he shows his characteristic courage and in the interests of "free-will" cheerfully denies that we have any solid ground for anticipating the conversion of the world. Enough: there is much in Mr. Knox's book which is crude and unconsidered. But this cannot destroy its general value as an exposure of the weaknesses of "modernism"; and it is in this that its significance lies. It is an earnest and successful plea to reasonable men to draw back from these shifting shoals where "we have to be reassured by a yearly statement from Dr. Sanday, comparable to the weather report, as to 'what we may still believe'," and to plant our feet firmly on the rock. The fine air of conviction which suffuses it, and the brightness of the style, should give the book a wide circulation and, we trust, will give it, in its main message, large acceptance.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*Zukunft und Hoffnung.* Grundzüge einer Lehre von der Christlichen Hoffnung. von DR. W. HADORN; Professor und Pfarrer in Bern. Beiträge zur Förderung Christlicher Theologie, Achzehnter Jahrgang. Heft I. C. Bertelsmann; Gütersloh. 1914. Pp. 147.

This is an outline of Christian Eschatology. Its aim, as the author tells us in the Preface, is practical. Dr. Hadorn intends to give an outline of the subject, which will be of help to ministers of the Gospel and to laymen who may have become doubtful as to the nature or the validity of the Christian hope.

Dr. Hadorn, therefore, says that he does not intend to enter into a thorough philosophical discussion of the question of Immortality, nor to discuss all of the detailed problems which arise in reference to Christian Eschatology and its relation to Jewish Eschatology. This practical purpose of the author must be kept in mind in estimating the value of the book. Otherwise the reader might be inclined to criticise the volume on account of the omission of many questions which are either not touched upon at all, or only with the greatest brevity.

Part I discusses the "Principles" which underlie a doctrine of Christian hope, setting forth its ground, its nature, and its content. The basis or ground of Christian hope is the experience of God in Christ which the Christian possesses. This experience, however, is regarded not merely as an inward experience unrelated to anything objective, but is immediately related to, and supported by, the Resurrection of Christ. As regards the nature of Christian hope, it is said to be an abiding and confident trust in, and expectation of, the future blessings promised in the Gospel. The "content" of this hope is a "glory" the precise meaning of which is not further explained except by the statement that it involves the fulness of all the promises of the Gospel, and unfolds itself in the individual Christian, in the Christian community, and in the world.

Accordingly in Part II this Christian hope is set forth in three sections of the book, dealing respectively with the personal and individual hope of eternal life, the "social hope" of the coming of the Kingdom of God, and the "universal hope" of a renewed creation or world.

The hope of the individual Christian is that of a personal, individual, and conscious immortality, of immediate blessedness at death in the presence of Christ, and of the resurrection of the body. In this part of the discussion there are two defects to which attention should be called. In regard to the idea of "eternal life", Dr. Hadorn fails to give any full and adequate statement of the meaning of this Scriptural idea; and in his treatment of the question of the resurrection of the dead he does not do justice to those passages of Scripture which assert, in some sense, the identity of the resurrection body with the body that is buried in the grave, although, of course, this is an identity in difference, and the difference is emphasized and well brought out by Dr. Hadorn.

The sections on the Kingdom of God, or the "social hope" of Christianity, as Dr. Hadorn calls it, are chiefly occupied with contrasting the Christian conception with that of several forms of contemporary German Socialism. In these sections Chiliasm is rejected, though not discussed at all at length.

The closing sections of the book deal with what the author calls "the universal hope". This is not a well chosen division of the subject. Indeed, all that is here discussed might better have been subsumed under one or the other of the first two heads. Thus, the section on future probation, which is entitled "the hope for the dead", might better have been put in the part dealing with the future of the individual; and the section entitled "the hope for the world", in which the restitution of a new heaven and a new earth is affirmed, should not be considered separately from the final consummation of the Kingdom of God.

Let us turn for a moment to the theological positions maintained by the author in these closing sections. He asserts the doctrine of future probation; not, however, in the form sometimes held, especially by Lutherans, that those who have not heard the Gospel in this life

have a chance to hear and accept it in the future, but that all who have not heard the Gospel and also all who, having heard it, have died undecided whether or not to accept Christ, have a chance to accept Jesus and the offers of the Gospel in the future life. As regards the rest of mankind, Dr. Hadorn argues in favor of the idea that they will at last be annihilated, and he criticises both the doctrines of Restorationism and of eternal future Punishment. He affirms, however, that our knowledge of this subject must always remain uncertain.

It is in these closing sections that Dr. Hadorn's book is most unsatisfactory. The argument in favor of annihilationism rests almost wholly upon *a priori* reasoning or upon what he terms "moral" and "religious" grounds, which are not anything more than the author's own sentiments on the subject.

The argument for future probation is equally weak. The two or three passages of Scripture to which appeal is made, will not support the doctrine at all. For example, when our Lord said that if anyone should speak a word against the Holy Spirit, it should not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in the coming age (Matt. xii. 32). He evidently did not mean that in the future life every sin, which was not the sin against the Holy Spirit, would be forgiven or might be forgiven. This is neither said nor implied. What Jesus evidently intended to say was that the sin against the Holy Spirit could never be forgiven at all, which is precisely the meaning of the parallel passage in Mark iii. 29. To get the doctrine of future probation out of this saying of Jesus is logic chopping rather than exegesis. The words "the coming age" (*αἰὼν μέλλον*), moreover, denote, not the future life of each individual between his death and the Judgment, but the age following the *Parousia* and the Final Judgment, *i.e.*, the age of the final consummation of the Kingdom of God.

Furthermore, the difficult passage 1 Peter iii. 19, 20, even if it meant that Jesus went, after His death, to the world of departed spirits and preached the Gospel, would afford no support to the doctrine of future probation, and in addition to this, the above interpretation of the passage seems an impossible one for a number of cogent exegetical reasons which we cannot stop to enumerate.

It is not, after all, this hopelessly weak basis on which Dr. Hadorn rests his belief in the doctrine of future probation, in the face of the explicit teaching of the Scripture to the contrary. His belief in this doctrine is based rather upon a number of presuppositions which are not expressly stated, but which nevertheless are seen to underlie his argument, and which are not only without support in Scripture, but are contrary to the teaching of the Bible. These presuppositions are—that God intends to save all men, and that man's salvation depends on his hearing the Gospel and not resisting it; that man's attitude for or against the Gospel as foreseen by God, is the determining cause of God's election of men to salvation; that this stands wholly in the choice of man; that original sin and actual sins are not sufficient to condemn men, but that only the sin of rejecting the Gospel offer is



a sufficient ground of condemnation. All of these ideas are in direct conflict with the gracious character of salvation, and with the express teaching of the Scripture.

*Princeton.*

C. W. HODGE.

*The Holy Spirit of God.* By W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, Wyckliffe College, Toronto. Formerly Principal of Wyckliffe Hall, Oxford. London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1913. Pp. 303.

This volume contains an expansion of the lectures on the L. P. Stone Foundation in Princeton Theological Seminary, which were delivered by Dr. Thomas during the session of 1912-13. In the Preface Dr. Thomas informs his readers of the purpose and scope of his book. His object, he says, was to provide a Monograph on the Holy Spirit for students, and to include references to literature and a bibliography on the subject.

The book is divided into four parts—1. The Biblical revelation concerning the Holy Spirit. 2. The historical interpretation of the doctrine in the history of the Church. 3. The theological formulation of the doctrine. 4. The modern application of the doctrine to various questions of the day.

In beginning the exposition of the Biblical teaching, Dr. Thomas first sets forth the Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit of God under three heads dealing respectively with the Spirit of God in His cosmical relations or relations to the world; in His "theocratic" or "redemptive" relations; and in His individual or personal relations.

After a brief chapter on the Apochrypha, the New Testament teaching is expounded. Dr. Thomas begins with Paul's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, not because he doubts the historicity of the Synoptic account of the teaching of Jesus, but because of the early date of Paul's Epistles. His method, accordingly, is to work backward, and show how the developed doctrine is rooted in the teaching of Jesus. In dealing with Paul's doctrine, Dr. Thomas shows how in the Apostle's thought and teaching the Holy Spirit is represented as the "Source", "Principle" and "Support" of the spiritual life. He then passes from the Work of the Spirit to set forth briefly Paul's view of the Personality and Deity of the Holy Spirit. The Apostle's idea of "flesh" and "Spirit", and of the relation of the Spirit to the exalted Christ are only briefly touched upon, and there is no treatment of the eschatological aspect of the work of the Spirit, which Schweitzer has recently emphasized as one of the distinctive features of Paul's doctrine in contrast with Greek thought.

After setting forth the Pauline doctrine, the teaching of the book of Acts is given, and Gunkel's view is briefly examined. This is followed by a chapter on the teaching of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels and a chapter on our Lord's teaching in the Gospel of John. Dr. Thomas points out how the Synoptic teaching is largely concerned with the official work of the Holy Spirit, as was the case in

the Old Testament, whereas the Gospel of John sets forth richly and fully the teaching of Jesus concerning the Person and Work of the Holy Spirit. This first part concludes with a chapter on the doctrine in the other New Testament books, and a chapter which gives a summary of the Biblical doctrine.

The second or historical part contains seven chapters tracing the development of the doctrine from the close of the Apostolic age through the nineteenth century. In the closing chapter of this part, in giving a summary review of the history of the doctrine, it is pointed out that five special dangers have always beset the purity of this doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The dangers are—Intellectualism, Pelagianism, Ecclesiasticism, Individualism, and Idealism.

The third part, which aims to formulate the doctrine, begins by stating and proving the Personality and Deity of the Holy Spirit. After this follow five chapters discussing respectively the relation of the Spirit to Christ, to the Bible, to the individual Christian, to the Church, and to the world.

The fourth part seeks to point out the application of the doctrine to various modern problems. The doctrine of the presence of the Spirit is distinguished from the doctrine of the Divine Immanence, and this is followed by several chapters which seek to show how the Biblical doctrine of the Holy Spirit is a corrective for various modern errors such as Modernism, Mysticism and Intellectualism. A concluding chapter deals with the bearing of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit on certain Church problems.

The bibliography at the end of the volume will prove helpful to students though it is by no means exhaustive.

*Princeton.*

C. W. HODGE.

## PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*The Saviour of the World.* Sermons preached in the Chapel of Princeton Theological Seminary. By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, a Professor in the Seminary. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1914. 12mo; pp. 270.

There are nine sermons included in this volume, designed to throw into emphasis, even at the cost of some repetition, the particular fact that Jesus Christ is the Saviour not only of individuals but of the world. The titles and texts of the successive sermons are as follows: The Prodigal Son (Lk. xv. 11-32), Jesus Only (Acts iv. 12), The Lamb of God (John i. 29), God's Immeasurable Love (John iii. 16), The Gospel of Paul (2 Cor. v. 14-15, 18-19, 21), The Glorified Christ (Heb. ii. 9), The Risen Jesus (2 Tim. ii. 8), The Gospel of the Covenant (John vi. 38-39), Imitating the Incarnation (Phil ii. 5-8). The first of these sermons endeavors to make plain the universal need of salvation; the second the sole provision of Salvation in Christ; the third the world-wide reach of His salvation; while the subsequent

ones seek to enforce this main message and to bring out particular elements in our Lord's saving work.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

*Judson The Pioneer.* By P. MERVIN HULL. Philadelphia: The American Baptist Publication Society. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 187. 50 cents net, postage 8 cents.

Any volume is welcome which calls attention anew to the consecration, courage, and blessed influence of Adoniram Judson. This brief biography, published in connection with the celebration of the centennial of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, is of such a popular character as to prove attractive and interesting to the youngest student of missions.

As the title of the book indicates, the purpose of the author has evidently been to select from many available sources the scenes and incidents which reveal the true character of Judson and which set forth his career as that of one of the world's greatest pioneers in the field of missionary enterprise.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Following the Sunrise.* By HELEN BARRETT MONTGOMERY. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 291. 50 cents net, postage 8 cents.

Probably the most valuable book published in connection with the observance of the centennial of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society is this review, by Mrs. Montgomery, of the century of Baptist Missions, 1813-1913. The first chapter relates to the foundation work already done in India before the century began. The next two relate the romance of the pioneer work in Burma and Assam, while chapter four deals with missionary work in India, "the rudder of Asia". "The Chance in China" furnishes the theme for chapter five, and the following chapter is devoted to Japan. "Pioneering on the Congo" is described in chapter seven, and the last chapter deals with "Buttressing Democracy in the Philippines." The book is carefully outlined, clearly written, well illustrated, furnished with helpful bibliographies at the close of each chapter, and in every way well adapted, not only to inform the average reader, but for the particular use of mission-study classes.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Immortal Seven.* By JAMES L. HILL, D.D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. Cloth, 8vo; pp. 151. 50 cents net, postage 8 cents.

This volume was published in connection with the centennial of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, and it records the work of Adoniram Judson and his associates, pioneer American Missionaries to India. The familiar forms of Dr. and Mrs. Judson appear more heroic than ever as they are viewed in connection with the incidents and details of this story, and the reader appreciates better

than ever how much of the success of their enterprise was due to the help of their worthy companions in service, Samuel Newell, Harriet Newell, Gordon Hall, Samuel Mott and Luther Rice. Not a little of the interest centers around Salem, and the old Tabernacle Church, where Judson was ordained, and around those scenes and characters which the recent Judson celebration brought into prominence. The book will be of interest to all who love biography and missions.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Seed Thoughts for Right Living.* By ALVAH SABIN HOBART, D.D.

Professor of New Testament Interpretation in Crozer Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: The Griffith and Rowland Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 303. 50 cents.

The author does not attempt to suggest new morals but "to apply new methods to the teaching of old morals." He begins on a level with all men who are seeking to do right, and leads by logical processes to the heights of Christian living, cheered by a Christian hope. Starting with the belief that there must be a science of right living, he seeks first of all to discover its general principles, regarding as his sources "history, experience, reason, conscience, the Bible, religion, human nature."

He next considers the Christian principles of right living, and the certain helps to such living. The fourth part of the book he devotes to "Suggestions to Special Classes", including parents, children, husbands, wives, church-members, ministers, travelers, business men, customers, employers, employees, and voters. He closes the volume with certain "Apostolic Suggestions", as to the progressiveness, the fruit, the defenses, and the dynamic of right living.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Vie En Christ.* A lui, en lui, pour lui, comme lui. Conseils et Expériences. Par FRANK THOMAS. 2e édition revue. Genève: J. H. Jeheber, Libraire-Éditeur, 28, rue du Marché. Paris, Libraire Fischbacher, 33, rue de Seine (VIe). 1914. 8vo; pp. 136.

A devotional exhortation in four chapters exhibiting the Christian career as life belonging to Christ (1 Cor. 6:19, 3:23), to be lived in Christ (John 15:4), for Christ (Rom. 12:11), and like Christ (2 Cor. 3:18). According to M. Thomas the Christian Church of to-day is feeble and abortive against the world because it has in it too many who believe in Christ only after a fashion, who have a sort of aesthetic admiration for Him without any vital attachment to Him (pp. 20-25). They have come to Him, but they are not His: "*ils sont venus à lui, ils ne sont pas à lui*" (p. 21). Those who have abandoned public worship and have drifted into doubt and incredulity, he believes, will come back only when the Church shows to the world that she is a society of active laborers, zealous in the service of their Master (pp. 77-78).

The book is passionately devotional, almost recalling a Count Zinzendorf in its religious fervor. Its appeals are beautifully illustrated.

Its theological background is that of the Anselmian orthodoxy (*cf.*, *e.g.*, pp. 17-18, 22-23). Free from all show of superficial emotion, its every page glows with the warmth of a life that has had the rich experiences of Christian fellowship.

*Langhorne, Pa.*

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

## GENERAL LITERATURE

*English Literary Miscellany.* By THEODORE W. HUNT. Oberlin, Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Company. 1914.

This volume consists of papers originally contributed to *Bibliotheca Sacra*, *The Methodist Review*, *The Presbyterian Review*, and *The Book-Lover*. It is the second in a series. The contents include general discussions of such subjects as *The Elizabethan Age of English Letters*, *The Historical Antecedents of the English Drama*, *The Transition to Modern British Poetry*, and *English Criticism*; and special discussions, on Shakespeare, Milton, Keats, Arnold, the Brownings, and Swinburne. Kindliness of tone, in marked contrast with the ambitious cleverness and pride of accuracy that spice many books of a similar intention, disarms the reader and carries him back to a time when literary topics were discussed for pleasure, not for scientific ends or for a philosophic purpose. There may be, however, some theological idea in the author's remark that "There is a providence in history and in literary history and a human agency as well, to each of which elements due regard is to be given by the student of letters lest either be pushed to a dangerous extreme". The human, he adds, is sometimes prominent in literature and again the divine. Fortunately he refrains from the tempting task of discriminating between the two in English literature, as some critics have done with preposterous results. Exception must be made, however, for Swinburne, in whom he finds very much less of the divine than in Mrs. Browning. By far the most elaborate of the general discussions is that on *English Literary Criticism*, which contains much information and many judgments.

*Princeton.*

G. M. HARPER.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Journal of Theology*, Chicago, July: DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, *The New Christianity and the World-Conversion*; EUGENE W. LYMAN, *Must Dogmatics Forego Ontology?*; DAVID S. SCHAFF, *Formulation of Fundamental Articles of Faith*; ERNEST D. BURTON, *Spirit, Soul, and Flesh in Greek Writers from Epicurus to Arius Didymus*.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oberlin, July: JOHN F. GENUNG, *The Irreducible Minimum*; GEORGE M. CUMMINGS, *Paul's Doctrine of the Logos*; G. CH. AALDERS, *The Wellhausen Theory of the Pentateuch*, and *Textual*



Criticism; EDWARD G. LANE, Psychology of Conversion; HOWARD A. BRIDGMAN, Leadership of the Church in Modern Life; EDWARD M. MERRINS, Jews and Race Survival; WILLIAM W. SWEET, Civilizing Influence of the Medieval Church; HAROLD M. WIENER, Stray Notes on Deuteronomy.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, July: ELIZABETH WORDSWORTH, Florence Nightingale; W. K. L. CLARKE, Christian and Greek Miracle Stories; WILBERFORCE JENKINSON, Old St. Paul's in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Literature; ROBERT VAUGHAN, Influence of Man upon Nature; S. A. McDOWALL, Evolution and Atonement: the Problem of Continuity; E. M. SPEARING, John Donne and his Theology; C. F. ROGERS, Affusion or Immersion; A. NAIRNE, Versions of Holy Scripture.

*Constructive Quarterly*, New York, September: H. P. BULL, Spiritual Factors of Unity; ALFRED E. GARVIE, Nonconformity: Its Ideals and History; JEAN RIVIÈRE, Outside the Church no Salvation; S. M. ZWEMER, A United Christendom and Islam; LEONID TURKEVICH, Orthodox Ritual in the Divine Service of the West; GERMAIN MORIN, The Spirit and the Future of Catholic Liturgy; CHARLES JOHNSTON, The Departure of Archbishop Platon; W. R. THOMSON, Votaries of Personality; DAVID H. GREER, A Study in Anthropomorphism; JOHN H. RITSON, The Scriptures as a Bond of Co-operation; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, Church of England in Relation to Other Reformed Churches; J. E. SYMES, Broad Churchmanship; W. F. LOFTHOUSE, An Experiment in Co-operation; W. CLASSEN, Decay and Growth of Ethical and Religious Ideas among Industrial Workers in Germany; LÉONCE DE GRANDMAISON, Lucie Felix-Faure Goyau.

*East and West*, London, July: LORD SYDENHAM, Medical Missions in India; S. G. WILSON, Claims of Bahaism; SUSAN BALLARD, Suicide in Japan; BISHOP MONTGOMERY, India; JAMES L. BARTON, Education and Evangelism; ELEANOR McDUGALL, Present Situation in Education of Indian Women; CANON MERCER, Separation of Black and White in the Church; T. C. COLLETT, A Layman's Visit to Zululand; D. S. BATTEY, Opium in the Villages of Bengal.

*Expositor*, London, August: ED. KÖNIG, Old Testament and Babylonian Language; JOHN A. HUTTON, Sense of Sin in Great Literature, 2 "Peer Gynt"; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology. 7 Universal Restoration; GERARD BALL, Epistle to Philippians: a Reply; A. E. GARVIE, Notes on the Fourth Gospel. 7 The Upper Room; H. T. ANDREWS, Structure of Prologue to Fourth Gospel; C. F. RUSSELL, The Second Commandment; E. B. REDLICH, Aristarchus. *The Same*, September: ED. KÖNIG, Old Testament and Babylonian Language; ARTHUR CARR, Boldness in the Day of Judgment; NEWPORT J. D. WHITE, The Creed and Dr. Sanday; ALPHONSE MINGANA, A New Document on Clement of Rome, his Relations and his Interview with Simon Peter; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology. 8 Conditionalism; JOHN A. HUTTON, Sense of Sin in Great Literature. 3 "La Morte"; C. VAN GELDEREN, Who was Nimrod?; A. A. DAUNCEY, The Two Great Refusals.

*Expository Times*, Edinburgh July: C. ANDERSON SCOTT, Church's Interpretation of the Historic Christ; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical and Oriental Archaeology; J. RENDEL HARRIS, Gnosis and Agape; WILLIAM WATSON, The New Jerusalem. *The Same*, August: ADOLF DEISSMANN, Study-Travel in New Testament Lands; FREDERICK J. RAE, The Christian Message about Prayer; D. R. MACKENZIE, Christianity and the African Mind; A. R. GORDON, Pioneers in the Study of Old Testament Poetry; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical and Oriental Archaeology; H. NORTHCOTE, The Song of Habakkuk. *The Same*, September: ADOLF DEISSMANN, Study-Travel in New Testament Lands; EDWARD SHILLITO, Prayer in the Epistle to the Hebrews; J. E. SOMERVILLE, Gadarene Demoniac; GEORGE MARGOLIOUTH, The Marriage Law in the Geniza-Zadokite Documents; A. H. SAYCE, Archaeology of Genesis.

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, April: ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, The Lord's Prayer; ANNA G. SPENCER, Marriage and Social Control; ALBERT R. VAIL, Bahaism—A Study of a Contemporary Movement; WILLIAM W. ROCKWELL, The Jesuits as Portrayed by non-Catholic Historians; RALPH B. PERRY, Contemporary Philosophies of Religion; ALBERT LEO, Churches of France and their Separation from the State.

*Hibbert Journal*, Boston, July: A. D. McLAREN, Creeds, Heresy-Hunting, and Secession in German Protestantism To-day; J. M. THOMPSON, Post-Modernism; ARCHIBALD WEIR, Criminous Clerks; CANON ADDERLEY, "Sacraments and Unity"; W. R. INGE, Institutionalism and Mysticism; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Mysticism and Logic; L. T. FARNELL, The Presence of Savage Elements in the Religion of Cultured Races; FRANCIS H. JOHNSON, The Higher Anthropology; J. AGAR BEET, The Hereafter in the Bible and in Modern Thought; W. MONTGOMERY, Schweitzer as a Missionary; CASSIUS J. KEYSER, Significance of Death.

*Hindustan Review*, Allahabad, August: J. STANARD, The Bahai Movement of Persia; P. A. V. AIYAR, Agricultural Labour: A Lesson from Austria; C. I. VARUGHISE, Ancient Public Libraries; SVED A. HAKIM, Sultana Raziyya.

*International Journal of Ethics*, Philadelphia, July: H. L. STEWART, Need for a Modern Casuistry; G. A. JOHNSTON, Casuistry and Ethics; E. W. HIRST, Absolutism and the Ethical Problem; S. RADHAKRISHNAN, Vedanta Philosophy and the Doctrine of Maya.

*Interpreter*, London, July: ARTHUR WRIGHT, Catchwords in the Gospels; R. H. KENNETT, Our Lord's Interpretation of Prophecy; WILLOUGHBY C. ALLEN, Criticism of Two Document Theory of the Synoptic Gospels; A. W. F. BLUNT, After Death; H. H. B. AYLES, Sanguis Jesu Christi; T. H. WEIR, Did Jesus Speak Greek or Aramaic?; JAMES JONES, Did Lazarus Write the Fourth Gospel?; J. C. HARDWICK, Religion in France; H. E. MADDOX, The Hundred and Twenty-first Psalm; G. W. OTTON, "That Rock was Christ."

*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Dublin, July: JOSEPH MACRORY, Present Chaos in the Church of England; DAVID BARRY, Ethics of Horse-

racing; PETER DAHMEN, *Islam in India—Its External Influence*; M. H. MACINERNY, Alan O'Sullivan, Bishop of Cloyne and Lismore; GEORGE S. HITCHCOCK, *Symbolism of the Apocalypse*; F. J. GHELLINCK, *Medieval Theology in Verse*.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, July: ISRAEL FRIEDLÄNDER, A New Responsum of Maimonides concerning the Repetition of the SHMONEH ESREH; ISAAC HERZOG, The Last Two Chapters of Samuel Ben Hofni's *כְּהָאֵב אַחֲכָאם שְׁרַע אֶלְעִיָּצִית*. B. HALPER, Volume of the Book of Precepts by Hefes B. Yasiah IV-VIII.

*Jewish Review*, London, July: ISRAEL COHEN, Modern Jewry in Bondage; L. G. MONTEFIORE, Anglo-Jewry at the Cross-roads; ROBERT B. SOLOMON, Gerasa; H. C. FRANKLIN, Jerusalem and Zionism; SALIS DAICHES, Salomon Maimon and his Relations to Judaism.

*Journal of Biblical Literature*, Boston, June: JOHN P. PETERS, Wind of God; J. DYNELEY PRINCE, Note on Vashti; HENRY A. SANDERS, New Collation of Ms. 22 of the Gospels; GEORGE A. BARTON, Exegesis of *ἐναντιοῦς* in Galatians 4:10 and its bearing on the Date of the Epistle; WALDO S. PRATT, Studies in the Diction of the Psalter III; JOHN P. PETERS, The Cock in the Old Testament.

*Journal of Theological Studies*, London, July: T. W. CRAFER, Work of Porphyry against the Christians, and its Reconstruction II; J. M. CREED, The Hermetic Writings; MARTIN RULE, The Queen of Sweden's 'Gelasian Sacramentary' III; R. H. CONNOLLY and EDMUND BISHOP, Work of Menezes on the Malabar Liturgy II; C. R. NORCOCK, St. Gaudentius of Brescia and the *Tome* of St. Leo.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, July: P. T. FORSYTH, Effectiveness of the Ministry; ELSÉ CARRIER, Notables of Nantes; GEORGE JACKSON, Lord Morley and the Christian Faith; R. G. W. HUNTER, Milton and the Liberties of England; CHARLES BONE, Confucianism: China's Established Religion; W. T. BALMER, Bergson and Eucken in Mutual Relation; F. W. ORDE WARD, The Coming Christocracy; The Christian Faith for To-day.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, July: H. E. JACOBS, The Ideals of Theological Education; C. E. LINDBERG, Problem of Comity Between Theological Seminaries; C. M. JACOBS, Can We Agree on a Standard Theological Curriculum?; JOHN W. HORINE, Board of Education of the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in North America; JOHN W. HORINE, Can we Agree on a Course of Religious Instruction in Our Colleges?; H. DOUGLASS SPAETH, Cooperation of Church and State in Religious Education; E. T. HORN, The Industrial Revolution; H. E. JACOBS, The Philadelphia Seminary; JOHN C. MATTES, The Dying Church of Hamburg; M. S. WATERS, Protestantism and Its Present Day Task; FREDERICK A. REITER, Christian Baptism II; W. WALTHER, Obligatory Confessional Subscription of Ministers II.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, July: HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, Justification by Faith; M. COOVER, Attitude of the Christian Minister to the Life of To-day; J. A. SINGMASTER, The General Synod; WILLIAM H.

HETRICK, The Country Church; EPHRAIM E. ERTON, Martin Luther in the Light of Recent Criticism; ELIZABETH O. COATS, Reminiscences of Rev. Morris Officer; H. E. BERKEY, The Law and the Gospel in Preaching.

*Methodist Review*, New York, July-August: J. W. BASHFORD, China; ELMER E. BROWN, College Studies and the Social Order; JAMES MUDGE, Why Ministers Should Study Shakespeare; JESSE B. YOUNG, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" in Every Man; CARL G. DONEY, Friedrich William Nietzsche; ARTHUR D. BERRY, Christian Doctrine of the Trinity; CHARLES G. SHAW, Religion and Irreligion in Wagner's Opera; HENRY E. WING, Herein is a Marvelous Thing; CHARLES L. GOODELL, Gardens and a Garden Lover; G. M. HAMMELL, A Twentieth Century Prophet and Apostle.

*Methodist Review Quarterly*, Nashville, July: GROSS ALEXANDER, Two Chapters from the Early History of Methodism in the South; W. R. LAMBUTH, Missionary Situation on the Congo; JOHN A. KERN, Philosophy of Personalism; EDWIN MIMS, Life and Letters of Charles Eliot Norton; J. E. GODBEY, Eucken's Ethics of "The Spiritual Life"; C. W. MATHISON, Ethics of Jesus; J. P. BARTAK, The Protestant Struggle in Bohemia; F. M. THOMAS, Edmund Burke; ROY L. SMITH, Pastor Amos at First Church, Bethel; H. M. ELLIS, Primacy of Faith and the Sin of Doubt; V. M. ILAHI-BAKSH, A Ringing Challenge from the Awakened Orient; C. A. WATERFIELD, Modern Message of the Church to Modern Industry; WILLIAM HARRISON, The Passing of the Mechanical Conception of the Universe; H. G. ENELOW, What Do Jews Believe?

*Monist*, Chicago, July: CALVIN THOMAS, Tragedy and the Enjoyment of it; K. C. ANDERSON, Person of Jesus Christ in the Christian Faith; PAUL CARUS, Religion of Tragedy and the Christ-Ideal; A. KAMPMEIER, Are We Just to Jesus?; WILLIAM B. SMITH, The Critical Trilemma; BERTRAND RUSSELL, On the Nature of Acquaintance III Analysis of Experience.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, July: E. E. KRESGE, The World-View of Modern Theistic Philosophy; SAMUEL McC. CROTHERS, Charm of English Prose in the Seventeenth Century; R. C. SCHIEDT, Bergson's Creative Evolution—An Estimate; The Message of the Bible as Material for the Religious Education of the Japanese; A. E. DAHLMANN, The Church and the Immigration Problem; PAUL B. RUPP, The Old and New Protestantism.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, July: D. D. WHITTINGHILL, Baptist Work and Prospects in Italy; J. R. STILLWELL, Doctrine of Salvation in non-Christian Religions as illustrated in Hinduism; G. KITTEL, Influence of Christian Water-Baptism according to the New Testament; P. I. LIPSEY, The Seminary as a Denominational Asset; J. E. WALTER, Morality and Religion; A. J. ROWLAND, Paul the Interpreter; S. E. EWING, Some City Mission Problems and How to Meet them.

*Yale Review*, New Haven, July: BLISS PERRY, Literary Criticism

in American Periodicals; HIRAM BINGHAM, Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine; LINCOLN HUTCHINSON, New Opportunities in the Pacific; FREDERICK S. DICKSON, High Prices and High Living; A. F. POLLARD, Liberty: Medieval and Modern; WILLIAM L. PHELPS, Conversations with Paul Heyse; THEODORE S. WOOLSEY, The American Vasari; H. DE FOREST SMITH, The Recovery of Lost Greek Literature.

*Bilychnis*, Roma, Luglio: MARIO PUCCINI, Un paladino dell' idea Cristiana: Raffaele Mariano; UGO JANNI, Il metodo di ricerca dell' Essenza della Religiosità; CALOGERO VITANZA, I precedenti classici del dogma della grazia; CARLO WAGNER, Tre cose fondamentali; WILFRED MONOD, Il Cristo spirituale; WILLIAM E. BARTON, La capella dell' Assunzione.

*Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes*, Paris, Juillet: PIERRE DE LABRIOLLE, Comment on fait aujourd'hui un dictionnaire. Le Thesaurus linguae latinae; ANDRÉ WILMART, Benedictiones Bobienses; LECLERCQ, Les certificats de sacrifice païen sous Dèce; P. BATIFFOL, M. Babut sur l'authenticité des canons de Sardique; GOUGAUD, Trois anciennes fêtes de N.-S.; P. DE LABRIOLLE, Tertullien a-t-il connu une version latine de la Bible?

*La Ciencia Tomista*, Madrid, Julio-Agosto: NORBERTO DEL PRADO, Escoto y Santo Tomás; J. G. ARINTERO, Cuestiones místicas; EMILIO COLUNG, Intelectualistas y místicos en la teología española del siglo XVI; JOSÉ D. GAFO, De cuestiones sociales; MIGUEL MENÉNDEZ, De lógica y criteriología; E. COLUNGA, De Derecho eclesiástico.

*Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Heusden, September: S. GREIJNDANUS, Een en ander inzake den grond voor het Schriftgeloof; F. W. GROSHUDE, Het Tekstkritisch systeem van H. von Soden.

*Recherches de Science Religieuse*, Paris, Juillet-Octobre: LUCIEN DELPORTE, L'anathème de Iahvé—Recherches sur le Herem préexilien en Israël; PAUL GALTIER, Absolution ou conformation? La réconciliation des hérétiques II; DENIS BUZY, Emmaüs et l'ancienne tradition locale; JOSEPH DE GHELLINCK, Note sur l'expression Geminae Gigas substantiae; JOSEPH DE GUIBERT, Le texte de Guillaume de Paris sur l'essencedu sacrement de mariage; PAUL DUDON, Notes et documents sur le Quiétisme—VIII Le cardinal Pier Matteo Petrucci; MARC DUBRUEL ET ALPHONSE AUGUSTE, Les Filles de l'Enfance de la Congrégation à Toulouse—A Archives; PIERRE ROUSSELOT, La vraie pensée de Bautain.

*Revue Bénédictine*, Paris, Juillet: D. DE BRUYNE, Une nouvelle prieface de la traduction hexaplaire de saint Jérôme; D. G. MORIN, I Une compilation antiarienne inédite sous le nom de S. Augustin, issue du milieu de Cassodore II Un traité inédit de S. Guillaume Firmat sur l'amour du cloître et les saintes lectures; A. MERCATI, L'autore della *Expositio in VII Ps. Penitentiales* fra le opere di S. Gregorio Magno; D. A. WILMART, Le commentaire sur les Psaumes imprimés sous ce nom Rufin; D. U. BERLIÈRE, Les évêques auxiliaires de Liège (suite); D. G. MORIN, I Le dragon du forum romain. Sa légende et son histoire; II D'où provient le missel de Bobbio; D. A. WILMART, Un manuscrit oublié de l'office de S. Victrice.



*Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses*; Montauban, Mars; J. ALFRED PORRET, La genèse de l'Evangile de Luc; L. PERRIER, Psychologie et cure d'âme des paralytiques; EMILE DANTINNE, Victor Chauvin; CH. BRUSTON, La traduction du Cantique des cantiques; CH. BRUSTON, L'unité du Christianisme apostolique.

*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, Innsbruck, XXXVIII, 3: KONRAD G. PREYSING, Der Leserkreis der Philosophumena Hippolyts; AUGUSTIN ARNDT, Die Sekten der russischen Kirche I; KARL SIX, Descartes im Jesuitenkolleg von La Flèche; JOSEF STIGLMAYR, Synesius von Kyrene, Metropolit der Pentapolis.







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